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Transport safety has a direct impact on people’s lives despite considerable improvements 
in recent decades. By treating transport modes independently and not taking full account 
of modal options available, policymakers have overlooked potentially important and low 
cost contributions to overall passenger safety. 
This thesis investigates the extent to which Cross Modal Switching (CMS), encouraging 
users to transfer to safer modes of transport, can be deployed as an instrument of transport 
safety policy. 
Research was conducted to establish the safety differences between modes on specific 
journeys, taking account of composite risks including all transport modes used. Primary 
research used surveys and qualitative interviews to target three different groups to 
understand their views on transport safety, willingness to switch modes, reasons that 
would cause them to switch and modal perceptions on risk and travel behaviour. The 
feasibility of promoting CMS was assessed by measuring substitutability between modes 
and calculating cross-elasticities using data from the empirical surveys conducted and 
previously published work. 
Cost benefit calculations were made using monetised risk and the cost of fares subsidies 
to assess the net safety benefits for three selected journeys. 
This analysis shows that there is a marginal justification for CMS as a tool within an 
overall integrated transport policy that considers safety in all modes simultaneously. This 
must recognise that the absolute safety benefits are not very large relative to other 
benefits, although the relative size depends on the manner in which changes of consumer 
surplus are treated in the CBA. CMS can be demonstrated to be cost effective in low risk 
modes, relative to larger infrastructure investments only yielding marginal safety 
improvements. Further research, using a larger sample of journey net benefit calculations, 
is thus required to validate the case robustly for CMS, identifying beneficial opportunities 
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 1  INTRODUCTION 
 OVERVIEW 
Transport in developed or high income countries is safer today than it has ever been. 
Nevertheless transport risk still affects people every day and there are still demands from 
the public to improve transport safety further. Paradoxically, these public demands have 
a tendency to focus on safety improvements for safer modes and overlook the least safe. 
Savage (2013a) for example highlights this aspect of the debate on transport safety as 
follows:  
“A disproportionate part of the public debate concerns commercial transportation safety 
[this could be attributed to actual versus perceived risks]. The dramatic nature of crashes 
in commercial transportation, especially those that result in multiple fatalities or 
considerable environmental damage, engenders extensive press coverage and a public 
discussion as to the causes and what can be done to prevent a repetition. Yet highway 
crashes [road accidents1] represent the vast majority (95%) of the total transportation 
fatality risk. The motor vehicle must be the most dangerous machine that we interact with 
on a daily basis.”  
Transport safety and policy have been intensely debated by the public (i.e. users), 
governments, decision/policy makers, transport operators and other interested 
stakeholders. Transport policy has generally been developed on a unimodal basis rather 
than in an integrated manner. Preston (2012) analyses why integrated policies where 
applied have had limited success within the UK and Europe. The factors that restrict the 
growth of integrated2 policies are: problems in defining the integration concept, problems 
in ‘operationalising’ the concept, limited practical evidence to demonstrate integrated 
policy achievements and individual behavioural and institutional barriers to integration. 
                                                 
1 It should be acknowledged that there are differences in safety of the various modes that use the roads 
ranging from walking and cycling through private cars and taxis to bus, coach and tram travel. 
2 Preston adopts the NEA et al. (2003, p17) definition of transport integration: the organisational process 
through which the planning and delivery of elements of the transport system are brought together, across 
modes, sectors, operators and institutions, with the aim of increasing net social benefits. 
  
2 
In the UK, fragmentation in ownership of public transport and the non-strategic 
competition model used are particular barriers to the success of integrated policies. 
Preston notes that integrated policies have had some success recently with supporting 
evidence emerging at a European level of the advantages of integrated policy (e.g. 
reduction of car use) and benefits in terms of “value for money” and cost effectiveness. 
Integration policy packages introduced at the lower rung of the integration ladder such as 
the promotion of active transport modes and public transport have been successful and 
there is a suggestion that schemes with an emphasis on integration across modes may 
represent good returns.  
Although global transport casualties have reduced considerably, deaths and serious 
injuries on all transport modes are still a serious problem. The World Health Organisation 
(WHO, 2013) reports almost 1.24 million deaths every year as well as 20 to 50 million 
non-fatal injuries sustained as a consequence of road traffic accidents. “Road traffic 
injuries3 are estimated to be the eighth leading cause of death globally, with an impact 
similar to that caused by many communicable diseases, such as malaria” (p1). As 
expected, there are a significant number of accidents attributable to road transport since 
it encompasses a number of different modes and users: cars/vans, buses, coaches, 
motorcycles, cycles and walking (i.e. a number of different motorised and non-motorised 
modes utilise the road infrastructure simultaneously). The average passenger casualty 
rates per 1000M person km from 2004-2013 (DfT, 2014c) indicate air and rail modes at 
0.01, with sea demonstrating a higher risk rate at 0.4. Comparatively there are notable 
differences in safety (average casualty rate per 1000M person km) of modes that use 
roads: cars 1.9, buses and coaches 0.3, walking and cycling 29 and 27 respectively. Road 
accidents are estimated to cost low and middle-income countries between 1–2 % of their 
gross national product.  
Transport safety, particularly a reduction in road casualties, is therefore an important issue 
for the European Union (EU) and the governments of its member states. In 2010, the EU 
committed to improving road safety by setting a target of reducing road deaths by 50% 
of the 2010 level by 2020. This goal followed an earlier target set in 2001 to halve road 
                                                 
3 WHO defines “a road traffic injury [as] a fatal or non-fatal injury incurred as a result of a collision on a 
public road involving at least one moving vehicle. Children, pedestrians, cyclists and the elderly are 
among the most vulnerable of road users”. 
  
3 
deaths by 2010 (although considerable progress was made in terms of overall reduction 
in fatalities the full target was not achieved, suggesting further safety gains can be 
attained). 
2014 was relatively not a good year for road safety. 25,845 people were killed in the EU28 
as a consequence of road collisions compared to 26,009 in 2013, representing a below 
trend decrease of only 0.6%, compared with the annual decrease of 6.7% needed to reach 
the target for 2020 (Adminaite et al., 2015).  
Investment devoted to safety measures has had a positive effect in preventing deaths and 
serious injuries on EU roads but the saving potential is far from exhausted. In 2014 more 
than 203,500 people were recorded as seriously injured by the police in the 23 EU 
countries that distinguish between seriously and slightly injured in their data.  
The DfT 2014a) in their Reported Road Casualties Great Britain (RRCGB) indicated an 
increase in the number of reported road deaths at 1,775 (mainly pedestrians with a 12% 
increase from 2013). This represents a 4% (62 deaths) increase compared to 2013 (1,713). 
Relatively, this number of fatalities is the third lowest annual total on record after 2012 
and 2013. Those seriously injured reported to the police increased by 5% (22,807), the 
first increase since 1994. 
The reaction to the RRCGB report from David Davies, Executive Director of the 
Parliamentary Advisory Council for Transport Safety (PACTS, 2015) stated that: “This 
level of death and injury represents personal tragedies… [and] huge costs to the health 
service and the British economy. Most of these deaths are preventable. They should not 
be seen as an acceptable cost of doing business. This should be a wake-up call for the 
Government and administrations across the UK to take action so that casualties go down, 
not up.”4 The total value of prevention of all reported road accidents in 2012 was 
estimated to be £15.1 billion (including an estimate of the cost of damage-only accidents 
but not unreported injury accidents). An illustrative figure was also provided which 
allowed for accidents not reported to the police and thus increased the total value of 
prevention of road accidents to around £34.3 billion (DfT, 2012b). 
                                                 
4 Noted in PACTS Briefings, Featured, News & Publications. Disappointing increase in GB deaths and 
serious injuries in Reported Road Casualties GB: 2014. June 25, 2015. 
  
4 
The article by Savage (2013a) comparing fatality risks in United States transportation 
across modes and time (2000-2009) indicates that about 43,000 Americans die due to 
transport accidents annually. These deaths represent almost four out of every ten 
“unintentional injury deaths” in the United States. Unintentional injury deaths are those 
deaths that do not result from old age, disease, homicide or suicide. Transportation is the 
largest cause of unintentional injury deaths (38%) and is similar in size to the sum of the 
next two predominant causes of such deaths (which are falls and poisonings). Savage also 
notes that the recent reduction in transport related fatalities may be partially compensated 
by increased injuries5. 
One approach to reduce transport casualties is through Cross Modal Switching (CMS): 
that is, to reduce traveller risk by encouraging travellers to switch to safer transport 
modes. CMS could help reduce the need for some of the large infrastructure investments 
which seek to enhance transport safety.  
The practicality of CMS, or modal transfer, depends on the degree of substitution possible 
and thus on the willingness and ability of transport users to change modes. Various studies 
have been undertaken to investigate mobility use and patterns. The segmentation of 
mobility patterns by modes and amounts of mobility have been examined by Diana and 
Mokhtarian (2009) with emphasis on the extent of multimodality in a person’s modal mix 
and preferred changes to that mix using a “multimodality index”. They aimed to define a 
new market segmentation approach by considering collectively an individual’s actual and 
perceived mobility levels according to different transport modes and their desire to alter 
them. In effect this provides a generic framework to investigate these “intermodal 
effects”. 
Their analysis considers that modal transfer is influenced by physical constraints (e.g. the 
transport network) as well as individual preferences and perceptions, and therefore looks 
at actual trips grouped on the grounds of suitability for modal switching. Their findings 
highlight the significance of multimodal behaviour so that the direction and size of 
potential modal shift can be better understood and the segmentation can be useful in 
assisting policy. For example, groups of car users who wish to increase use of public 
                                                 
5 Vehicle safety has improved in the last decades and the focus has been on “crashworthiness” where design 




transport and reduce car dependency can be identified and compared with those who are 
satisfied with their current modal use. The willingness to change transport modes has 
been explored by them in the context of encouraging use of public transport to reduce 
environmental impacts and rationalise the use of resources. 
Recent work in this area has been provided by Heinen and Chatterjee (2015) who 
analysed the variation in weekly transport modes used by individuals in Great Britain 
using data from the National Travel Survey (NTS). They examined the variance in modal 
shares (i.e. primary and secondary and the total number of modes used). Their findings 
show that 69% of those who make at least one trip weekly use multiple modes, there is 
lower “modal variability” for people living in smaller communities and modal variation 
is strongly connected with mobility capabilities and resources. Thus it is suggested that 
more assistance should be given to encourage use of public transport and active transport 
modes (walking/cycling) in these communities. Overall, encouraging investment in non-
car transport modes would facilitate users towards “more balanced mobility” (p281).  
The difference between safety levels for road transport compared to other modes, the 
continuing economic burden of accidents and the literature supporting modal variability 
towards public transport and reduced car transport mode use collectively suggest that 
CMS is potentially a viable approach that could provide safety improvements.  
 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE AND QUESTIONS 
This thesis examines the extent to which the effective promotion of CMS can enhance 
overall transport safety on urban and long distance passenger transport, considering the 
whole door-to-door passenger journey. The central research question arising from this is 
therefore: 
 To what extent can CMS be used (explicitly or implicitly) as an instrument of 
transport safety policy to encourage users of less safe modes to move to safer 
modes of transport? 
To answer this question some sub-questions will be addressed: 
 What methods of appraisal and tools should be used for the assessment of the 
safety policy initiatives and CMS in particular? 
  Is the level of substitutability between modes and the cross-price elasticity (CPE) 
of demand sufficient to allow for CMS as a practical measure? 
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 What policies/instruments can be deployed to achieve CMS in practice (e.g. 
subsidisation)? 
 Do the monetised benefits of CMS outweigh the cost of implementing the 
approach?  
 If possible and beneficial, to which routes and modes should CMS be applied? 
The rationale for the thesis is underpinned by two standpoints. The first is that transport 
safety policy gains from a rational approach, taking a long term perspective rather than 
short term reactions to specific incidents. Secondly, transport safety policies have 
previously been developed largely with reference to single modes in a compartmentalised 
manner. Although some work has been undertaken at the multimodal level which 
recognises that safety should be considered as part of the overall evaluation of multimodal 
projects, much of this seems to be at a cursory level. The European Commission (EC, 
2013) passenger transport thematic looks at safety considerations but is focused mainly 
on road safety. Most studies on multimodal transport focus on time savings, reducing 
congestion and environmental benefits with limited emphasis on safety aspects. 
By treating modes independently and not taking full account of the options within a 
specific journey, policy has hitherto overlooked a potentially important contribution to 
overall passenger safety, a contribution which, for many journeys, could be achieved at 
relatively low cost. 
 APPROACH 
Based on the premises set out above, the thesis sets out to consider whether CMS is worth 
promoting as a means of yielding safety benefits. The overall approach showing links to 
subjects addressed in the thesis is set out in Figure 1-1. 
This highlights the two main strands of the work, namely: 
 to assess the case for CMS in terms of the safety differences between modes; 
and 
 assuming that modal safety differences are sufficiently large, to consider the 




Figure 1-1: Overview of approach 
If these two elements both give a positive result, the work can proceed to consider the 
benefits from CMS and the policy implications of how it might best be implemented. The 
overall approach is therefore as follows. 
Firstly, two initial premises are considered: 
Transport safety policy: The overall approaches to transport safety are examined as 
context. The logic is that a rational response to transport safety, of the type typified by 
CMS, is a more effective one than being driven by major events, even if these events are 
prominent to the general public and other stakeholders. 
Appraisal mechanisms for CMS: A second preparatory section is needed to examine 
and select the most appropriate appraisal tools with which to evaluate CMS approaches.  
The potential value of CMS depends on there being sufficient safety differences between 
modes. The thesis therefore investigates the safety gains on specific journey types which 
can be achieved by modal switching or by changing the modal mix. This process is 
undertaken for a wide range of possible journey types and different modal combinations 
within each of these types. By comparing the risk of death and serious injury per 
passenger km in composite journeys, the work addresses the potential value of CMS. If 
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significant differences in safety between exchangeable modes are established, then 
overall transport safety can be improved by encouraging consumers to switch to safer 
modes for at least part of their journey.  
To support the overall appraisal and allow the benefits of reducing risk to be assessed 
objectively, methods and tools for measuring and comparing risk need to be considered. 
The cost element of the comparison is addressed later in the context of CMS promotion. 
The next stage in the assessment is to consider whether CMS is viable and how this can 
best be achieved. Factors here include the levels of substitutability between modes and 
the CPE of demand when switching between modes. These are addressed through two 
questionnaire surveys targeted at mainly leisure and business travellers for a range of 
mode/journey type combinations, together with one expert survey linked to follow up 
qualitative interviews with experts and users. The results of this data gathering are 
combined with reviews of the literature to test the validity of the approach.  
Having established the potential value of CMS and the practicality of implementing it, 
CBA is applied to determine the net benefit of CMS in a variety of scenarios. In addition 
to testing the value of CMS this analysis also provides valuable insights into the priorities 
and promotional incentives needed to make the approach work in practice. 
If a valid basis for CMS, and an optimal way to apply it, can be established, the final stage 
is to consider the implications for overall transport safety policy. The work has significant 
implications for a wide range of transport types from road and rail travel through to the 
more recent efforts to promote urban cycling as a way to reduce emissions and congestion. 
 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The thesis is arranged to answer the research question stated above and provides 
theoretical background, theory to practice, empirical assessment and analysis. It is 
organised into ten chapters including an introduction and conclusion. 
Chapter 2 aims to put into context the main policies and principles that underpin this 
thesis: namely, examining the potential of CMS to improve overall transport safety. It 
considers the rational basis for transport safety policy in terms of setting objectives and 
guiding practical implementation and highlights the importance of a rational approach for 
the uptake of CMS. 
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The economic case for state intervention in transport safety is outlined and is developed 
here as a platform for the promotion of CMS. Chapter 2 therefore provides the definition 
of an optimal transport safety policy across various modes and how policy outcomes can 
be evaluated. 
Chapter 3 considers appraisal methods for transport safety. It describes and provides a 
critique of CBA in the context of alternative appraisal techniques and shows why it is the 
preferred approach for the appraisal of CMS in this thesis. Issues associated with the 
application of CBA, safety output/benefit measurement, actual and perceived risk and 
valuation of safety are important factors that are closely investigated. 
Chapter 4 introduces the essential innovative conceptual framework of the work: the use 
of CMS as an instrument of transport safety policy. An overview of CMS is provided in 
the context of policy and modal behaviour with examples. This is followed by a review 
of the literature on CMS as applied to various transport objectives and specifically with 
respect to safety improvements. 
Chapter 5 sets out the analysis methodology for the thesis, describes the approach and 
details the methods used to test its hypotheses. 
Chapter 6 considers composite journey risk as a means to determine the full end to end 
travel risk for a variety of journey types. It presents the approach and calculates the risks 
of death or serious injury for a range of journey types. The door to door journey risk is 
analysed taking full account of the risks of the different modes used for each journey and 
the modal transfer risks are also considered. The aim of this analysis overall is to 
determine the significance of the safety differences between different modal 
combinations for typical journeys of different lengths.  
Chapter 7 aims to understand the risk perceptions and other decision making criteria of 
travellers making modal choices. It presents the analysis of the primary research 
undertaken using questionnaires targeting different user groups. Specific objectives were 
to understand their views on transport safety, willingness to switch modes and the reasons 
that would cause them to do this, modal perceptions on risk and travel behaviour.  
Chapter 8 provides evidence on CPEs from the published literature and the inferences of 
CPEs and perceived importance of price in consumer decisions (findings from the 
empirical survey analysis in Chapter 7). This chapter therefore reviews the impacts of 
price as identified by the surveys and in particular aims to directly measure CPE of 
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demand which relates price to the mode selection process. It also provides a basis to 
understand the extent of subsidies that would be required to promote CMS. 
Chapter 9 applies the CBA appraisal approach to determine the net benefit of applying 
CMS promoted by public subsidy. Initially the chapter evaluates the significance of the 
comparisons of perceived (from Chapter 7) and actual (Chapter 6) risks and their 
implications for CMS. The main part of the chapter then concentrates on applying CBA 
to provide net benefit assessments. These compare the monetised safety benefits and 
related economic benefits of modal shifts on given journeys to the cost of realising these 
shifts through subsidies. These assessments determine the net value of CMS for a range 
of selected point to point and regional journeys of different distances.  
These CBA calculations test the concept of promoting modal switching and hence help 
to draw the analytical elements of the thesis towards a conclusion. This is provided in 




 2  POLICY AND PRINCIPLES 
This chapter aims to put into context the main policies and principles that underpin this 
thesis: namely, examining the potential of CMS to improve overall transport safety. 
The chapter initially examines the way in which decision-makers approach, determine 
and implement transport safety policy with an emphasis on rational methods. The main 
approaches and threats are outlined and analysed to identify the most appropriate entry 
points for the methodological developments proposed. 
The value of CMS can only be fully achieved if it is implemented as part of a rational 
approach to transport safety policy. If the policy context is skewed by a combination of 
vested interests, a lack of understanding of the statistics and disproportionate responses 
to specific accidents driven by media coverage, then the value of CMS may not be fully 
realised. Understanding how to achieve a rational approach to transport safety is therefore 
an important aspect of this thesis. 
In this work there is a strong emphasis on the need for rationality in policy-making. It is 
recognised that transport safety policy-making is part of the political process and is 
subject to trade-offs against other priorities as well as media scrutiny which may be 
irrational from a transport safety perspective. Within these constraints however, it must 
still be argued that policy-making should aim to be rationally based. In this context the 
task of the scientist or academic critic is to develop a rational understanding of issues and 
possible solutions and to bring this to bear on the policy development to help ensure the 
formation of well-informed, practical and balanced policies. 
Following the discussion on the approaches to transport safety the chapter explores 
optimal policies (safety), the applicable norms (efficiency and equity) and the rationality 
of goals and goal setting in transport safety. The remainder of the chapter focuses on the 
arguments for public sector intervention in transport safety and how transport safety can 
be optimised.  
The economic case for state intervention and transport safety policy is developed as a 
platform for the promotion of CMS. In some countries the transport infrastructure itself 
is nationally or regionally in public ownership and here the role of the state is clear. Even 
with privately operated systems however there is a strong case for intervention at some 
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levels. The chapter concludes by focusing on the definition of an optimal safety policy 
across various modes and how policy outcomes can be evaluated.  
 RATIONALITY APPROACHES 
 2.1.1  Overview 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines rationality as something based on or in accordance 
with logic. A rational approach to safety assessment is simply one based on reason, which 
is to say on a clear and logical thinking process. The ultimate goal of rational thinking is 
the discovery of truth and the consequent dissipation of unfounded opinion and illusion. 
A policy based on such thinking will therefore most likely achieve the greatest 
improvement for a given investment. 
There is an important distinction between knowledge-based rationality of thought or 
thought processes as might be expressed in mathematical formulae, versus practical 
rationality of actions or decisions as may be expressed in policy decisions. This 
distinction approximates to the distinction of epistemic versus practical rationality. 
Epistemic rationality according to Benn and Mortimore (1976) refers to whether or not a 
proposition can be proved conclusively true. It is an epistemological notion and 
epistemically rational propositions are epitomised by mathematical truths/equations. 
O’Sullivan (2011) further states: “If…we speak of an epistemically rational agent we can 
only mean one who has reached a state of perfect knowledge – an agent all of whose 
beliefs are held with absolute certainty…” (p114). According to Benn and Mortimore 
practical rationality refers to the relation between an individual’s/agent’s declared goals 
and the actions taken to attain those goals. For practical rationality the actions taken must 
be effective for achieving the goals.  
A science based approach is often regarded as an essential ingredient of a rational process. 
The European Transport Safety Council (ETSC) is an independent non-profit 
organisation, (ETSC, 2003a) intended to promote transport safety across Europe using a 
science based approach that does not represent a single party or industry. The ETSC was 
formed in 1993 in response to the persistent and unacceptably high European road 
casualty toll and public concern about individual transport tragedies. Cutting across 
national and sectoral interests, ETSC aimed to provide an impartial source of advice on 
transport safety matters to the European Commission, the European Parliament and, 
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where appropriate, to national governments and organisations concerned with safety 
throughout Europe (ETSC, 2015)6. The Council asserts that emphasis on transport safety 
is furthermore based on the three pillars of Engineering, Education and Enforcing. The 
ETSC also advocates the identification and promotion of best practice, for example EU 
guidelines on effective engineering, education, and enforcement. They consider this a 
basis for effective transport legislation that will help overcome limitations emanating 
from disparities in perception and philosophical approach across Europe. In this context, 
the ‘scientific’ label is being used partly to counter the perception that safety policy may 
be unduly influenced by vested interests. The application of scientific methods is 
considered to remove any inherent bias. 
 A science based decision-making model is often used in the transport planning process. 
This could be described as a rational planning model with the following features which 
relate to rationality of goal setting and practical rationality: 
 Rationality of goal setting: 
o Identify objectives; 
 Practical rationality: 
o Identify the possible courses of action to meet the objectives; 
o Predict consequences of these actions; 
o Evaluate the consequences; 
o Select the most appropriate alternative in accord with efficiency criteria. 
This approach is rational and scientific but it can be too limited if the mechanisms are 
applied only to aspects of the problem readily amenable to science and engineering 
solutions. There are a number of social and economic factors that must also be addressed 
effectively including the individual behaviour patterns of the travelling public and their 
response to any proposed measures. It is certainly true that the objectivity of a scientific 
approach is important, though there are cases where psychological, cultural or other social 
issues cannot be overlooked. 
                                                 
6 When interviewed on March 6th 2015, ETSC confirmed that in its present form it purely focuses on road 
safety as it considers that 98% of fatalities arise from road related accidents. It also acknowledges as a result 
over time that there is presently a gap for an overall organisation that considers the safety aspects of all 
transport modes collectively. (ETSC 2015, pers. comm., March 6th). 
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 2.1.2  Threats to rationality 
Goss (1989) points out that decisions relating to maritime safety, “…could be made a 
good deal more rational or scientific, so as to rely less upon judgement and emotional 
reactions to major tragedies.” This idea may be expanded to cover other modes of 
transport and when referring to safety assessment in general. 
Following any major transport accident there is often political and public demand to 
achieve an unrealistically low level of risk on the particular mode of transport affected. 
This is understandable, but there is a danger that if the initial reactions are not tempered 
by rational assessment of the issues, budgets will be redirected to the affected mode of 
transport at the expense of other areas where the same resources could yield far greater 
benefits. 
Two examples of such situations following UK accidents are: 
 The ground fire on a BA Boeing 737 at Manchester International Airport on 
August 22 1985, which resulted in 55 fatalities. This initially led to a proposal to 
require smoke hoods to be carried in all public transport aircraft. Two years later, 
rational evaluations found that this was not a cost effective proposal and 
concluded that mandatory use of smoke hoods on aircraft would not eliminate the 
risk of death or serious injury in the event of fire on board the aircraft (CAA, 
1987). This contrasts with the effectiveness of low level lighting in aircraft 
gangways to guide passengers to evacuate more rapidly and removal of seats near 
emergency exits to facilitate evacuation, both of which have been introduced as 
practical measures in response to this specific event. 
 The Ladbroke Grove rail crash in 1999, which led to calls for the immediate 
installation of Automatic Train Protection Systems, ATP (auto stop at red signals) 
on the UK rail network at a cost of £3.1 billion over 20 years (1999 estimates). 
This compared to the Train Protection and Warning System, TPWS (warning only 
at red signals) being installed at the time at a cost of £450 million. The joint 
inquiry into Train Protection Systems after the Southall and Ladbroke Grove 
accidents (Uff and Cullen, 2001) acknowledges that the TPWS was a “stop gap” 
solution and that over time ATP would be implemented as a permanent solution 
since this was already being trialled at the time of the Ladbroke Grove accident 
on specific routes. The report states that TPWS was approximately 55-60% 
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effective in saving ATP preventable fatalities valued at £13.9 million for fitment 
to all signals and £7 million for partial fitment. It also notes its reservations on the 
effectiveness of TPWS and noted that the Ladbroke Grove accident could have 
been prevented if the ATP system had been in use.  
In some cases, short term (rolling stock has a relatively short remaining life) measures 
have been implemented retrospectively, such as the introduction of central automatic 
locking of passenger-operated hinged doors on older stock (Mk 3 coaches) while the train 
is in motion to prevent falls from moving trains. Central locking on Mk 3 meant that trains 
did not move until all doors were shut and locked and passengers could not open them on 
moving trains. This was a measure for the limited period of some years for which this 
rolling stock remained in use (e.g. transfer of HSTs to Scotland) and was a mandatory 
requirement from January 1 2006 (Connor, 2011).  
In the aftermath of a major disaster, the public wish to see action and politicians ignore 
this desire at their peril. Nevertheless, the ‘optimal’ solution, considered across all 
transport modes, may be substantially different from the ‘obvious’ solution at the time of 
the disaster. In the UK, the Health and Safety Executive have advocated a system of what 
can be achieved that is “reasonably practicable” across all sectors, including transport. 
ALARP (“As Low As Reasonably Practicable”) is about ensuring that when considering 
reductions in risk these are weighed proportionately to the benefits of risk reduction 
achieved. For example, investing £2m to avoid minor injuries for three people is 
disproportionate, compared to investing £2m in the reduction of 150 fatalities (which can 
be considered to be reasonable). 
The solution to this problem is the availability of rational, scientific, objective and clearly 
expressed analyses that show the advantages of a balanced approach which 
(subsequently) directs resources most effectively. 
 OTHER PERSPECTIVES 
 2.2.1  Considerations from other perspectives 
Research in this area suggests that there are a number of other possible perspectives that 
are consistent with the rational approaches considered above. King (1995) discusses 
psychological, cultural, economic and political perspectives on the issue of transport 
safety. These are not alternatives to rational safety policy; rather they represent different 
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discipline-based perspectives on questions of transport safety which may be adopted 
either within the framework of a rational or a non-rational approach. Thus, in evolving a 
rational approach to transport safety, it is important to take account of such perspectives. 
 2.2.2  Psychological 
Psychological perspectives are useful in the delineation of practical measures to promote 
safety. Many transport accidents are attributable to human errors and, in seeking to avoid 
such incidents, it is vital to understand how human beings interact with each other and 
their environment. These issues/findings must then be taken into account in decisions 
relating to operational procedures and rules as well as in vehicle and infrastructure design. 
The public perception of risk and how people act on these perceptions is also an important 
determinant of the effectiveness of safety policies. This is because such policies, including 
the promotion of modal switching, rely on the public response to measures designed to 
change behaviour. This psychological aspect will therefore be important when 
considering the implementation of measures to promote safety including CMS. 
 2.2.3  Cultural 
How different cultures think about safety differs widely and should be considered when 
delineating safety policy. This may affect the level of acceptable risk, and also the 
approaches to achieve the accepted risk level. For example, whereas in some countries 
such as the Netherlands an entirely open plan design of infrastructures with few areas 
fenced off near rail infrastructures is considered fully consistent with safety, in others 
such as the UK a much more paternalistic approach is thought to be needed to achieve the 
same or desired level of safety. This highlights that the two cultures have different 
attitudes towards safety: one placing responsibility on the individual while the other 
places it on the rail infrastructure provider to prevent access to their assets. As with the 
psychological aspect, this will also be very important in considering measures to promote 
improved safety to the public. If the public consider that safety is already sufficient, it 
will be more difficult to encourage behavioural changes through promotion with safety 
as the main driver. 
 2.2.4  Economic 
Economics studies the allocation of scarce resources among competing ends and reminds 
us when discussing safety to take account of the true opportunity cost of policy measures 
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and to relate these to the expected benefits. This leads to the use of transport appraisal 
methods which trade monetised benefits against costs in evaluating safety measures.  
Economic theory can thus be applied to help the analysis of proposed safety measures. 
For example, neo-classical economics rests on three basic assumptions which also help 
to provide a framework for this assessment: 
 People have rational preferences among outcomes that can be identified and 
associated with a value; 
 Individuals maximise utility and firms maximise profits; 
 People act independently on the basis of full and relevant information. 
All of these assumptions are important factors for the analysis and are taken up in more 
detail later in this chapter in Sections 2.3 and 2.5. 
 2.2.5  Political or power / “Machiavellian” 
This perspective helps to identify what is politically feasible, affordable and practicable 
at a given time and this is certainly relevant to a rational discussion of safety policies. 
The power/“Machiavellian” approach to understanding policy making is based on 
positive economics: that is, a description and explanation of actual economic phenomena 
working out in practice. This can be contrasted with the normative approaches outlined 
in previous sections. This approach emphasises the acquisition, perpetuation and use of 
political power, hence “Machiavellian”. Flyvbjerg (1998) discusses this, drawing on the 
work of Machiavelli, Nietzsche and Foucault and using the case study of the Aalborg 
Project in Denmark to improve traffic safety and improve the environment in the centre 
of Aalborg. Flyvbjerg discards normativism (what should be done) and instead advocates 
“what is actually done” as an approach. His work focuses on the interaction between 
power and rationality (i.e. rationality is always mediated through power structures), fully 
admitting that an increase in power diminishes rationality. It focuses on four value-
rational questions: where are we going with planning; who gains and who loses and by 
which mechanisms of power; is this development desirable; and what should be done? 
However, in the context of this work, his analysis of the Aalborg case concludes that the 
project did not succeed: i.e. there was no improvement in traffic safety and no reduction 
in noise and air pollution. The project was considerably fragmented with only a few of 
the sub-projects actually being implemented. Flyvbjerg then concludes that the mistakes 
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made in the project ought to be avoided elsewhere. Hence Flyvbjerg returns to a 
normative stance in his argument.  
In summary, the power/”Machiavellian” perspective is interesting as a contrast to the 
normative approach, although it is not relevant in this thesis as observing what is done 
still does not provide policy guidance. 
 OPTIMAL POLICIES AND NORMS 
The starting point of any discussion of policy must be an elucidation of the norms, which 
in moral or political philosophy are prescriptive statements against which an evaluation 
of good or bad policies can be made. Economists can in principle adopt many norms as a 
basis for normative policy judgments. It has traditionally been held that the state or 
regulatory bodies may wish to intervene under two main normative principles: the equity 
norm and the Pareto norm. It would be useful to examine how the equity and Pareto norms 
function in an economy and, subsequently, the reasons why the state would wish to 
regulate using these norms as outlined by Little (1970).  
The equity norm (Arenson, 2007) is principally concerned with the fair distribution of 
wealth and resources in an economy. The Pareto norm, which will be central to this thesis 
(Kanbur, 2005), as with its derivative the Kaldor-Hicks compensation principle, also 
known as Potential Pareto Improvement (PPI) (Kaldor, 1939), evaluates the efficiency of 
allocation of resources within an economy.  
Thus it is appropriate to examine Pareto optima and PPI conditions, instances where these 
conditions are not present in an economy and where intervention by the state or regulatory 
body could help ensure the attainment of these optima. 
According to the strict Pareto criterion (Pareto norm), where a change results in an 
improvement making some people better off without making others worse off, the change 
is good and ought to be implemented. This is observed up to the point where another 
change implemented would make one person better off but another person worse off 
(Begg et al., 2003).7 It suspends judgement on all other instances. It can be demonstrated 
that if the price of every good or service in an economy is set equal to the true marginal 
                                                 
7 An allocation is Pareto-optimal for a given set of consumer tastes, resources, and technology if it is 
impossible to move to another allocation that would make some people better off and nobody worse off. 
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cost of producing it8, a Pareto optimal allocation of resources will be the result. Under 
conditions of perfect competition a firm’s profit maximising price will equal long run 
marginal cost in the long run equilibrium position; hence goods or services are produced 
at Pareto optimal levels under perfect competition in all markets provided that there are 
no public non-excludable externalities and provided that all agents in the economy are 
adequately informed in matters relating to their choices (Gould and Ferguson, 1980).9 
The Pareto norm, introduced by Pareto (1909), has been evolved further by economists 
including Pigou (1932), Kaldor (1939) and Mishan (1965) in the context of welfare 
economics. Considering the context of social policy, it is useful to examine the Pareto 
criterion under four different types of social policy: good policy, good/bad policy 
(agnostic stance) and bad policy. There are four possible outcomes or results from any 
policy shown in Table 2-1. 
  
                                                 
8 True marginal cost equals the full marginal resource cost, otherwise known as marginal social cost. 




Cases Policy outcomes under Pareto Criterion 
Case 1 If there is a situation where some people gain and no one loses as a result of a policy then 
according to the Pareto norm it is a good policy and therefore ought to be implemented. 
Case 2 If there is a situation where some people gain and some people lose whereby marginal benefit 
MB minus marginal cost MC (these are both all measured in money terms) is greater than or 
equal to zero (MB-MC ≥ 0) then in accordance with the Pareto norm it is unclear whether a 
policy should be undertaken or not. However with MB-MC ≥ 0 then in principle the gainers 
could fully compensate the losers in which case it would revert to a situation where there is 
a definite Pareto improvement. This is referred to as the PPI in which the Kaldor-Hicks 
compensation test is used to determine the appropriate compensation; that is to say if the 
policy is accompanied by a further policy designed to compensate any losers the two together 
will achieve a Pareto improvement. 
Case 3 If there is a situation where some people gain and some people lose then where MB-MC <0 
the Pareto norm suspends any judgement. In these circumstances there is no potential for 
Pareto improvement by gainers compensating losers but it is still difficult to establish 
whether a policy should be undertaken or not. The utility significance of the gains to the 
gainers may outweigh that of the losses to the losers when the marginal utility of money is 
different for different people.10 
Case 4 If there is a social policy where some are worse off and nobody is better off in accordance 
with the Pareto norm this is a bad policy and in effect results in a Pareto decline. 
For cases 2 and 3 where there is not a clear-cut a priori Pareto improvement an appraisal (e.g. Cost 
Benefit Analysis)11 can be carried out to see if there is a PPI or not. In the outcomes 1 and 4 CBA may 
be used to substantiate the effectiveness of the policies, although in most instances 1 and 4 are 
hypothetical since most policies have some good and some bad implications. 
Source: Author’s Own 
Table 2-1: Policy outcomes under Pareto Criterion  
Under conditions that are not perfectly competitive or where certain externalities or 
imperfections are present, there is a strong case for the state to intervene and regulate 
within an economy because maximum welfare is not attained. The state intervenes when 
there are distortions in the market causing market “failure” or inefficiency, i.e. failing to 
achieve efficiency (Pareto optimality) in the allocation of society’s resources. In practice 
markets rarely live up to these conditions, hence a variety of market failures are common. 
Market failures can be addressed by state intervention using a variety of policy 
instruments (e.g. fiscal instruments such as tax/subsidy, or legal regulatory instruments 
such as emission controls). Weimer and Vining (2005) note that the theory of market 
failures has been a key topic in the study of public policy for many years. The theory 
                                                 
10 This is in principle relevant to case 2 but if the gainers actually compensate the losers then with no one 
being worse off, consideration of the different marginal utilities of money become irrelevant. 
11  Discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. 
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suggests that the pursuit of private interests will lead to ineffective outcomes when 
considering the provision of public goods, natural monopoly, externalities and 
information asymmetry, and that the case for state intervention can be used to correct 
these problems. Kleiman and Teles (2008) also note that the theory of market failures is 
extensively used as a diagnostic tool for evaluating policy problems and as an analytical 
tool for making policy choices. Wu and Ramesh (2014) highlight the differences between 
market failure (imperfections) and government failures while also recognising the duality 
of both in avoiding such failures.  
Examples of market failures (Pareto optimal conditions are not present) and policy 
responses are: EU Competition policy to deal with abuse of dominant position; taxes or 
subsidies used in order to promote various aspects of environmental policy such as 
renewable energy; and direct emission controls for cars. 
The equity norm is not widely used in public transport policy except in relation to services 
for remote areas on the basis of accessibility and fairness rather than efficiency. 
Concessionary fares for older and disabled persons are another example. Provision of 
public transport in remote areas and concessionary fares may be considered to be 
inefficient allocation of resources, however can be considered to be equitable in terms of 
delivering services to rural communities and subsidising the older and disabled 
population who may not be able to afford such services. 
Also implicit in much economic evaluation is the use of “equity” values for non-working 
travel time savings. For example, in the HM Treasury Green Book (2013a) it has been 
established practice to use a national average standard value of non-working travel time 
savings (averaged across all income groups and hence implicitly equity weighted) for all 
modes of transport for appraisal purposes. Standard values are used as they are considered 
to be independent of income. 
The Pareto norm does not assist in achieving the equity norm since it assumes for a given 
income distribution no one is better or worse off. It does not make an assumption 
regarding how the income should be distributed. In order to achieve equitable distribution 
another mechanism would need to be implemented. 
There are a number of distortions that may cause a market system to fail to achieve 
efficient allocation of resources in respect of safety in transport. These include monopoly, 
public externalities in the absence of certain types of property right, differing standards 
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and information asymmetries or imperfections (these are discussed in detail in Section 
2.5). 
 GOALS IN TRANSPORT SAFETY 
 2.4.1  Rational goals  
Rosencrantz (2006) provides a succinct discussion on rationality in which he aims to 
provide new and alternative approaches based largely on ideas and suggestions 
originating from moral philosophy and philosophical decision theory and what this means 
in the context of transport policy decisions. He emphasises that: “...rationality is the first 
virtue of decisions – whether made by individual agents making decisions for themselves 
or by officials making decisions for the public. A decision however thoroughly calculated 
and thought over must be rejected or revised if it is irrational” (Rosencrantz, 2006, p2). 
Rosencrantz (2006) is adopting a normative position here: that is, a position on how 
decisions ought to be made as opposed to how they are actually made in any particular 
context. Herein lies a link of rational policy choice to ethics and moral/political 
philosophy as the disciplines which discuss normative issues in depth; for Rosencrantz 
(2006) a person who makes a practically irrational decision is in some way irresponsible 
and morally blameworthy - hence, unethical. This is an area which has been extensively 
discussed by writers such as Rawls (1971), Harsanyi (1976) and O’Neill, (2004). 
 2.4.2  Aspirations, objectives and goals 
Goals are the objectives that a decision-maker would like to realise and there may be a 
hierarchy of subsidiary goals leading to an ultimate objective. While it has been stated 
above that there is rationality of means and instruments we can also look to the rationality 
of the goals themselves, both the ultimate and the subsidiary goals. This becomes 
important in the context where transport safety is traded off against other government 
goals such as health or education. 
Some solutions have been proposed for the analysis of conflicting or incoherent ultimate 
goals. When goals are inconsistent or incoherent a rational individual should revise their 
own goal system. In such an instance some goals may be partly achieved without 
abandoning or lowering the achievement level of other goals. The following authors’ 
views provide some insight on how to address conflicting or incoherent goals.  
  
23 
Allais (1979) argues that multiple ultimate goals can remain rational providing that the 
ends are consistent and the differences can be accounted for by differences in individual 
preferences or tastes. He further suggests that rationality of ends should be consistent 
even though they may be arbitrary due to differences in individual tastes: “It cannot be 
too strongly emphasised that there are no criteria for the rationality of ends as such other 
than the condition of consistency. Ends are completely arbitrary. To prefer highly 
dispersed random outcomes may seem irrational to the prudent, but for somebody with 
this penchant, there is nothing irrational about it. This area is like that of tastes: they are 
what they are, and differ from one person to the next”. (Allais, 1953[197912], p70). 
According to Allais (1979) goals are only rational if they are consistent, and irrational 
when they are contradictory.  
Rosencrantz however suggests that there can be goals which are based on different policy 
priorities and therefore not irrational even though contradictory. He proposes to outline a 
general rationality criterion for a goal taken as an end in itself rather than in relation to 
other goals. He states that a goal should say or imply something about how the 
individual/agent who has the goal should act. Otherwise, he states, it would be appropriate 
to conclude that the goal would not be rational. Goals that fail to guide an individual's 
actions, that is to say are imprecise, vague and trivial, are not rational. Action guiding 
goals have been discussed by Edvardsson & Hansson (2005). More specifically they 
should satisfy the four rationality criteria of precision, evaluability, approachability and 
being motivating (motivity). These are similar to the SMART (Specific, Measurable, 
Achievable, Realistic, and Time-bound) criteria used in public service project 
management. 
Individual preferences exist which may have subjective elements and policy makers’ 
preferences may be based on objective elements; however, these collectively aim to 
maximise overall utility. 
                                                 
12 This is the direct English translation, which appears for the first time, of ‘Fondements d’une Théorie 
Positive des Choix Comportant un Risque et Critique des Postulats et Axiomes de L’Ecole Americaine’ 
which was published in French as Memoir III annexed to Econometrie, Colloques Internationaux du Centre 
National de la Recherche Scientifique, Vol. XL, Paris, 1953, pp.257–332. 
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 2.4.3  Assessing the rationality of goals - Vision Zero 
When considering the approachability of goals it should be noted that goals can be 
rejected if deemed unrealistic or impossible to reach. For instance utopian goals are 
irrational (dysfunctional) since they cannot be achieved (Laudan, 1984). Rosencrantz et 
al. (2007) argue that this is often based on a black and white concept of goals as either 
achievable or non-achievable. This view they say is misconceived as they state that it 
ignores the fact that goals can be achieved at varying degrees (Cintora, 1999). Indeed, 
many important goals in social practice are difficult, or perhaps impossible, to achieve 
fully, though they can still encourage progress in the right direction. In this context 
Sweden’s road safety policy “Vision Zero” can be considered to satisfy the criterion of 
approachability, despite being not fully realisable. 
The rationality of a goal can be tested by taking the example of “Vision Zero”. The 
1996/1997 Bill states that: ‘‘the long-term goal of traffic safety is that nobody shall be 
killed or seriously injured as a consequence of traffic accidents’’ and that ‘‘the design and 
function of the transport system shall be adapted accordingly’’ (Government Bill, 
1996/97:137). There are similar goals that have been introduced in countries such as 
Norway and Denmark and also at a European level. In September 2000, the Norwegian 
Parliament adopted a vision of zero killed and seriously injured (Steinset et al., 2002). 
The Danish government has formulated its vision in the slogan ‘‘every accident is one too 
many’’ (Færdselssikkerhedskommissionen, 2002). On an international level, the 
European Commission adopted a target to be realised by 2010, aiming at reducing the 
annual traffic fatalities in the European Union by at least 50 percent from the 2000 base 
year level (Peden et al., 2004). The long-term vision of a transport system in which no 
people at all are killed on the roads is however still restricted to a national level. 
“Vision Zero” has been widely debated and criticised on a number of grounds (Nelson, 
1996; Ekelund, 1999; Elvik, 1999a and 1999b; Lind and Schmidt, 1999). Criticisms 
include its being utopian or populist (zero risk of death or serious injury in a road 
accident), an improbable approach to trade-off (is road safety the only priority) and 
authoritarian (extreme precaution imposed rather than individual choice on risk provided 
no one else is harmed). Rosencrantz et al. (2007) argue that despite the above, Vision Zero 




In order for Vision Zero to satisfy the first rationality criterion, it must be precise, clearly 
stated and free from vague and/or ambiguous terms, in order for the agent to know what 
to do. The three areas in Vision Zero that need precise definition are “road fatality”, 
“serious injury” and “road traffic accident”. In Sweden ‘‘road fatality’’ is defined “as 
person killed in a traffic crash or within 30 days after the crash (OECD/ITF, 2015, p434). 
For “serious injury”, two definitions are used. “…road traffic accidents with fatal and 
severe personal injury reported by the police are still used as official statistics. Another 
definition is used in the preventive road safety work. This definition is based on health 
loss following a traffic injury in which the previous health condition is not recovered 
within a reasonable amount of time. A person with any percentage of medical impairment, 
who has not recovered their previous physical health condition, is defined as seriously 
injured”. (OECD/ITF, 2015, p434). Hence, regarding clarity of definitions, Vision Zero 
is considered a specific goal targeting zero fatalities or serious injuries, although the 
definition of serious injuries is not precise as the time taken for the person to be well is 
not specified but referred to as a “reasonable amount of time”. ‘‘Road traffic accident’’ is 
defined as an event that has occurred on a road, in which at least one moving vehicle has 
been involved and which has resulted in personal injury or material damage (SIKA and 
SCB, 2004)13. 
In terms of evaluability for Vision Zero, successful goal evaluation presumes that it is 
viable to assess actual goal achievement. As this goal can be measured as regards road 
traffic fatalities and serious injuries it is considered evaluable. Moreover the goal set 
interim targets for 2007 as it is long term.  
Rosencrantz et al. (2007, p564) state that “goals can be achievement-inducing not only 
by guiding action towards the desired end-state, but also by motivating the agent to act 
in ways that further the goal”. In terms of motivity, Vision Zero is action-inducing and it 
may be seen in the future through empirical evidence whether it fully satisfies this 
criterion. 
                                                 
13 The definition of “road traffic accidents” in Sweden does include bus boarding & alighting casualties at 




Overall the analysis provided by Rosencrantz et al. suggests that Vision Zero14 is an 
action-guiding and, hence, a rational goal as it satisfies the criteria of precision, 
evaluability, largely satisfies approachability, and perhaps also motivity. In practical terms 
Vision Zero has led to a number of implementation measures, such as the construction of 
roundabouts and safer roadsides. Despite the steps that have been taken to reach Vision 
Zero, the goal is, presently, far from being realised. When Vision Zero was introduced, a 
target of a 50% of 541) reduction of fatalities between 1997 and 2007 was set. This goal 
was not achieved: the absolute number of fatalities in 2007 was 471. The initiative was 
extended to 2020 with a new target of no more than 220 fatalities or 47% reduction in 
fatalities from 2007. A recent progress report (Trafikverket, 2015) evaluates whether 
recent developments suggest that the 2020 targets are achievable and discusses progress 
on all road safety performance indicators. The main conclusion is that if current safety 
efforts continue then it would be reasonable to achieve the 2020 interim targets for 
fatalities and serious injuries, with the caveat that road safety for cyclists must increase. 
The conclusion is derived from comparing the annual fatality reduction in the years 2008–
2013 (8%) with a required further reduction (5% annually).  
Sweden has reduced road fatalities from 1997 (541) to 2013 (260) by 52% compared with 
the overall EU reduction of 57% (EU absolute numbers of fatalities were 60,267 and 
25,938 respectively) during the same period (European Union, 2015). However as the 
Swedish case was from an already very low base in terms of fatalities per million 
population, it could be seen as a better performance. 
 2.4.4  Practical rationality 
A distinction can be made between the rationality of goals and objectives as considered 
in the previous section and the rationality of the means and instruments to achieve these 
goals. Rationality of means or instrument, that is the practical rationality of an action, 
refers simply to the effectiveness of means in attaining the desired goal. 
                                                 
14 There has been some debate around Vision Zero by various stakeholders suggesting it is based on the 
rejection of economics and the substitution of ethics and values to a higher order of decision-making 
significance. The decision to use ethics as a decision-making guideline was arrived at after debate and 
discussion. Nevertheless, in this thesis Vision Zero has been presented as policy that is based on rational 
goals and this is further supported by Elvik (2008) who considers visionary targets as an element of the 
normative foundations of transport policy and in more recent work (2013) suggests that, “rationality is an 
ideal for transport safety policy …within normative welfare economics…” p. 62). 
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This work on CMS will primarily be concerned with the rationality of actions or decisions 
and hence practical rationality, including the means to achieve this through rational 
analysis methods. It will be presumed throughout the work that policy decisions should 
be practically rational or, at least, that practically rational decisions are better decisions. 
In effect, the position of this thesis regarding rationality closely follows a variety of 
previous work in this field: notably, work carried out by Spohn (2002), Mele & Rawling 
(2004), Rosencrantz (2006), Hansson (2006), Edvardsson (2006) and, more recently, 
Elvik (2013). 
Elvik considers rationality an optimal basis for transport safety, albeit noting specific 
instances where there may be certain paradoxes15 with respect to road safety policy and 
proposing reasonable solutions to overcome the contradictions. For example, strict 
adherence to the application of individual’s Willingness-To-Pay (WTP) for improved road 
safety may be an inconsistent assessment methodology, as it is strongly influenced by 
variable factors such as personal income differences (earning ability may vary by an order 
of magnitude or more). This leads to differences between high income earners and low 
income earners in the marginal utility of money. Hokstad and Vatn (2008), citied in Elvik 
(2013) show that this problem with conventional WTP can be overcome by introducing 
the notion of “relative willingness to pay”. When there are groups whose benefits from a 
measure vary extensively due to income differences, this variance can be overcome by 
adjusting for differences in the marginal utility of money by assigning “utility weights”. 
The two groups are then more comparable regarding true costs and benefits and associated 
options that are presented. Elvik proposes a fixed value per life saved. This is normally 
recommended in official guidelines for CBA as is the case of Great Britain in the 
WebTAG appraisal guidance (DfT, 2014b).  
 THE CASE FOR INTERVENTION 
The main arguments for state intervention to ensure transport safety can be considered in 
terms of externalities, monopolies, information asymmetries and harmonisation of 
standards. These are now discussed in a general sense followed by consideration of how 
this can be applied to transport safety and the impact of different organisational structures. 
                                                 
15 Referring to situations in which conflicting choices can both be defended as rational. 
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 2.5.1  General case for intervention 
Externality arguments 
Where there is market failure for goods that cannot be traded (typically due to the 
impossibility of “consumer exclusion” from enjoyment of public benefits) there is an 
incentive for regulatory bodies to intervene to bring about optimal allocation of resources 
through certain measures or policy regulations. Internalisation by the market of the effects 
is problematic. Figure 2-1 gives some idea of the range of such instruments. 
  
Figure 2-1: Typology of policy instruments for internalising external effects 
From transport safety policy and CMS an important case of public non-excludable 
externality where regulatory intervention is required is in respect of third party safety. In 
certain cases, the externality represented by safety impacts on third parties can/may be 
internalised through third party insurance cover (which may be either voluntary or 
compulsory) but this is by no means always the case.16 
Monopolies: avoidance of abuse of dominant position 
There are two good examples of natural and non-natural monopolies within the transport 
sector. Railway infrastructures are classic examples of a natural monopoly in every 
country. Two examples of non-natural monopolies are: the local bus industry in bigger 
                                                 
16 In the case of aviation, while air operators are, in principle, insured for damages to third parties there is 
invariably a “combined single limit” which sets a ceiling on the total possible insurance payout to third 
parties. Once that limit is exceeded there is no insurance cover for any further damages. 
  
29 
cities, such in the UK prior to deregulation in 1986; and to a lesser extent, British Airways 
prior to 1986 when it faced duopolistic competition on a number of routes. Presently there 
is evidence of near-monopoly situations in many areas since deregulation. For example, 
certain rail routes in the UK are served by two operators but the majority are only served 
by one (e.g. First Great Western or Merseyrail) and this is similar for bus operators (e.g. 
First Cymru and Arriva Buses Wales). 
The more general abuses of dominant position by monopolies are of limited relevance to 
transport safety.  
Information asymmetries/imperfections 
In transport safety this is potentially very relevant to the consumers who travel on the 
various modes of transport as there may be considerable imperfections in the information 
utilised by consumers regarding the relative safety of various modes. The need to address 
issues of information asymmetry/imperfections is therefore another valid reason for state 
involvement in the transport safety domain. 
The need for harmonisation of standards 
Rights of way are determined by the state in road transport. Similarly in aviation and 
shipping there are collision avoidance rules to provide safe passage for aircraft and 
vessels. It would be difficult to leave this to the private sector as different standards would 
inevitably emanate from different companies/firms or individuals. Common standards are 
essential in the transport sector to reduce the risk of death or serious injury. Although 
uncontrolled airspace suggests greater risk acceptable to private aircraft than controlled 
airspace, it does have a well-defined set of rules for rights of way, flight levels, etc. The 
development of the European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS) for example 
aims to make rail transport safer through the introduction of the European Train Control 
System (ETCS), which guarantees a common set of standards that enables trains to cross 
national borders (European Commission, 2015).  
 2.5.2  Application to transport safety 
This section takes the general concepts introduced in the previous section and considers 
how these can be applied to the transport specific case. A general introduction is given 
and then this section follows the same basic structure as 2.5.1 i.e. externalities, 
monopolies, differing standards and information asymmetries. 
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Safety represents a good or benefit that can be consumed and traded off, as with other 
traditional goods and services; therefore, it can be considered as a characteristic of the 
transport good in Lancaster’s classical sense of the term (Lancaster, 1991). 
The treatment of transport safety as a commodity, or (following Lancaster) as a 
characteristic of the transport good, has been an underlying assumption in the literature 
of Moses & Savage (1990) and later King (1995). Both texts assert that together with 
price, speed, frequency and quality of service, safety can be considered to be an economic 
attribute. King (1995) asserts that the economic attribute ‘safety’ is dependent on 
consumers’ willingness to pay for it and also that it can be traded off against other 
attributes. King also expresses that “The equilibrium level of safety [is dependent on] 
willingness to pay …, the type of market structure and the cost of provision. The precise 
relationship between these two demands is influenced by several factors … under two 
broad headings: market and informational factors” (p9-10).  
In practice however, the treatment described above is open to some criticism, as 
consumers are not always rational and consistent in their choices, mainly because of 
asymmetries/imperfections of information and convenience factors17. More recently, 
transport studies from developing countries also recognise safety alongside other 
attributes such as quality, convenience and cost (Githui, 2010 and Vilakazi and Govender, 
2014). Savage (2013b) outlines that safety, to a certain degree, is considered as a “product 
quality attribute” of transport and emphasises that while there are similarities with other 
transport quality attributes (time, congestion etc.), there are differences in terms of market 
failures. For example, congestion on a train may lead to inconveniences such as 
commuters having to stand, bus delays and traffic congestion, but this can be contrasted 
sharply with the much more important implications of safety failures (i.e. casualties and 
injuries). 
Public non-excludable externalities  
The main thrust of the argument for regulatory intervention to promote safety must be on 
the grounds of public non-excludable externality and imperfections of information. As far 
as passengers are concerned, safety is one aspect of the good they buy from operators. 
There is an obligation in most cases on transport operators to provide their service with 
                                                 
17 For a full discussion of these issues see further Sjöberg (1987), Dixit & Stiglitz (1977), Dixit (1979), 
Viscusi (1992), Leland (1979), Shapiro (1982) and King (1995).  
  
31 
due regard to safety; but under conditions of competition there is also a market incentive 
to do so for passengers, since safety is a clear characteristic of the transport good. Safety 
should be provided to an “optimal” level18 by competitive firms without any state 
intervention as previously noted.  
In many cases this useful result does not arise in respect of risk of death or serious injury 
imposed on third parties by operators and infrastructure providers. Third parties are those 
without any direct market relationship with the operators or infrastructure providers either 
as passengers or as crew; and in many instances a public non-excludable externality is 
present regarding safety to third parties. In such cases the case for state intervention to 
provide optimal provision of safety to the third parties may be made. If the only 
externality-based case for intervention arises in respect of risks to third parties, it would 
follow that the case for state intervention is the strongest by far in relation to road 
transport. The reason for this is simply that in the case of aviation, maritime and rail19 
transport, risk of death or serious injury to third parties is generally low, whereas in road 
transport there is a much greater risk to third parties (DfT, 2014c and European Union, 
2014). In aviation, most accidents occur in areas where there are no third parties present 
to be affected (such as at sea and in remote areas). In shipping, most accidents involve 
collisions with other ships, groundings or fire/explosions which rarely affect third parties. 
The exception is large oil spills, which have extensive impact on third parties. In rail 
transport, most accidents again are derailments or collisions with other trains which occur 
within railway land, are considered to be part of the same system and thus do not usually 
affect third parties. In recent years there have been far more casualties to road users in 
collision with trains in Britain. Road transport accidents, however, do affect third parties 
due to the multiple use character of road networks where motorised transport frequently 
comes into direct contact in accidents not only with other independent motorists but also 
with pedestrians and cyclists. To the extent that these impacts on the safety of third parties 
constitute public non-excludable externalities there is a case for state intervention to 
promote an optimal level of provision. The classic example of this (in recognition of the 
                                                 
18 Savage (2013, p2) argues that: “…economists would have no problem in concluding that the “optimal” 
level of safety is most likely not perfect safety (presuming that it was even technically possible). This type 
of thinking clearly creates tension between economists and those who feel that it is somewhat “immoral” 
to decide not to spend money to avert some low probability risk…”  
19 For rail the impact on third parties arises mainly at level crossings and with respect to trespassers. There 
are also some incidents arising from freight train derailments resulting in major fires, e.g. in Canada. 
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fact that this type of externality is most common by far in road transport) is the state-
imposed legal requirement that all road users should hold third party insurance, which 
may be used to compensate third parties in the event of an accident which affects them.  
Monopoly arguments for intervention 
As consumers can and do trade safety against other economic attributes in a consistent 
and rational manner, one possible abuse of a dominant position by any transport 
monopoly (especially those with inelastic demand) would be ignoring or paying little 
attention to consumers’ wishes regarding safety; transport monopolies may take short cuts 
on safety because the consumer has no alternative for the service in question. 
Notwithstanding the non-rational behaviour of some limited consumers who often make 
unsafe choices20, there is a case for some type of regulatory intervention to control 
monopolies in order to mitigate the consequences of the abuse of a dominant position by 
such firms on the grounds of safety. Monopolists (sole providers of a service in the 
market) may not have the same incentive to provide for safety as competitive firms. 
Different standards emanating from different authorities 
Common standards for transport safety are essential since varying standards have in some 
cases led to serious compromises on safety. It must be stressed that while national 
common standards are appropriate for some industries, they are not sufficient in transport 
since road, rail, air and sea transport (especially the latter two) are not confined within 
national boundaries. Transport routes cross national borders and therefore national 
standards per se are insufficient. This problem is particularly well illustrated by the much 
higher accident rate for Left Hand Drive (LHD) heavy goods vehicles (HGVs) on UK 
roads, caused by unfamiliarity with British road conditions of those who normally drive 
on the right, and/or visibility from that side of the vehicle. For example, in a study 
undertaken by the University of Loughborough on behalf of the Department of Transport, 
Danton et al. (2009) noted that 92% of all LHD HGVs accidents occur on motorways and 
A roads21 with ‘‘vehicle blind spot’ being the main contributory factor in 76% of the 
incidents. This is due to the drivers operating left hand drive vehicles while in the UK the 
standard is right hand drive vehicles. In comparison to Right Hand Drive (RHD) HGVs, 
                                                 
20 For example modes of transport such as rail and air are statistically safer than road, however consumers 
still choose to use travel by motorcycle (risk takers, i.e. young adult males) or car (for other reasons such 
as cost, convenience and/or personal space) even though this suggests inconsistent characteristics 
21This is to be expected since most journeys for LHD HGVs are on motorways and A roads. 
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LHD HGV accidents were approximately 20% higher. Hence there can be a case for 
regulatory intervention at a supranational level to co-ordinate safety standards for any 
mode of transport which is international.  
In practice, most countries, barring a few anomalies, comply with the international 
conventions and regulations on collision avoidance and rights of passage in the aviation 
and sea transport modes. 
Information asymmetries/imperfections 
Section 2.5.1 noted that consumers (passengers) may often be ill informed regarding 
modal safety and that this may give rise to sub-optimal modal choices. Better consumer 
information is needed which the market itself often fails to provide. This imbalance can 
be redressed by the improved provision of information by state organisations. A form of 
information asymmetry is adverse selection. Classically, this occurs when some players, 
often managers and other insiders, know more about the financial situation of firms than 
outside investors. In transport safety, adverse selection is broader. Rather than transport 
staff making better informed transport safety choices, the emphasis is on possible adverse 
selection by the travelling public as a whole because they are poorly informed of the real 
safety implications of their modal choices. The effective promotion of CMS may be a 
means to address this. 
Examples of imperfect information in transport safety are sometimes clear cut. Taking the 
case of a used car, if the prospective purchaser is unaware of defects that may compromise 
safety the potential effects are obvious. The situation is less clear cut with other aspects 
of transport. In some cases, information may be available to the public if they are inclined 
to seek it out and assimilate it, but in most cases members of the public are not willing to 
do this. Therefore, as a result of withheld information, an unwillingness to seek 
information and the complexity of the information they do have, the public do not make 
modal choices with the full range of safety information available to them. This leads to a 
case of information asymmetry/imperfection. 
One factor which has potentially helped this situation over the past decade, at least in 
terms of access, has been the rapid growth in the Internet. This has allowed the public to 
be better informed and may help to a certain degree to address the information asymmetry 
problem. The limitation of this advance is that while the information exists online and can 
be accessed by the public, it is not always in an approachable form. Furthermore, if the 
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public do not consider there to be a specific safety risk at the outset, they are unlikely to 
use the means now at their disposal to access the statistics.  
Arguably, while private operators have every incentive to provide such information at 
least for those modes which are safer, unfortunately for those modes which are less safe 
they have every incentive to hide the relevant information. It is thus important to note that 
published information usually serves the ends of those who publish it and this does not 
always coincide with the public’s needs. For example, transport websites could publish 
information on risk factors for the various modes in the same way that they currently do 
for journey carbon emissions.  
It must be emphasised in any case that for a market system to produce Pareto-optimal 
results it is indispensable that all consumers should be well-informed in matters relating 
to their choices; and in any case almost every type of intervention is, to some extent, 
“paternalistic.” 
 2.5.3  Institutional structures 
The ownership (public or private) of institutional structures is important as this impacts 
the nature and effectiveness of state intervention. If institutional structures are state owned 
then any regulatory intervention is facilitated by the state, whereas intervention in private 
ownership infrastructures is more difficult due to differing objectives and interests. 
Transport sector ownership structures vary between and sometimes even within countries. 
Moreover, a key distinction needs to be made between infrastructures (roads, railway 
tracks, airports) and operations (airlines, train operators etc.). The former are almost 
entirely state owned throughout the EU, except airports22. In the case of railways for 
example, the network is almost always public sector controlled. Even in the UK, where 
the infrastructure was run by Railtrack, its successor Network Rail is classified as a 
government body under Treasury control since September 2014. In the case of operations 
there is considerable variability in the ownership pattern: for example, rail operations are 
privately owned in the UK (although with a degree of public subsidy in the case of many 
operators). While in other European states, freight operations are often partly or wholly 
                                                 
22 According to the ACI Europe Report on the Ownership of Europe’s Airports (2010) the majority of 
European airports (78%) are publicly owned, with 13% owned by mixed public private shareholders and 
9% fully privatised. In terms of passenger handling the publicly owned airports only handle 52% of 




under private sector control, passenger operations are typically under varying degrees of 
public sector control (Hayashi and Morisugi, 2000). 
 OPTIMISING TRANSPORT SAFETY POLICY 
 2.6.1  Context 
To provide context for the definition of optimal transport policies and within those, 
optimal transport safety policies, the literature on this topic is reviewed. 
The elements of the normative foundations of transport safety policy (elements that define 
what the objective ought to be) are examined by Elvik (2008). He provides a comparative 
analysis of policy measures in Norway in terms of: visionary targets (e.g. Vision Zero – 
see Section  2.4.3 ); numerical targets and systems of management by objectives; notions 
of optimal safety and acceptable risk; and regulations, standards, incentives and 
mechanisms for resource allocation in the public sector for transport safety measures. 
Elvik concedes that defining an optimal level of safety has advantages in that it is rational, 
provided that the normative grounds of welfare economics are accepted. Although such a 
level has been estimated for road safety in Norway, he notes that wider support remains 
for Vision Zero by policy makers in Norway. The reason for this is that Vision Zero has 
democratic acceptance and is simple and transparent, while optimal transport safety 
policy notions are considered complex and have low democratic acceptance. 
For transport policies in general, Timms et al. (2002) sought to define optimal levels of 
pre-defined transport measures using a method for devising transport strategies that made 
iterative use of transport models in nine European cities. A key element was the definition 
of objective functions which encapsulated policy-makers’ objectives and allowed trade-
offs between internal and external benefits/costs with respect to economic efficiency and 
sustainability. Their work noted that optimal strategies are comparatively insensitive to 
the costs of externalities. When costs of externalities are based upon accepted values, 
optimal strategies are similar to those with no value assigned to the externalities. This 
suggests that those strategies are most effective in achieving a balanced economic 
efficiency / sustainability objective and also perform best when this objective is extended 
to take into consideration the local environment and safety, using standard values for the 
costs of these. On the other hand, if greater emphasis was placed on local environment 
and safety through higher cost evaluation, optimal strategies would be likely to involve 
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imposing higher charges for car use. This means that the most effective strategies to attain 
balanced economic efficiency/sustainability objectives perform equally well when these 
objectives are extended to safety and the local environment. If however greater 
prominence is attached to safety and the local environment, reflected through evaluating 
their costs at a much higher level, optimal strategies would then potentially lead to 
increased charging for less safe modes such as car travel. 
Savage (2003, 2013b) discusses appropriate levels of safety and outlines optimal safety 
attained when an individual’s willingness to pay (demand) is equal to the marginal cost 
of providing the safety (supply). The value individuals place on safety is referred to as 
Value of a Statistical Life (VSL), a metric much used in transport safety planning. Evans 
and Morrison (1997) calculated the optimal level of safety for a railway in the UK, from 
the information gained on the value that individuals place on safety; the marginal costs of 
accident prevention; and the connection between investment in the prevention of 
accidents and the actual number of accidents.  
The debate on optimal safety here distinguishes between the cost of safety provision and 
the value of safety to individuals and society as a whole. This leads to friction between 
policy makers and safety advocates who believe in averting even the small probabilities 
of risk (Savage, 2013b). Evans (2013) highlights this issue concerning “closely managed 
transport modes [rail and aviation]...” and suggests that implementation of certain safety 
measures (train protection systems) can be very costly in relation to the value that is 
realised in terms of safety benefits. The next section examines overall optimal safety 
across all transport modes with respect to marginal costs and benefits. 
 2.6.2  Definition of an optimal safety policy 
The case for state intervention under various headings and for various modes was 
reviewed in Section 2.5. Since this has been shown to be a multifaceted issue, a further 
question that can arise is the definition of an overall optimal policy mix in respect of 
transport safety across all modes. 
Goss (1977) advocates: ‘The subject [optimal level of safety] is important because, if it 
is not achieved, or it is achieved in one sphere of the safety regulations and arrangements 
made, and not in another, then it may well be that we would be devoting the wrong amount 
of resources to saving life and limb as well as mal-distribution of the total resources 
involved. This involves comparing the costs and the benefits and, since the benefits consist 
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of deaths and injuries avoided, it is necessary to have some means of valuing life and 
limb.’ (p22).  
If the costs and benefits of a continuous series of safety initiatives can be measured and 
monetised, Figure 2-2 illustrates how an optimal level of safety can be defined. This 
represents a different approach optimising the benefit cost ratio and hence a contrast to 
the more ‘absolute’ Vision Zero approach.  
 
Source: Goss (1977) 
Figure 2-2: Optimal safety levels 1  
The vertical axis represents sums of money while the horizontal is the continuum of safety 
measures. The curve TC indicates the total costs. It rises gradually from the origin and 
accelerates with more safety measures since it is reasonable to assume that as one moves 
from simple safety measures to more complex ones they will become increasingly 
expensive. The curve TB represents total benefits and is concave from below. Basic safety 
measures will tend to result in large benefits while more complex or later measures will 
yield diminishing returns since previous measures will already have significantly 
contributed to the reduction of casualty rates. 
The difference between the two curves TB and TC provides the net benefit derived from 
any given level of safety measure. The optimum net benefit is therefore where TB is 
furthest above TC, shown in Figure 2-2 by Q, whose location on the X axis will vary 
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according to the assumptions by which the benefits are calculated. This may also be 
illustrated by obtaining relevant marginal curves as shown in Figure 2-3. 
 
Source: Goss (1977) 
Figure 2-3: Optimal safety levels 2 
Here there is no change on the horizontal axis but the vertical axis measures the 
increments of the costs and benefits in moving from one option to another. Given the 
shapes of the two total curves areas in Figure 2-2, the marginal cost curve (from TC) must 
be rising and the marginal benefit curve (from TB) must be falling. The optimum level is 
where MC and MB cross and at 0Q (Goss, 1977). 
The optimal level of safety investment is therefore where the difference between the 
marginal benefits - the value of marginal reduction in risk of death or serious injury - and 
the marginal costs - the increase in cost incurred as a result of a policy - is equal to zero. 
This can satisfy the Pareto norm. Where a change in policy has resulted in an 
improvement that leaves some gainers but no losers, the change is considered to be a 
Pareto improvement and ought to be undertaken. However, the MB-MC>0 might still 
have some losers. If this is the case then compensation is necessary to convert a Potential 




This chapter has developed the theoretical foundation within which CMS could be applied 
as an integral part of an overall optimal transport safety policy. 
First of all the case for rationality in policy choice and in policy implementation is set out 
drawing on the work of Rosencrantz. Thereafter the notion of Pareto optimality is 
introduced as an appraisal approach and the exact meaning of optimality in relation to 
safety policy choices is discussed in depth. One key implication of adopting the Paretian 
approach for this thesis is that it allows one to adopt a vision of the efficiency of allocation 
of scarce resources across many transport modes and to compare the efficiency of 
allocating resources to safety policies as opposed to other areas of public policy. Within 
the Paretian framework the major sources of market failure which warrant the case for 
state intervention to promote a socially (Pareto-) optimal allocation are then considered 
in principle and as they apply to the case for transport safety promotion policies to be 
undertaken by the state. More detail on the practical tools for implementation of Pareto-
optimal policies of state intervention, such as Cost-Benefit Analysis, is given in the next 
chapter.  
The chapter has shown that rationality needs to be applied to both the setting of transport 
safety goals and the means used to achieve them. It has also highlighted that a rational 
approach requires a number of perspectives to be taken into account. Chief among these 
are psychological, cultural, economic and political power perspectives. It has also been 
noted that a rational approach needs to balance safety goals across modes so that 
investment is targeted where the benefits will be greatest. 
Methods for selecting the most appropriate policies are also considered in terms of norm 
and goals. This discussion considers both the ‘absolute’ options such as Vision Zero which 
sets almost unachievable targets as a means to push progress forward, and other 
approaches which trade monetised safety benefits against the costs of achieving them.  
Arguments for state intervention are important because this is likely to be the basis for 
any interventions to implement CMS. Such interventions are normally justified on the 
basis of market failures and when Pareto optimality is not present. The next chapter will 
consider the appropriate methods of appraisal that are based on the efficiency norm and 
the associated tools to be used in the context of transport safety to assess CMS. 
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 3  TRANSPORT APPRAISAL & TOOLS OF TRANSPORT 
SAFETY POLICY 
To translate into practice the idea of a systematic cross modal dimension for a rationally 
founded safety policy requires effective analytical tools. These are now considered in this 
chapter to establish the best approach to be used for the appraisal of CMS in policy 
decision making. 
Transport appraisal is the comparison of various costs and benefits that arise from policy 
or investment decisions which are presented in a comparable form. For Cost Benefit 
Analysis this involves monetary valuation of all costs and benefits while other techniques 
such as Multi Criteria Analysis allow for costs and benefits to be recorded in different 
units. Appraisal is extensively used in the transport sector as there are many effects of 
policies (time, safety, environment, etc.) and it is recognised that some type of common 
framework assists in the evaluation and understanding of the effects when there are 
budget limitations and several policy options being compared (Eliasson, 2014). Transport 
appraisal is dynamic with several feedback loops. Figure 3-1 provides an overview of 
how decisions and judgements can be distorted or misrepresented by vision, pressures 
and analysis (Mackie et al., 2014) in transport projects. It also shows the stakeholders 
involved. 
 
Source: Mackie et al., 2014 
Figure 3-1: Decisions and judgements are affected by visions, pressures and analyses 
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As decision makers’ judgements are subject to a number of factors, including whose idea 
the project is, who wants it, who benefits, who pays, etc. it has been recommended that a 
common framework or formal guidance is required in transport appraisal. This is an 
alternative to decision makers deciding themselves, as they face large numbers of projects 
and it is unfeasible to fully process all the options within given time constraints. Mackie 
et al. (2014) summarises this well by noting that: “Appraisal . . . makes it easier to 
structure information and remember and consider all or most aspects of a suggested 
project. It enables orders of magnitude to be created that are comparable both across 
projects and types of effects. A framework within which impacts are quantified on a 
consistent basis forces decision makers to face up to numbers, so decreasing optimism 
bias and our inherent reluctance to give up beliefs and ideas” (p4). 
 TRANSPORT SAFETY APPRAISAL 
This section reviews the appraisal techniques used in transport safety and outlines the 
most appropriate technique that will be used in this study. Jones-Lee (1994) discusses the 
need to design measures so that estimated safety effects can be appraised in an explicit 
and systematic manner in the public sector decision making process. He identifies six 
approaches, of which the first three ignore safety effects, rely on informal judgement and 
only use safety standards or targets. The remaining three, of greater relevance to this 
work, are: 
 Cost-effectiveness analysis – an evaluation tool which compares mutually 
exclusive alternatives on the basis of the ratio of their costs to a given single 
effectiveness measure. This measure may be quantified, but importantly need not 
be monetised; 
 Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) – quantification in monetary terms of all relevant 
opportunity costs and expected benefits of policy measures. In the context of 
transport safety it encompasses explicit costing of risk and valuation of safety 
outputs; and 
 Decision analysis – a sequential analysis method used when benefits accrue from 
contingencies which depend on the outcome of preceding contingencies, i.e. in 
sequence. The logical structure of the sequence is established using a decision tree 
and expected values are allocated to branches working back from outcomes to the 
  
42 
initial decision, in a process that eliminates branches yielding lower benefit 
values. 
Of these, both the CBA and the decision analysis approach as developed by Keeney 
(1982) allow safety benefits to be traded off against other benefits and they explicitly take 
into account opportunity costs and potentially damaging consequences. 
Evans (1994) also advocates the need for systematic tools to appraise transport safety 
using frameworks that can be applied to road and public transport. He classifies risk 
evaluation into three groups, namely CBA, industrial risk assessment (individual risk and 
societal risk) and the elimination of all avoidable accidents. Individual risk is defined 
“…to be the probability of death to any specified individual in a year as result of some 
activity.” (p417). The probability range is split into three areas (high, middle and low). 
The middle range should be “As Low As Reasonably Practicable” (ALARP). The main 
focus is the area between high and middle range and assumed to be the risk of death of 1 
in 1000 for those at work and 1 in 10,000 for third parties. The latter are assumed to have 
less risk as bystanders. Societal risk is concerned “…with the distribution of the number 
of injuries or fatalities in any single accident … a particular concern with the risk of high-
fatality accidents” (p419).  
Elimination of all avoidable accidents is another approach which avoids any monetisation 
or weighing up of benefits against opportunity costs (e.g. the Swedish approach of a 
centre barrier on single-carriageway roads to prevent overtaking). It is essentially a form 
of target setting.  
In this work the elimination of all avoidable accidents is rejected as an approach on the 
grounds that such an attempt to achieve an absolute could and almost certainly would lead 
to misallocation of resources that could be better utilised elsewhere. As with Jones-Lee, 
Evans advocates a combination of CBA and risk assessment as a framework to appraise 
safety. Evans (1997) further expands his classification to include a fourth category, 
labelled “criteria based on accident frequencies” (previously referred to as societal risk) 
and the reduction of these (again a targets-based approach), although he concludes in 
favour of CBA combined with risk assessment. More recently Evans (2013) confirms that 
while target based approaches (all preventable accidents should be prevented) are used in 
closely managed transport modes such as rail and aviation, they make no allowance for 
the size and costs of the safety measure. Even if the risk is very small, the cost of 
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mitigating the risk may be high. This leaves decision makers in a quandary, in that they 
do not want to accept preventable accidents but also want to have value for their 
investment of either public or private expenditure.  
Generally, most of the available analytical techniques follow a similar process, at least in 
principle. Some of the key steps in the UK are outlined by the Department for 
Communities and Local Government (2009) as follows: 
 Identify objectives; 
 Identify options for achieving the objectives; 
 Identify criteria to be used to compare the options; 
 Analysis of options; 
 Selection;  
 Feedback. 
This section summarised the appraisal tools used to assess CMS as a potential contributor 
to transport safety. Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) is the primary method in this field, but 
before selecting this for this thesis, a range of alternatives are considered. These 
assessments are summarised below followed by a final section which selects the best 
technique to apply. 
 3.1.1  Cost Benefit Analysis 
Broadly speaking CBA is used to facilitate efficient allocation of society's scarce 
resources to achieve the maximum benefits possible and thus to inform policymaker 
actions. It is based on welfare economics and requires all policy impacts to be expressed 
in monetary units (DaCoTA, 2012). Mackie et al. (2014) refers to it as “…a framework 
within which all impacts of a scheme can be brought together and compared using the 
money metric” (p.5). 
There is an extensive body of literature on CBA as it has been developed over the last 50 
years. There are several works explaining in detail the problems encountered in a cost-
benefit analysis and how to solve these (Boardman et al., 2011; Pearce et al., 2006; Layard 
& Glaister, 1994; Mishan, 1988; Sen, 2000). 
Although conceptually straightforward, the issues and the subjectivity in a CBA arise 
from the process of selecting and quantifying the benefits, selecting the discount rate and 
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to a more limited extent assessing the costs. It is here that the views and objectives of the 
organisation preparing the CBA can significantly affect the outcome. 
Over time CBA in various forms (sometimes as part of Multi-Criteria Analysis) has been 
incorporated in official guidance manuals that govern transport appraisal (e.g. WebTAG 
in the UK). The work carried out by Mackie and Worsley (2013) for the UK Department 
of Transport provides a summary of practices and compares CBA across seven countries. 
The outcome shows that there are strong similarities in practice among a number of the 
countries. 
 3.1.2  Cost Effectiveness Analysis 
Cost Effectiveness Analysis (CEA) compares the costs of alternative ways of providing 
the same output (Communities and Local Government, 2009). CEA is therefore used 
under the following circumstances: 
 When measurement of benefits in monetary terms is impossible; 
 When the information required is difficult to determine or when any attempt to 
make a precise monetary measurement of benefits would be open to dispute; 
 When dealing with intermediate outcomes whose specific benefits are not clear in 
isolation. 
CEA is not used for consideration of subjective judgements or in the analysis of projects 
with multiple objectives. It generally omits impacts at the level of detail that would be 
included in a CBA analysis and a single measure of effectiveness is normally applied. For 
costs, non-budgetary costs are generally excluded.  
As a result, a CEA is generally a simpler procedure, but less comprehensive than CBA. 
One description summarising this well by Boardman et al. (2011) is that with respect to 
technical efficiency CEA is able to rank alternative policies but it is not able to specify 
whether the project is worth undertaking or not (for example, a subsidy per trip for rural 
bus services). For this reason it is less well suited to the appraisal of CMS in this thesis. 
 3.1.3  Multi Criteria Analysis 
Multi-criteria Analysis (MCA) provides a framework to compare unvalued costs and 
benefits using weighting and scoring. In some respects it is an alternative to CBA which 
avoids defining monetary values for the major costs and benefits, similar to CEA. 
  
45 
Nevertheless, MCA relies considerably on the judgement and experience of the people 
using it. An important function is to deal with the difficulties that human decision-makers 
have been shown to have in handling large amounts of complex information in a 
consistent way. 
MCA helps decision-makers when their judgement is reliant on more than one criterion. 
Jensen (2012) describes MCA “… [as] a set of alternatives, [defining] a set of criteria 
for decision making and ways of measuring them (measures are often not in the same 
units), and [deriving] weights for the criteria” (p.51).  
Bristow and Nellthorp (2000) refer to MCA frameworks that are objective led, with an 
equivalent set of indicators mirroring the success of the objectives and permitting weights 
to be allocated to the indicators. This results in a rankable value for each project. 
MCA could be applied to the CMS case, but it is more subjective than CBA and hence 
less likely to convince planners and decision makers of the value of CMS. 
 3.1.4  Target based approaches 
A target based approach sets a specific, usually quantifiable, target which policy is 
expected to attain in order to be judged effective and/or successful. The Swedish Vision 
Zero policy discussed in Chapter 2 is an example in the safety domain, with the target of 
eliminating all avoidable road fatalities (Tingvall, 1995).  
Elvik (2003) discusses the role of target setting in seeking to reduce EU road casualties. 
The targets act as a tool for motivating and monitoring action by all relevant stakeholders 
to reduce death and injury in road traffic collisions. Sub targets such as specific types of 
collision or the involvement of specific road user groups can be also used but need to be 
set in accordance with the main target. Additionally, targets for behavioural performance 
indicators, like alcohol levels or seat belt use, are also valuable providing they can be 
monitored. Time scales are variable (5-20 years). A robust statistical methodology is 
necessary to set the reduction targets. Target setting in other transport modes is discussed 
in ETSC (2003b). 
The problem with using the target approach is that it takes no account of the possible costs 
associated with meeting the desired standard. In some cases perhaps this cost may be 
deemed so negligible that the policy would self-evidently pass any more formal cost-
benefit type of assessment; and in such cases the targets may be consistent with a CBA 
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approach. Generally speaking, however, the targets approach is regarded as one-sided and 
partial: it looks only to potential benefits without any due consideration of costs of safety 
provision. However an interesting a priori reflection could be that if it were shown that 
the costs of CMS were in certain types of cases small or negligible a target type of 
approach could be adopted for CMS as a safety tool. Overall, the use of CBA is more 
convincing and will still demonstrate the value of an approach which has good outcomes 
and limited costs. 
 3.1.5  Goal achievement matrices/Decision analysis 
Goal achievement matrices 
Attempts to overcome some of the weaknesses of CBA have led to numerous extensions 
and modifications, such as the Planning Balance Sheet (PBS) or the Goal Achievement 
Matrix (GAM) (Hill, 1968). The latter defines and organises impacts according to a set 
of explicit goals that the proposed action is attempting to meet, and identifies 
consequences for different interest groups. It is also designed to accommodate non-
monetary impacts, and uses a set of non-monetary value weights for computing a 
summary evaluation; it is thus similar to MCA. 
Impacts such as social objectives that are not easily quantified in monetary terms can use 
GAM. Accident reduction measured by number of fatalities and reduction of air pollution 
measured by the amount of pollution are two examples of the application of GAM. GAM 
is a simple tool used where differing impacts can be considered through community 
consultation, and it considers equity effects that are difficult to monetise in CBA. 
The disadvantage of GAM is that there is no common framework which can be used to 
estimate the level of achievement of all goals. The weights applied to goals are subjective 
and interdependencies of objectives are not reflected (NSW Government, 2013). 
The GAM process is a useful tool for the consideration of issues whose benefits and costs 
are non-quantifiable in money values and are therefore unable to be included in a 
conventional cost benefit analysis. Booz Allen Hamilton (2003) for the Department of 
Transport, Ireland used the GAM technique to evaluate the qualitative goals of the 
identified railway projects for investment. The Planning Balance Sheet (Lichfield et al., 
1975) stresses the importance of recording all impacts, whether monetary or not, and 
analysing the distribution of impacts among different community groups. Thus it adds the 




This approach involves the following steps to a policy decision: 
 Specify the logical structure of the decision problem in terms of sequences of 
decisions and realisation of contingencies. This tree links the initial decision (the 
trunk) to the possible outcomes (the branches). 
 With the framework established the approach is to work backwards from the 
outcomes to the initial decision calculating expected values of net benefits across 
contingencies. 
 Branches are then eliminated starting with the lowest expected values and 
working upwards. 
 This leads eventually to the outcome of the best combination of net benefit and 
high probability.  
 3.1.6  Formal Safety Analysis (FSA) 
In 2002, the IMO (International Maritime Organisation) approved guidelines for 
evaluating risk in the maritime field using Formal Safety Analysis (FSA). Montewka et 
al. (2014), citing the IMO guidelines (2002 and revised 2013), suggests FSA as “a 
rational and systematic process for assessing the risks associated with shipping activity 
and for evaluating the costs and benefits of IMO's options for reducing these risks” (p. 
77). The underlying rationale of FSA is that it is a proactive tool (identifying hazards prior 
to a serious accident taking place) that assists in clear decision making. It enables a 
systematic and proactive view to be taken of transport safety allowing informed decisions 
to be made on the basis of objective analysis of risk.  
FSA is essentially CBA applied to safety issues when the benefits are quantified in terms 
of reductions in risk. Safety in transport primarily addresses ways of reducing risk to 
humans, vehicles, freight and the environment. It therefore seems appropriate to apply 
FSA to transport safety appraisal since it encompasses both CBA and risk assessment. 
The FSA approach also permits continual assessment and improvement (review and 
revision). This is necessary to ensure optimal resource allocation when the associated 
risks are not static and changing technology and other factors lead to fluctuating risk 
levels. It consists of five steps:  
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1. Identification of hazards/accident scenarios with potential causes and 
outcomes;  
2. Assessment of risks - evaluation of risk factors;  
3. Risk control options - regulatory measures to control and reduce risks;  
4. Cost benefit assessment - cost effectiveness of each risk control option; 
and  
5. Recommendations for decision-making - information about hazards, 
associated risks and cost effectiveness of alternative risk control options. 
The FSA approach is not new; it has been applied in the nuclear industry since the 1950s 
and is also applied in the maritime sector.  
There are limitations to the FSA. Although it is proactive it is a complex and technical 
method that can be misused and therefore not necessarily provide the appropriate results 
for the system being analysed. Montewka (2014) notes that it could be more advantageous 
to have a more systematic risk perspective, integrating various features of the risk 
description and allowing the necessary recommendations to be addressed at the different 
stages of the risk analysis. For a critical review of FSA see Kontovas and Psaraftis (2009) 
and for a review of FSA see Psaraftis (2012). 
The United Kingdom currently applies FSA in the shipping industry (e.g. cruise industry, 
Lois et al., 2004) and other transport modes are also increasingly using FSA. The rail 
sector for example has adopted measures similar to FSA in the safety case regime applied 
to certification of new train types.  
 3.1.7  Selection of technique 
Sections 3.1.1 to 3.1.6 have described the CBA approach in the context of alternative 
techniques and shown why it is the preferred approach for this thesis. It meets the 
requirements for practical rationality, and although it has weaknesses these can be 
controlled. It has been shown that there are many opportunities for subjectivity within the 
CBA framework and that considerable care is needed to ensure that the result is fair and 
objective. To perform a CBA effectively requires not only an objective approach but also 
a good appreciation of the proposed development and its likely impact. CBA is applied 
in the UK through guidance provided by HM Treasury in the Green Book (2013a) and in 
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the Netherlands by the Dutch General Guideline for Social Cost-Benefit Analysis 
(Romijn & Renes, 2014). 
For a fuller discussion on transport project appraisal and techniques see Jensen (2012) 
and EIB (2013). 
 COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS (CBA) 
 3.2.1  Overview of approach 
Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) as outlined in Mishan’s classic work on the subject (Mishan, 
1988) has become an extensively used tool for the appraisal of optimal public policy 
choices based on the Pareto norm. Benefits as well as costs are monetised and the analysis 
goes beyond an individual consumer’s or firm’s private costs and benefits to embrace 
those of overall society. In effect, it is an attempt to resolve the measurement problem of 
Bentham’s utilitarianism by attributing monetary values to all (marginal) benefits and 
(marginal) costs associated with a policy. It can be inferred that for any proposal with a 
positive marginal net benefit, the gainers in principle could compensate the losers by 
money transfers and still be better off (i.e. there is the potential to achieve a strictly 
defined Pareto improvement). This, in principle, involves the assessment of various safety 
projects in terms of their marginal net benefit: that is to say, marginal benefit (MB) minus 
marginal cost (MC); and where (MB ≥ MC) there is potential to make a Pareto 
improvement.23 The (MB-MC) can be established for each project using CBA and other 
types of transport appraisal. When (MB-MC) has been established for a number of 
transport safety initiatives using CBA, the (MB-MC) calculation is used to rank the 
various possible policies or investments. The projects/policy initiatives with the highest 
(MB-MC) should be undertaken first. Where policy benefits and costs are spread over a 
number of years, the (MB-MC) becomes a net present value calculation, where the net 
benefits in future years are suitably discounted to equivalent present values. The NPV is 
calculated using the following formula: 
                                                 
23Potential Pareto Improvement can be transformed into an actual improvement by appropriate re-





ΔBt = change in benefits in period t 
ΔCt = change in opportunity costs in period t 
r = rate of interest used to discount returns (discount rate) 
t = period of time in years 
N = total number of years 
It may be noted that the question of what discount rate to use in the calculation of NPV 
for public sector projects in general has been widely debated; but it is not necessary to go 
into the details of the debate for the purposes of this work. It is an issue which leads into 
the heart of the economic theory of capital and interest; and it is, in any case, an issue not 
just for transport policy appraisals but for all applications of CBA to public policy in a 
multi-period context. 
 3.2.2  Advantages and disadvantages 
A CBA type of appraisal would lead to improved decisions overall and should be as wide 
ranging as possible to maximise its potential. Rather than not including poorly understood 
key impacts, it would be more appropriate to account clearly for uncertainty, thus 
imposing robustness between the different objectives being examined.  
An OECD (2011) discussion paper considers the scope of CBA to have expanded 
gradually over time, and that it is capable of highlighting distributional and other 
indicators important for political objectives. It is considered compatible with changing 
strategic policy priorities. 
Cost Benefit Analysis emerges as a structured, rational, transparent and relatively 
objective approach which can be used as a basis for assessing proposed transport safety 
measures. CBA looks at the costs involved in the means to attain goals while benefits are 
simply a measure of the degree to which goals are achieved. Therefore, CBA is the 




NPV = Σ 
(∆Bt - ∆Ct) 
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t 




CBA can act as a remedy to single investments in transport which take a small amount 
from large groups (e.g. taxpayers) but benefit a small group (e.g. a segment of users), 
when considering several investment options within budgetary constraints.  
CBA in transport can also effectively support the scarce allocation of resource within a 
programme where there are conflicting interests. Options and anticipated impacts have to 
be clearly described in the CBA framework, whereas decision-making is rarely expressed 
in this way (more often as visions or targets) and hence could result in conflict among the 
stakeholders (Figure 3-1).  
According to Mackie et al. (2014), “Cost-benefit analysis has become a widely used and 
well developed tool for appraisal of proposed transport projects. An important advantage 
of using CBA is that it is a way to overcome cognitive, structural and process-related 
limitations and biases in decision making” (p10). 
Methods of transport appraisal used in a number of countries were compared in a study 
carried out by Mackie and Worsley (2013). Their analysis showed that most countries use 
CBA within a comprehensive assessment framework that includes non-monetised 
benefits. There is an increasing focus on wider economic impacts and reliability 
valuation, although further development is required regarding time savings and reliability 
benefits. 
The fact that CBA provides a monetised statement of the outcome means that the results 
can be used to support claims for the resources needed for the implementation of safety 
measures. So for example, the net benefits in terms of monetised lives saved can be used 
to justify the cost of a road improvement or a new rail system. As a result, CBA is 
considered to be the preferred option for transport safety policy appraisal for this thesis. 
In spite of its rationality, CBA is not a panacea and one of the keys to its effective use is 
to be aware of its limitations and potential weaknesses. The limitations and questions for 
CBA are as follows: 
 How acceptable is the underlying utilitarian moral norm? Are there other relevant 
moral norms for policy evaluation and do these preclude CBA or argue for it to be 
a part of a multi-criteria analysis? 
 What levels of government intervention does it serve and what is its role in each? 
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 Subjectivity of benefit (and in some cases, cost) assessments cannot be avoided; 
it is inevitable where the future is uncertain. 
 Perceptions of CBAs – the motivations of those doing it are often important in 
determining the outcome, i.e. they are rarely totally objective. 
 Timescale issues – discounting of long term benefits adds more subjectivity. 
 How suitable is appraisal of the introduction of CMS as suggested in this work?  
 Technical issues surrounding the values and where they come from. How reliable 
are they and should private values or social adjusted values be considered? 
 The difficulty of valuing intangible assets. CBA looks at both monetised and non-
monetised impacts for this reason, but this leads to valuation issues for the money 
metric. 
 The cost-benefit analysis does not tell us whether a scheme is widely accepted or 
bitterly controversial or whether there is investment available and so it is 
incomplete. It does not easily map onto the higher order strategic goals of the 
government. 
 The key barrier to CBA is generally in the institutional and political environment, 
as appraisal is only effective where stakeholders (decision and societal) are open 
minded with respect to the social value for money and importance of any project.  
 3.2.3  Issues of standing 
Given the points above, it is clear that CBA has many subjective elements in practice 
despite the rigour of the framework it provides. As a result, one of the first questions that 
should be asked of any CBA is who is doing it and why. 
The result of this is to place limits on the acceptability of the method in the eyes of the 
public who become cynical of the stated billions that a myriad of proposed schemes are 
set to yield for the society. Some of the issues which relate to this are as follows: 
 Jurisdictional membership: this relates not only to the benefits per se, but to whom 
the benefits accrue; i.e. how widely are we to cast the net when considering 
benefits; whose benefits are to count? If benefits relate only to a certain group of 
people, they are less likely to be accepted by others who may be omitted or even 
be worse off by the proposed change. 
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 Exclusion of socially unacceptable preferences. The classic case here is the Ralph 
Nader case, in which a US motor manufacturer used CBA to justify continuing to 
produce an unsafe car design because to change would have been more costly than 
to compensate the victims. Fully factoring in social costs is therefore an important 
part of a CBA. 
 Inclusion of preferences of future generations. The change in the valuation of 
benefits over time is achieved using a selected discount rate as mentioned. The 
selection of this rate often has an important bearing on the result. 
 3.2.4  Political implications of CBA 
Related to the issues of standing, considered above, are the political aspects of CBA. This 
returns to the issue of who is undertaking the work, why they are doing it and who is 
paying them. The potential for subjectivity allows for values to be selected which will 
make the outcome suit a particular purpose and hence, over time, the results become less 
believable. This has important impacts on levels of public discourse and, ultimately, on 
the process of democracy. 
Since it has been suggested that CBA is the most appropriate method for assessing the 
possible role of CMS as an element of transport safety policy in this work, it is important 
to note the potential limitations and political implications of using such an analysis 
(Sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4 ). Some of these limitations and issues are particularly pertinent 
to the application of CBA to transport safety, such as the exclusion of socially 
unacceptable preferences, jurisdictional membership and the consideration of full social 
costs. For example when assessing the extent of modal switch from one mode to another 
it is useful to determine who actually benefits from the transfer (a large group or a specific 
group).  
 EVALUATION OF CBA 
 3.3.1  Baselining – the counterfactual 
One of the first problems when developing a CBA is to baseline the proposed 
development properly. In practice, this means developing a model of what there is now, 
and what would happen ‘anyway’ in the future, i.e. without the proposed development. 
The process of defining the counterfactual evolution of the situation is difficult, but it is 
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complicated further when the interactions with the proposed change are taken into 
account. Taking as an example the construction of a local road traffic improvement 
measure, its performance in the future will depend on a range of time varying factors, but 
the construction of the improvement may itself impact traffic flows in ways beyond those 
it is designed to do. Similarly, if lower speed limits are introduced independently, the 
benefit of the new measure may be much more limited. 
 3.3.2  Valuation of benefits and costs 
One of the main criticisms of CBA is that the determination of the benefits is a subjective 
process. The same may also be said of the costs, though these are often related to more 
tangible assets and activities and thus have a greater grounding in ‘objective fact’. Some 
of the problems faced when seeking to determine a statement of benefits which can be 
regarded as sufficiently objective are as follows: 
 Forecasting – Benefits are often more difficult to forecast than costs. There may 
have been similar activities in the past that can be cited as points of reference, but 
there are usually sufficient differences to allow serious questions to be raised.  
 Valuation – even if the occurrence of the benefits can be forecast with confidence, 
the next problem is to ensure that they can be valued effectively. This issue, as it 
relates to safety, is dealt with in Section  3.4.4 , but at this point it is important to 
note the subjectivity of this process and the sensitivity of the final outcome of a 
policy appraisal to how this is done. This subjectivity is epitomised in the 
‘willingness to pay’ approach often used for the valuation of intangible and non-
marketable benefits, whereby individual users give some indication of their 
willingness to pay for a proposed improvement (such as the preservation of a 
landscape or their safety) when using certain modes of transport. For example, 
there is a wide range of values which have been used for the so-called Value of 
Statistical Life (VSL) or Value of a Preventing a Fatality (VPF).  
 Cost – Although less subjective than benefits assessment, the determination of 
costs is also open to question. In part, the selection of the approach to baselining 
will help to determine which costs are included and which excluded. This 
approach can be used to hide costs if a less than objective approach is being taken. 
Even when objectivity is sought, the costs may be based on forecasts or proposals 
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which prove to be optimistic (in effect an optimism bias)24. This is illustrated by 
the recurrent problem of cost overruns which seem to plague so many large capital 
intensive public sector projects (e.g. the West Coast Mainline railway 
infrastructure upgrade in UK). To address this optimism bias in projects it is 
recommended (HM Treasury, 2013b) that an adjustment or uplift should be made 
to reflect underestimation of scheme costs (Flyvbjerg and COWI, 2004). The DfT 
(2014d) provides specific guidance on the estimation and reporting of the costs of 
transport schemes and their importance, in that overly optimistic cost estimates 
can affect the viability and the value for money of a scheme. For this study 
optimism bias has not been considered since modal transfer does not envisage any 
large capital investments and the costs of transfer are known. 
 3.3.3  Timescales and discounting 
An important issue that must be addressed in most CBAs is how the benefit and cost 
profiles develop over time. The results of a CBA are often presented through a Net Present 
Value (NPV) which combines the discounted profile of benefits minus opportunity costs 
for the whole period over which the costs and benefits are considered. The discount rate 
selected is therefore an important part of the analysis and is another way in which 
subjectivity can enter the process. 
For some developments, the discount rate is related to the actual cost of borrowing the 
money needed to fund the project. For many others however, there is more flexibility. 
Proposed projects with a significant environmental benefit are a good example of the 
issues associated with the selection of discount rates. Although there are standard rates 
provided by governments at national and international level, often in the region of 4% (in 
real terms), these are often considered to be too high for projects with long term 
environmental benefits. The result of applying “too high” a rate is to emphasise the 
present at the expense of the future, which can prevent efforts for long term improvement 
from proceeding. There is an argument that in considering public sector projects the state 
should apply a zero discount rate, since the state is an entity which lives on and is expected 
to represent the interests of future as well as current generations. Benefits in 50 years’ 
                                                 
24 HM Treasury (2003) with reference to the Review of Large Public Procurement in the UK notes that 
there is a demonstrated, systematic tendency for project appraisers to be overly optimistic and that to redress 
this tendency appraisers should make explicit, empirically based adjustments to the estimates of a project’s 
costs, benefits, and duration. 
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time may be difficult to predict precisely today but they will nonetheless be very real for 
future generations; and the state as an institution is supposed to represent those unborn 
future generations. HM Treasury (2013), in the Green Book, state that the Social Time 
Preference Rate (STPR)25 should be used as the standard real discount rate. The current 
rate of STPR is calculated at 3.5%. Earlier rates used in transport project appraisal were 
8% and then 6% respectively (Burgess and Zerbe, 2011). For long term projects over 31-
60 years, they suggest lower rates (3%) be used. The reason for using lower rates in the 
long term arises from future uncertainty for long term forecasting (e.g. a 60 year time 
horizon for a project coming into use under current Green Book rules). Lower discount 
rates have been used and noted by Mackie and Worsley (2013) in their international 
comparisons, where the Netherlands use a 2.5% discount rate with a 3% risk premium, 
while Hepburn (2007) shows the social discount rate for the Czech Republic to be 1% 
compared with other OECD countries. Generally, European countries tend to utilise 3-
4% discount rates and have fairly long project lives while the USA, Australia and New 
Zealand use rates of 7-8% with shorter project lives.  
 3.3.4  Sensitivity analysis 
One way in which the subjectivities of CBA as to likely future benefits can be controlled 
in an environment of uncertainty is to undertake a sensitivity analysis. This provides for 
an assessment of the variability of the outcomes of the analysis when ranges of variability 
are assigned to some of the key variables. To undertake such an analysis helps to define 
the confidence that can be placed in the final outcome. In some cases, it is useful to 
identify the cross over point at which net expected benefit (benefits minus costs) ceases 
to be positive. If, for example, the benefits assessment is highly conservative at this point, 
it indicates that the case is robust enough to justify the proposed development. 
 APPLICATION OF CBA TOOLS  
Previous chapters and sections have concentrated on and addressed how governments can 
intervene to promote an optimal level of safety using CBA as the effective and practical 
                                                 
25HM Treasury (2013) in the Green Book states, “Social Time Preference is defined as the value society 
attaches to present, as opposed to future, consumption. The Social Time Preference Rate (STPR) is a rate 
used for discounting future benefits and costs, and is based on comparisons of utility across different points 
in time or different generations” (p.97). 
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tool of appraisal. However, appraising the extent to which governments should actually 
intervene to promote transport safety using CBA raises issues that require detailed and 
careful scrutiny. These issues are broadly: 
(a) Safety output/benefit measurement; 
(b) Risk; and 
(c) Valuation of life.  
The following sections consider each of these issues, which are fundamental to 
understanding CBA for transport safety measures. 
 3.4.1  Measurement of safety output 
When examining transport safety in a cost-benefit framework it is of primary importance 
to establish attained safety levels by mode (these are the outputs which after all constitute 
the key benefits of safety policy) and the rates of change of these outputs in response to 
policy changes. A standard measure must be used for all transport modes to permit cross-
modal and cross-country comparisons of the risk of fatality and/or serious injury. 
A review of the literature on this subject quickly reveals that there are a number of 
different ways of measuring attained safety levels of transport modes: see Walmsley 
(1992), Collings (1994), Jørgensen (1996), ETSC (1999), Hakkert and Braimaister 
(2002), Evans (2003), and SafetyNet (2007). Much of this literature concentrates solely 
on presenting measures that indicate safety levels for a specific purpose/study with a 
limited discussion on the most appropriate measure for wider cross-modal comparisons. 
While this might raise only limited problems when examining attained safety levels 
within a particular transport mode, the choice of the appropriate measure becomes crucial 
the moment we begin to look at the cross modal safety comparisons which are central to 
this work.  
In general, an averaged measure of the risk of a fatality in the various modes can be 
obtained by calculating the ratio between an indicator of fatalities over a determined 
period and an indicator of total amount of travel on the specific mode. Similarly, the 
average risk of serious injury can be calculated as the ratio of the total number of injuries 
of a defined type over a period and the total amount of travel on the specific mode in that 
same period. For one period of time (t) this can be summarised by the following fraction: 
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Total number of fatalities or injuries during time t 
Total amount of travel on mode during time t 
The numerator of this fraction is relatively straightforward conceptually, although there 
may be some argument about the number of fatalities to attribute to a mode.26 In general 
the rule should be to use "casualties”, or, in other words, the accidents that relate to the 
specific transport mode, independent of inadmissible passenger or third party behaviour 
and of natural causes. For example there could be a debate as to whether air deaths due 
to terrorist activities or sabotage should be included as fatalities in aviation. They may 
not be directly attributable to aviation in one sense but then neither is the weather; yet a 
significant number of aviation accidents are directly attributable to bad weather27 and 
these are counted in the fatality statistics. There is also the issue of whether occupants 
including crew, and also workers on associated infrastructure, especially road and rail 
maintenance, are included. It would appear that it is appropriate to include all fatalities 
on a mode in a year other than those which are due to deliberate misadventure (e.g. 
suicides from people jumping deliberately under trains should not count as railway 
fatalities). 
A fundamental theoretical problem arises, however, with the definition of the 
denominator. The main question is how to measure the risk exposure on the total amount 
of travel completed. The literature, as mentioned above, indicates a range of measures for 
this denominator: total number of trips, total number of hours spent on a particular mode 
by passengers, total vehicle-km and total number of passenger-kilometres completed. It 
is the contention of this section that there is actually just one primary denominator and 
hence just one definition of the average risk of a fatality or serious injury that is 
appropriate, especially when cross-modal comparisons are made, namely the passenger 
or person-kilometres denominator and the resultant measure of safety output. The caveat 
to this is when journeys of different lengths can provide the same utility to the traveller. 
For example, an air journey may be longer in comparison to a shorter journey by another 
mode, but may be completed in the same time period. In this case, the number of journeys 
would be a valid comparison. In general however, the contention is that distance travelled 
                                                 
26For instance, is a fatality to a person who was trespassing on the railway to be counted as a fatality in 
rail? 
27A number of aviation accidents in the landing phase are attributable to attempted landings in the presence 
of cumulonimbus clouds and associated wind shear in the vicinity of airports. 
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is an important factor in the assessment, as underscored by its inclusion in most national 
transport safety statistics. Travellers are not indifferent to journey time and the extensive 
studies on travellers' valuation of time recognise this. 
First of all it should be noted that to use a measure which has passenger journeys as 
denominator will fairly evidently be inappropriate. This is because, all else held the same, 
where journeys are shorter the risk of a fatality or injury will be lower (the exceptions are 
boarding and alighting and take offs/landings discussed later in this section). Hence, a 
journeys-based measure will make certain modes (with shorter journey times) appear to 
be intrinsically safer when, in fact, the apparently better safety record only reflects shorter 
journey times.  
The main alternatives to the journeys-based measure are the passenger-hours and 
passenger-kilometre variants, both of which have, in the past, been used widely enough 
in the measurement of safety output. Both clearly avoid the distortion described above. 
The passenger-hours denominator provides a measure of safety output in terms of 
“exposure time” (time spent travelling), while the passenger-kilometres denominator 
provides a measure of safety in relation to distance travelled. When we are comparing 
safety among modes (or even different vehicles within a mode), and where the average 
speed of the modes/vehicles is similar, the comparative ranking in terms of safety will 
also be similar no matter whether passenger-hours or passenger-kilometres measure is 
used, and so no great conceptual problems arise. If, however, as in this thesis, a 
comparison is being made of safety outputs among modes which have very different 
average speeds (e.g. average speeds at sea are in the region of 20 knots, compared to 300 
in aviation), the comparative ranking in terms of safety will be critically affected by the 
measure that is used. To be precise, faster modes of transport will, all else held the same, 
be ranked as comparatively safer under the passenger-kilometres as opposed to the 
passenger-hours measure. 
Consequently it is crucial to decide on which is the more appropriate measure of safety 
output: that based on passenger-hours or that based on passenger-kilometres.  
Using the principles of Lancaster's well-known theory of goods' characteristics it is 
possible to justify the preference for the measurement of the total amount travelled on the 
basis of passenger-kilometre. Lancaster (1991) pointed out that many goods which 
consumers demand and enjoy possess not just one, but a number of characteristics which 
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make them attractive:28 “In general, a good will possess more than one characteristic, 
and many characteristics will be shared by more than one good.” Transposing this to 
transport, it can be said that when people use transport they consume a fairly basic good, 
namely travel, for which safety is one relevant characteristic for the consumer.  
However, among the characteristics which define the travel good, time to destination also 
plays an important role in influencing consumers’ modal choice in almost all instances: 
all else held the same, consumers prefer a faster mode of transport since it saves them 
time. Put in terms of Lancaster’s theory, a faster journey time implies a more "valuable" 
good (higher marginal utility)29 for which consumers are willing to pay higher prices: for 
example, over most of Europe people generally pay higher fares to travel on faster trains 
on the high-speed train networks such as the TGV in France and Eurostar Italia in Italy. 
Subsequently, time en route is a key element but not, of course, the only element of the 
travel good. Hence, it follows that what is of interest to the passenger is not the amount 
of time spent on board per se30 (this would point to the use of the passenger-hours 
denominator in our average risk fraction), but rather the distance travelled within a 
particular time. From this consideration it follows that the appropriate denominator for 
our risk assessment fraction is total passenger-kilometres over the period of averaging. 
The risk assessment fraction can be further refined dependent on the availability of 
appropriate data according to population demographics by mode (old and young car 
drivers for example) or various other refinements (such as differentiation of aviation risks 
by time of year or by destination, both of which have a link to weather and hence to 
accident risk in aviation). Another refinement would look at subsidiary risk measures 
relating to specific components of a journey that should be taken into consideration for 
certain modes of transport, notably boarding and alighting on buses and take-off and 
landing in planes where there are significantly higher risk levels in comparison to the rest 
of the overall journey. These refinements are relevant; they imply, for example, that on 
an air journey which involves connecting flights as opposed to the same journey on a 
direct flight, the risk of death/serious injury will be greater. Nevertheless that does not 
                                                 
28 For example, particular cars may be at once a mode of transport for a person, and convenient. 
29 For example, when travelling from Reading to London why do people either travel by car or train rather 
than travel by bicycle? Transatlantic passenger liners disappeared upon the serious growth of scheduled 
transatlantic air services. 
30 See Lancaster (1991). 
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undermine the basic validity of measuring the overall risk from either type of flight in 
terms of passenger kilometres in the denominator. 
Although this might seem a definitive statement on the appropriate statistical measure of 
safety output, in light of the above considerations, this is defensible. Furthermore, since 
some standpoint on this issue must be taken in order to make conclusive safety 
comparisons between modes whose average speeds are different, it is considered that 
passenger-kilometre is, among the possible alternatives, the unit of measurement for 
which there are the most plausible supporting arguments. Bergantino and Patel (2000) 
also supported per passenger km unit of measurement and calculated estimations of safety 
output to provide a statistical comparison of safety output levels attained in various modes 
for Great Britain and Italy, while ETSC (2003) provided modal comparisons of safety 
performance in the EU.  
There is a corollary of this argument for use of the passenger-kilometre denominator when 
calculating attained safety output. Where within a particular mode there are large 
variations in average speed, and where both separate figures on fatalities and injuries for 
the different elements within a mode (e.g., separate figures for fatalities/injuries on high-
speed trains and slower trains) and figures for total passenger- kilometres for each element 
are available, it would be possible - and in the light of the Lancaster arguments outlined 
above, highly appropriate - to present a separate safety output figure for the high-speed 
and low-speed elements. 
 3.4.2  Risk 
General  
Prior to reviewing the risks relevant to this work a brief outline is provided of what risk 
is to give some context. Beck (2009) classifies risk under a number of categories including 
existent and non-existent and individual and social responsibility. For the former category 
he notes that risk is the anticipation of a future threat and therefore regards risk to be both 
existent (if the anticipated risk is realised) and non-existent (if the risk fails to materialise). 
He also considers risk from an individual and a social responsibility perspective. An 
individual accepts responsibility for their own decision and subsequent consequences of 
their decision; this is contrasted with the social responsibility of others, i.e. to what extent 
others are impacted by the risk decision of individuals and the degree to which they are 
involved or not in the decision process. 
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Adams (1999) in his work discusses the management of risk under conditions of 
uncertainty and refers to it as a “balancing act”. He identifies three types of risk, 
highlighted in Figure 3-2, which are not mutually exclusive. Risks perceived directly are 
considered as risks where some judgement is taken by the risk taker. For example a 
pedestrian crossing the road does not undertake a probabilistic risk assessment before 
doing so; they rely on some mixture of instinct, intuition and experience to cross safely. 
Risk perceived through science is mainly referred to in the risk management literature. 
Here, risk is considered through a wide body of research, statistics, cause-and-effect and 
inferences. Probability of risk is examined under this category and it is also where most 
published work on transport safety appears. 
Lastly, virtual risk contains uncertainty and unknowns. If there is no clear or convincing 
scientific evidence, judgements about these risks will be influenced by people’s 
predisposition to view the evidence in particular ways. The four common types of 
dispositions are the individualist (optimist, science provides the solutions), the egalitarian 
(pessimist, if something cannot be proved to be safe it is considered dangerous), the 
hierarchist (all risks need to be managed, science needs regulation) and the fatalist (no 
power and reliant on luck). 
 
Source: Adams (1999) 
Figure 3-2: Risk typology  
Adams (2012) highlights the problem of uncertainty in transport risk using road safety as 










circles in Figure 3-2. Institutional risk managers, such as legislators and regulators 
making and enforcing rules regarding transport safety, are in the ‘perceived through 
science’ circle, versus individual risk managers (directly perceiving risks) who are guided 
by judgement.  
Risk arises in any situation where there is uncertainty of outcome, and probability is the 
mathematical way of measuring that risk (perceived through science) which also provides 
a means to assess different combinations of risks. It goes without saying that risk is 
pervasive in human affairs. 
While risk is not necessarily a priority element or consideration for most policies, it is 
essential when examining transport safety policy. This is due to the fact that the principal 
benefits that emanate from a transport safety policy are definable in terms of risk 
reduction. For this work, taking the risk typology diagram of Adams, the focus is mainly 
in the examination of perceived risk through science (will be referred to as objective risk) 
and risk perceived directly (will be referred to as perceived or subjective risk). 
The introduction of Automatic Train Protection in UK, for example, would essentially be 
geared to produce a reduced risk of death or serious injury to passengers or others; 
whereas an area being designated as a public park has no risk reduction benefits. Transport 
presents a serious risk of accidental death or injury on a daily basis irrespective of the 
measure that is used to gauge what the level of risk is on a specific mode. 
Evans (1994) suggested that there are four different types of measure commonly used to 
determine the level of risk in any transport activity: 
a) the number of accidental deaths (and/or serious injuries) per year associated with 
transport by comparison with other activities; 
b) the number of accidental deaths (and/or serious injuries) per hour spent travelling 
by comparison with other activities; 
c) the number of accidental deaths (and/or serious injuries) per passenger kilometre; 
and 
d) the number of major accidents per year. 
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The debate on which measures ideally should be used was examined in greater depth in 
Section 3.4.1 . 
Objective risk 
The objective assessment of risk refers to the actual estimation of risk in any activity or 
situation on the basis of objective data. Rundmo et al. (2013) define objective risk as “the 
probability of an adverse event that is estimated by statistical methods and risk estimation 
techniques based on accidents and incidents (probability × consequence × exposure)” 
(p1664). The risk may be estimated in two ways, which are quite similar: 
(a) to appraise accident risks using past statistics on relevant accidents, or 
(b) to appraise accident risk by constructing a model for the purpose of forecasting 
the likely risk profile (this may be based on statistical projections, technical 
assessments of the impact of a new development, or a combination of the two) 
Both methods of estimating risk have limitations in accuracy. A major problem for method 
(a) to estimate risk is knowing how representative the statistical records are for the 
proposed assessment. This is because in using past data there is an inference that the past 
is a reliable guide to future events and therefore there is a logical problem of induction. 
If, for example, air accident risks were being determined then it would be evident from 
the data that the types of air accidents have changed significantly and using past data to 
predict future accidents may not always be very accurate or precise. This particular 
problem could be overcome by trying to use more extensive data sets wherever possible 
or by seeking to extrapolate from past data in a more sophisticated manner; for example, 
by the identification of systematic trends as opposed to straight extrapolation of averages. 
It is, in any case, a problem of all scientific method and not just confined to objective risk 
estimation in transport. 
There are also problems associated with the size of some data sets. Some accident risks 
are very difficult to estimate since there may not be sufficient accident data available for 
a new vehicle, aircraft, vessel that has been introduced. For instance, the introduction of 
High Speed Craft in the maritime sector is relatively new and there is a distinct lack of 
accident data available for this type of vessel. A remedy for this would be to determine 
accident risks by the construction of a model, but this is also susceptible to flaws since it 
too involves predicting the future based on stated assumptions that could be inaccurate 
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(as the assumptions will usually be based on some sort of inference from past experience). 
The Channel Tunnel offers a possible example of this. Even though one might have 
thought that there could have been considerable confidence in estimates, for example, of 
fire risks in railway tunnels based on vast past experience of over 100 years of rail tunnels, 
the Channel Tunnel would appear to be sui generis for a number of reasons and so 
estimates of fire risk appear to have been understated.  
Prospect theory is a further dimension to take into account because this addresses 
subjective attitude to objective risk. It should be noted that perceived risk combines the 
perceived risk of an accident occurring and the perceived consequences. Prospect theory 
is a behavioural economic theory that describes the way people choose between 
probabilistic alternatives that involve risk, where probabilities of outcomes are known. 
The theory states that people make decisions based on the potential value of losses and 
gains rather than the final outcome, and that people evaluate these losses and gains using 
certain rules to form judgements and make decisions. The model is descriptive: it tries to 
model real-life choices rather than optimal decisions which are characteristic of 
normative models. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) created the theory and developed it 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) as a more accurate description of decision making than 
the expected utility theory.  
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) explained the major violations of expected utility theory 
as being choices between risky prospects with a small number of outcomes. They found 
empirically that people underweight outcomes that are merely probable in comparison 
with outcomes that are obtained with certainty; also that people generally discard 
components that are shared by all prospects under consideration. Under prospect theory, 
probabilities are also replaced by decision weights. The value function is defined by 
deviations from a reference point and is normally concave for gains (implying risk 
aversion), commonly convex for losses (risk seeking) and is generally steeper for losses 
than for gains (loss aversion).  
Perceived (subjective) risk  
Perceived risk is the perceived probability of an accident occurring and the perceived 
consequences of such an event.  
When accident risks have been determined through risk estimation objectively, those 
examining the issues will adopt their own subjective attitude to the risks as objectively 
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measured. It is well established that individuals differ widely in their subjective attitudes 
to clearly defined risks (e.g. risk taking and risk averse people) and there would also 
appear to be some identifiable broad cultural differences in this matter. As a result, the 
level of risk associated within and across specific modes of transport is only a perceived 
risk; whether by individuals, governments or whole societies. This can lead to serious 
anomalies; for example, in the aftermath of various train or aviation disasters both modes 
of transport have been perceived to be extremely dangerous ways of travelling although 
that is not the case.  
The aviation accident of a Concorde aircraft F-BTSC in Paris on Tuesday 25 July 2000 
highlights the point clearly (BEA, 2000). The accident resulted in the death of all the crew 
and passengers on board the aircraft, totalling 109 fatalities. Shortly before take-off, the 
front right tyre of the left landing gear was damaged and pieces of the tyre were thrown 
against the aircraft structure. A major fire broke out under the left wing. Problems 
appeared shortly afterwards on engine No. 2 and for a brief period on engine No. 1. The 
aircraft was neither able to climb nor accelerate. The crew found that the landing gear 
would not retract. The aircraft maintained a speed of 200kt and a radio altitude of 200 
feet for about one minute after which engine No. 1 stopped. The aircraft then crashed onto 
a hotel at La Patte d’Oie in Gonesse.  
This aircraft type had been in operation for over 25 years and this had been the first fatal 
incident. Therefore, the subjective perception of high risk by governments and individuals 
seemed an excessive over-reaction at that time, in view of the fact that all Concorde 
aircraft were grounded for a period of one year and then subsequently taken out of service. 
This subjective perception may of course have been allied to a desire to remove from 
service an aircraft that was no longer cost effective. There is also a large disparity between 
the subjective perceptions of risk across different regions and between countries and also 
in attitudes to perceived risk, which is problematic when comparing the risk either within 
or across modes.  
Problems associated with subjective perceptions of risk can be partly resolved by using 
and disseminating objective risk assessment analysis. This can assist in identifying and 
quantifying actual levels of risk inherent in specific modes of transport in an objective 
manner and may help to dispel misunderstanding in the subjective perception of risk, 
although it cannot eliminate the problem altogether. 
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The discussion on risk gives an indication of the problems that arise when seeking to 
quantify the risks associated with transport in terms of a probability of death or serious 
injury, and is a vital element in the rational appraisal of policy benefits within an overall 
cost-benefit analysis of safety policy.  
 3.4.3  Total journey risk 
In most of the literature to date, safety outputs have been defined for a specific mode 
taken in isolation and in effect for what are presumed to be seamless journeys. Yet, in 
practice, many journeys involve the combination of a number of modes; or they may 
involve stopping and taking connections at some point in the journey even when the 
whole journey is carried out in the same mode. All of these factors can have a significant 
impact on the total risk exposure for the person making the journey. The analysis of total 
journey risk seeks to take this into account. 
The concept is, perhaps, best grasped through some simple examples. A typical city 
commuter who takes the train to work daily will need to get to the local railway station 
from his/her residence/workplace in order to get the train. This will typically involve a 
walk, a cycle ride or a car trip to the station daily. Since the risks of death and serious 
injury vary significantly among modes this unfortunately means that it is not accurate or 
sufficient to take the commuter’s risk as the relevant rail safety figure for the 
country/region (deaths/serious injuries per person kilometre on trains in the region). A 
composite figure combining the relevant rail risk with a figure for the 
pedestrian/cyclist/car risk for the part of the journey from home to station is required. 
This composite figure can be designated as the total journey risk. 
The calculation of this composite follows easily from the considerations given above 
regarding the most appropriate way to measure safety output on any given mode: 
deaths/serious injuries per person kilometre. The distance travelled in each mode during 
a composite journey needs to be calculated and these distances need to be used as weights 
to get an overall weighted average composite risk for the journey. A similar point also 
applies when connections have to be made among separate services within the same 
mode. Making the connection may increase the journey risk by comparison with a direct 
journey involving no connections.  
There is a much debated theory in the risk literature regarding risk compensation. 
Peltzman (1975) suggested that risk compensation offsets any safety measures introduced 
  
68 
in the car industry (e.g. seat-belts or anti-lock braking). He noted that drivers increase 
their exposure to risk (for example by driving faster) as compensation for the increase in 
the safety of their vehicles. The essence of the risk compensation debate lies in assessing 
which risk changes will produce compensating behavioural change. Whether this effect 
occurs and the extent to which it does exist has been debated and contested in the 
literature. Risk compensation can be evaluated through individual behaviour or 
examining aggregate data to measure the impact of laws and regulations. While studies 
acknowledge that there may be some behavioural change/s, the effect on crashes and 
injuries is not clear. There is also inconclusive evidence at present on the extent of the 
overall risk compensation on safety measures (Hedlund, 2000). Risk compensation 
proponents (Adams, 1995) acknowledge this dilemma: “... the multi-dimensionality of 
risk and all the problems of measuring it … preclude the possibility of devising any 
conclusive statistical tests of the [risk compensation] hypothesis.” Hedlund (2000) 
provides a comprehensive review on the topic and some useful rules for thinking about 
how risk compensation and behavioural adaption may affect the outcome for safety 
policies. Noland (2013) highlights that many of the theoretical debates are not clearly 
resolved, although there is a consensus that behavioural adaptation occurs and theory can 
provide guidance on when this is likely to be a large effect. He proposes a theoretical 
framework that is intended to clearly provide an understanding of the motivations of 
travellers (i.e. their utility-maximizing behaviour) and how trade-offs are made between 
risk and mobility, as well as other attributes that influence transportation choices. The 
main conclusion from the study is that road safety studies and the guidance developed 
from these should be based on a theoretical foundation that considers the behavioural 
reaction to a policy change.  
In view of the debate surrounding the literature on risk compensation, the uncertainty on 
the level of risk-compensating behavioural change, and the inconclusive explicit evidence 
on safety outcomes, this thesis will not take risk compensation into consideration any 
further except to acknowledge that both at an individual and at an aggregate level there 
may be behavioural changes after safety policy measures that could be considered to be 
risk compensating. In addition risk compensation applies mainly to changes in the risk 
profile within a mode, for example developments in vehicle safety. Since the CMS 
concept is based on exploiting the relative gradients in safety between modes, the impact 
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of risk compensation on CMS is more limited than it would be on the specific mode 
affected through safety measures. 
Overall, there is extensive literature on objective and perceived risk, both in general and 
specifically related to transport. For a fuller discussion see Adams (1995), Noland (1995), 
Sjøberg (1999), Kirwan (2006) and Rundamo (2013). 
 3.4.4  Valuation of safety (fatal and non-fatal) 
The third of the complicated issues arising from safety assessments is the valuation of 
human life and limb; this seems to be the most contentious31 aspect in economics and 
especially of most CBAs in transport. Safety improvements can only be achieved at a 
cost, and so the question arises what the appropriate monetary valuation to place on safety 
improvements enabling the direct comparison of costs and benefits and ensuring scare 
resources are allocated efficiently would be (Jones-Lee and Spackman, 2013). In 
economics, the measure for avoidance of fatality or injury is the risk-money trade-off for 
small changes in risk (probabilities) of death. These values are referred to as VSL or 
VPF32. There have been many critiques of this approach to valuation of safety benefits 
but in many of them there is a simple misunderstanding of the terminology (Viscusi, 
2005). Often the critiques miss a very basic point: it is not the value of a human life per 
se that is being valued, rather an evaluation in monetary terms of the value of the small 
changes in the risk of death or serious injury due to some policy. 
Approaches and methods of valuation 
Jones-Lee (1989) considers the explicit valuation of safety under two broad objectives, 
namely national output maximisation and social welfare maximisation. Firstly, he 
                                                 
31 With the exception of direct financial reduction by insurance companies for the bus and car industries. 
For example, Pay As You Drive (PAYD) is a car insurance policy which better reflects crash risk, as the 
insurance premium is paid per mile/kilometre actually driven. The PAYD insurance premium can be further 
differentiated to reward safe driving behaviour with a lower premium due to advanced monitoring 
technologies. The PAYD underlying principle is that car drivers will be incentivised through variable cost 
of travelling to adapt their travel behaviour. Norwich Union Insurance, UK [now ‘Aviva’] fully 
implemented their PAYD insurance after a pilot in 2003. The company provides direct incentives to the 
individual driver to improve safety. Travel behaviour is monitored using a GPS-based black box in the 
vehicle that registers how often, when and where the vehicle is driven. Different insurance rates apply for 
young drivers (23 and younger) and those between ages 24-65. For night time (23:00-5:59) driving, young 
drivers have to pay higher prices (e.g. the price per kilometre is £1 ($1.22). For older drivers, night and 
morning peak are expensive, although this is not as high as with young drivers and billing is on a monthly 
basis (Zantema et al., 2008). 
32Value of Statistical Life (VSL) is more commonly used in the US although both terms are identical. 
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considers other approaches to the valuation of life. They were based on the life insurance 
method (the costs of death/injury correlated to the amount people insure life and limb), 
the court award method (based on damages awarded by the court representative of an 
individual’s loss of future output or unclear societal cost of death/injury), implicit public 
sector valuation (based on previous public sector decisions on values of life and safety) 
and the valuation in terms of time (where the remaining life expectancy of an individual 
is determined through aggregate time value over remaining life expectancy). All these 
methods, while each having apparent merits, were considered to be lacking both in the 
context of national output maximisation and maximisation of social welfare objectives. 
The decision analysis approach developed by Keeney (1980) was also cited by Jones-
Lee; this required the construction of a multi-attribute “organisational” utility function 
reflecting the value judgement of the decision maker/group regarding various trade-offs 
of choices and consequences (see Jones-Lee for a fuller discussion on the critique of these 
methods). 
The aforementioned methods were largely superseded by output based (net/gross output 
also known as human capital methods) and willing to pay approaches. This last is based 
on revealed or stated preferences. The subjectivist willingness to pay approach has now 
replaced an earlier objectivist approach to the valuation of safety. Both methods are 
discussed in the following section. 
Willingness-to-Pay Approach 
Although a variety of methods have been used to estimate the value of life and safety, it 
is intended that within the context of this thesis, the WTP approach will be considered as 
the most appropriate method of estimation. A large body of literature advocating the WTP 
approach has been developed over a number of years. See Drèze (1962), Schelling (1968), 
Mishan (1971), Bergstrom (1982), Dalvi (1988), Jones-Lee (1989) and Bahamonde-Birke 
et al. (2015). The main rationale for economists behind the WTP approach is that it is 
based within welfare economics (Paretian)33 and its principles are: 
“(a) that social decisions should, so far as possible, reflect the interests, preferences and 
attitudes to risk of those who are likely to be affected by the decisions and, 
                                                 
33 This is based squarely on utilitarian moral principles. 
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 (b) that in the case of safety, these interests, preferences and attitudes are most effectively 
summarised in terms of the amounts that individuals would be willing to pay (or would 
require compensation) for variations in safety…if a public sector project is undertaken”34 
(Dalvi, 1988, p6).  
Under the WTP approach it is important to note that changes in safety provided by public 
sector projects will usually result in very small changes in probability of death or serious 
injury for a specific individual during a defined period in the future. Although, in valuing 
life and safety it should be highlighted we are not dealing with either: 
 how much money specific individuals will pay or are required to be compensated 
for avoidance of death/certain death, or 
 the amount of money legally required to compensate; 
 but rather the sums of money each person in a community should pay/would in 
principle accept to be compensated for the change in risk they face as a result of 
policy changes. The degree of risk and compensation may vary by country 
according to legal system, extent of liability, etc.; e.g. airline code sharing.  
While this is in principle clear enough, some interesting difficulties arise when trying to 
apply WTP in practice. Early forays in this field tended to presume that there would be a 
single figure that could be applied to any individual for the valuation of a change in risk 
of death/serious injury due to a transport safety policy measure. Yet people differ in their 
attitudes to/preferences for risk: both as individuals and due apparently also to cultural 
factors. Then there is the crucial point that the amount which a person may be willing to 
pay to reduce risk, say on the railways by 0.001 per 1000M person kilometres per annum, 
will depend on how many kilometres that person travels by train in a year. In the extreme 
case somebody who never uses trains will not want to pay anything to improve rail safety 
(unless of course they are motivated by a sense of social solidarity)35. In practice there 
                                                 
34
 Dalvi’s mathematical expression for an individual’s WTP to avoid death is: 
   T 
 [ ∑ Bt/(1 + r)t  ] A 
  t=0 
where: T = remaining life time, Bt = utility (or benefit) enjoyed by living (labour income, non-labour 
income, non-market activities and leisure, premium for pain, grief and suffering), r = individual rate of time 
preference and A= risk aversion factor. 
35 This, of course, touches on a very fundamental potential weakness of the whole utilitarian based approach 
to welfare economics: it simply cannot get to grips with people “caring” for each other or acting in a selfless 
manner to serve the community.  
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will be likely be no single figure for WTP but a whole range of figures for different 
individuals depending on their preferences and on how many kilometres per annum they 
travel on particular modes of transport. This latter difficulty could no doubt be overcome 
by taking the average annual distance travelled by a typical user of a mode in a country 
and relating this to the change in risk per 1000M person km, but that still involves some 
crude averaging out across people who may have very different total distances travelled 
per year. See Dalvi (1988) for further discussion in this area. 
According to Ball (2000) the view is to use a broad number of outcomes from various 
techniques that have existed rather than a single methodology. The main reason for this 
is that valuation techniques entail considerable problems, such as those mentioned above, 
and also include methodological problems (induction) and the problems surrounding 
different subjective attitudes to objectively qualified risks. Therefore the values of 
changes in risk of death and serious injury are considered as a range rather than a single 
point value. Presently, the range lies between £1-10 million (with most between £2-4 
million) per life saved in 1000M person km. The advantage of using a range is that it 
provides decision makers a degree of flexibility in arriving at safety decisions because of 
complex contextual factors, rather than by the application of any more “formulaic 
recipes”. In the UK, the contingent valuation using stated preference willingness to pay 
is mostly advocated because of its sound methodology, anchored in the principles of 
welfare economics; although there still remain some unresolved problems with contingent 
valuation, some of which have been reduced and which are addressed in the next section. 
The UK Department for Transport currently considers the VPF based largely on the WTP 
but also includes additional smaller elements of avoided output losses and medical and 
ambulance costs36.  
Bristow & Nellthrop (2000), Hayashi & Morisugi (2000), Miller (2000) and Mackie and 
Worsley (2013) have provided valuations of life figures for a number of different 
countries. The values are significantly spread but these could be attributed to the 
differences in safety standards in different countries and/or differences in subjective 
valuation or attitudes to the change in risk. 
                                                 
36VPF defined and estimated as VPF= (WTP+NQ+MA) where WTP is the willingness to pay, NQ is the 




Critique of Willingness-to-Pay Approach 
Early critique on the WTP approach is addressed by Broome (1978) and involves 
objections to the approach itself rather than a rejection, according to Jones-Lee (1989). 
Broome questions the limitations of the hypothetical compensation test using the WTP 
approach but this objection has largely been answered by Bergstrom (1982) and Dehz and 
Dreze (1982) using constrained maximisation of a social welfare function that yields 
similar results. He also raises the issues of how distributional weights (this is a general 
problem, not just in risk) and divergences are specified in subjective perceptions of risk, 
and of concerns regarding individuals’ willingness to pay, not only for marginal changes 
in risk using the WTP approach, but also for more sizeable risks (non-marginal changes). 
For example, using WTP cost associated with the exposure of 1,000 people to an 
increased risk of death by 0.001 will be higher than the costs involved with exposing 
1,000,000 to incremental individual risks of 0.000001 even though the expected loss of 
life is the same in both instances. In such a scenario, Broome suggests that a government 
may choose the least costly option and hence act “incoherently” whereas they should be 
indifferent between the options. He argues that the value for the statistical life should be 
independent of the population at risk (and thus the size of the variations in risk). In the 
end, an alternative is not offered by Broome and others but their work points to the need 
of some caution in the use of the approach. 
More recently, Deloitte (2009) in their Review of Highways Agency Value of Life 
estimates for the purposes of Project Appraisal for the NAO highlight the main limitations 
as: 
 how to prompt individual preferences; 
 determining the value placed on small reductions in risk; and 
 combining individuals’ WTP.  
WTP aims to value the rate at which people are willing to trade safety against other goods 
and hence to reflect the preferences and attitudes of people who are likely to be affected 
by accidents towards risk. Revealed preference or stated preference methods are used to 
determine these preferences empirically. Revealed preference consists of the 
identification of circumstances where choices involve different safety outcomes. For 
example, labour market studies show how people trade off income versus physical risk, 
i.e. wage premia for high risk jobs. Stated preference (using contingent valuation) 
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involves asking a representative sample population about the amounts they would be 
willing to pay for improved safety. 
Revealed preference relies on the isolation of risk-wage related differentials from other 
factors. A person may choose a job due to the proximity to their home rather than the 
quality of the risk/wage trade-off. This can result in variable ranges of values and 
inaccuracies.  
Contingent valuation has problems associated with individuals’ understanding and 
valuation of small risks reductions; several small risks of the same size need to be valued 
for WTP to be precise (i.e. a person facing a number of small risk of a similar size may 
pay reduced sums for each successive risk as the overall budget is restricted). WTP also 
does not necessarily equate to actual ability to pay, people can overstate amounts in 
hypothetical scenarios and the combination of individuals’ WTP may not result in the 
social WTP as external social cost is not considered. 
Elvik (2013) also addresses some of the issues pertaining to the willingness-to-pay 
approach, including choice between options with identical impacts on safety, and 
preference reversals associated with preference aggregation. These could both be 
overcome by providing a fixed value per life saved instead of a non-linear demand 
function. Elvik notes the failure of conventional WTP to reflect the intensity of 
preferences, and the failure to adjust for the marginal utility of money; this can be 
overcome by assigning utility weights to individuals’ willingness to pay or income.  
Divergence between compensation ex ante and compensation ex post, “concerning 
whether ex post compensation should adjust for hedonic adaptation among injury 
victims” (p69), could be resolved through a “capabilities approach” where the quality of 
life is assessed on the basis of an individual’s ability to do something. Lastly, conflicts 
between individual and collective rationality can to a certain degree be overcome by the 
introduction of pricing (where the external effects can be internalised, taxation and fees 
can be used to mitigate the effect of the externality). 
A recent article by Bahamonde-Birke et al. (2015) suggests that despite all of the 
acknowledged limitations WTP appears to be the most pertinent and accurate approach 
for valuation of safety and for non-market goods more widely.  
The valuation of life and injury using the WTP approach is thus a central element in cost-
benefit analysis despite certain problems which have been highlighted in the literature. 
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As shown, many of these can be overcome in a suitably refined analysis and variations 
thereof. Its validity will therefore be presumed in what follows and it is a natural 
progression from safety output measurement. The value of life and serious injury figures 
used later in this work are fixed values as provided by the DfT’s Web TAG Databook 
(2014, Table A 4.1.1). Fixed values can help to overcome some of the issues relating to 
the WTP approach as noted by Elvik (2013) earlier in this section.  
 SUMMARY 
The first part of this chapter described and discussed the CBA approach in the context of 
alternative techniques, evaluated the options and showed why CBA is the preferred 
appraisal approach for this thesis. It meets the requirements for practical rationality and 
although it has weaknesses, these can be controlled by careful application. It can therefore 
be applied with confidence to the treatment of CMS. 
The chapter also investigated some of the theoretical issues in applying CBA in practice 
such as safety measurement, assessment of actual and perceived risks and the valuation 
of safety policy. The question of the best measure of the “output” of safety policy draws 
on the earlier analysis and work of Bergantino and Patel (2000) and has concluded that 
safety output should be measured in terms of fatalities (and serious injuries) per person-
kilometre, or as in most cases, per 1000M person km.  
In evaluating the reduction in risk of death or serious injury as a result of safety policies, 
it is argued that the “willingness to pay” method is the only appropriate and promising 
monetary measure of the “VSL/VPF” in accordance with the wide body of literature on 
the topic. Combining all the tools allows a measure of the monetary value of the benefits 
achieved through a reduction of fatalities from a cross-modal switch impacting the risk 
of death; and these (along with an analogous measure of the benefits in terms of reduced 
risk of serious injury) have been the primary measure of the benefits resulting from a 
policy of encouraging or requiring modal switch by passengers.  
Later chapters, particularly Chapter 6 (Casualty Risk Assessments) and Chapter 9 (Net 
Benefit Calculations) provide a basis for the CMS benefit assessment because they 
calculate the risks which can be combined with the Value of Prevented Fatality/Injury 
(VPF/ VPI) valuation. This means that the differences between modes can be set out in 
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monetised terms and, hence, the advantages of CMS can be set out in a form that policy 




 4  CROSS MODAL SWITCHING (CMS) 
With the background of the definition of an optimal transport policy and the methods used 
that have been examined in the previous chapters (2 and 3), this chapter introduces the 
essential innovative conceptual framework of the work: the use of CMS as an instrument 
of transport safety policy. Firstly a brief historical overview of modal change over the 
second part of the 20th century is provided as context. A general overview of CMS is then 
given in the context of policy and modal behaviour with examples in the first part of the 
chapter, while the second part reviews the literature on CMS as it relates to various 
applications and specifically with respect to safety improvements. 
 HISTORICAL CONTEXT FOR MODAL CHANGE 
To demonstrate the dynamics of transport mode use over a long time period, Figure 4-1 
highlights some of the changes in the use of surface travel modes from 1952 to the present.  
 
Source: DfT (2014c) 
Figure 4-1: Passenger kms by mode: Great Britain 1952-2013 
This shows that over this 61 year period there was in Great Britain a fourfold increase in 
total distance travelled in all modes (excluding air) and that almost all of this increase 
was based on the use of private road vehicles, mainly passenger cars but also taxis and 
vans. Although not visible in Figure 4-1, domestic air travel has increased by 50 times 
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since 1952 (ONS, 2010). Accompanying this was a major switch away from bus, with 
this mode falling by about half over the period and a relatively static use of rail for much 
of the period, though with a significant increase in use from the mid-1990s onwards. This 
confirms that modal use is by no means constant over time. For travel outside Great 
Britain, in addition to the very large increase in air travel there has also been provision of 
services such as the high speed Eurostar train and Le Shuttle car travel to France which 
provides travellers with more capacity and frequency options that were not there prior to 
1994 when the Channel Tunnel opened. Table 4-1 provides 2014 values which can be 
compared with 1993 when only ro-ro ferry/ train services were available with very limited 
uptake. 
Route Rail Share (%) Air Share (%) 
Paris – London 81 17 
Paris – Brussels 95 5 
Source: Adapted from Marie, 2014 
Table 4-1: Rail-Air market shares on specific routes  
Taking more recent trends, DfT (2014c,e) and DfT (2013a) provide an indication of 
average total distance travelled by people in England37 in each of the main surface modes 
for the period 1995/1997-2013. This is presented in Figure 4-2. This confirms the trend 
that was visible in the later part of the time series shown in Figure 4-1, namely a gradual 
but steady reduction in the use of the car over the 1995 to 2013 period. This is about 12% 
for drivers over the period and passenger levels also reduce, but slightly more slowly at 
10%, suggesting a very gradual increase in occupancy rates. 
 
                                                 





Source: Adapted from Table NTS0305 Average distance travelled by mode: England, 1995/97 to 2013 
(DfT, 2014e) 
Figure 4-2: Average distance travelled by mode: England, 1995/97 to 2013 
The growth in rail/metro use is also confirmed over this period, again as a steady rise. 
This is made up of surface rail growth of 66% while the London Underground’s miles per 
person per year also grew by 24%. The largest fall, overall, was in non-local bus which 
was down by 49%, but London bus mileage increased by 68% and other local bus was 
almost steady. It should be noted that operator data suggests an absolute growth in 
scheduled express coach travel in Britain, although this may be offset by declines in other 
forms of coach travel. Cycling increased by 8% and walking reduced by 6%, DfT, 2014e 
(Table NTS0305).. Modal use, even on this shorter timescale, is therefore relatively fluid, 
supporting the prospects for encouraging further modal change in support of safety policy. 
Long term aggregate modal changes are made up of a large number of individual mode 
changes and hence support the proposition that switching does occur in some instances 
in the short-term. They also give some indication of what modal changes have been 
possible and in response to what stimuli e.g. some of the 'switching' may be people 
changing journeys (e.g. new job etc.) and selecting different modes from their previous 
job, but some changes are likely to consist of people actually changing from one mode to 
another for reasons of cost, convenience or preference (USEmobility, 2013).  
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The modal changes observed have taken place for varying reasons. Broader travel patterns 
have altered due to changes in disposable income (substantial change of behaviour by 
young adults (17-20), especially males where driver licences have reduced from 51% in 
1995/97 to 30% in 2013 (Berrington and Mikolai, 2014), more affordable pricing, greater 
accessibility on certain routes due to network or infrastructure expansion, increased 
capacity, environmental pressures and avoidance of traffic congestion. Increases in public 
transport infrastructure and networks have enabled more use of public transport rather 
than cars to access city centres. Examples include the large increase in bus capacity in 
London (DfT, 2015a) and the increases in train capacity initially by removing seating but 
also by lengthening train formations (Stagecoach, 2015). Taxation and user charging has 
also played a part. In particular the London congestion charge (to reduce congestion and 
emissions) encourages use of public transport and cycles in preference to private cars 
(TfL, 2013). It is also true to say that technology improvements play a part in promoting 
modal change, particularly the availability of reliable information about public transport 
both in real time and to allow for journey planning but also more recently apps such as 
Uber promoting increased use of public taxis. These examples illustrate therefore that 
modal switching does occur over time in response to a range of incentives including better 
provision of alternatives, financial instruments such as charging, taxation and incentives 
as well as convenience and avoidance of delays.  
The significance of this for this thesis is that it confirms the willingness to consider 
substitution among modes by passengers; this is, after all, central to the practicability of 
a policy designed to promote overall safety by encouraging or requiring modal 
substitution. 
 CROSS MODAL SWITCHING - OPTIMAL SAFETY POLICY ACROSS 
ALL MODES 
 4.2.1  General 
In principle, a degree of substitutability among transport modes has been assumed for 
passengers on a wide variety of routes, as statistical studies show that there is significant 
actual and potential capacity for substitution across modes. This opens up the possibility 
that one way of improving passenger safety on those routes where substitution is possible 
would be to encourage or even require modal shift to the extent that passenger safety is 
demonstrably different between modes. This point has been noted as a side effect in a 
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number of previous studies (e.g. the effects of new railway lines or new systems of rail 
signalling which allow faster or more frequent rail journeys in transferring some 
passengers from road to rail, thereby reducing road accidents). Early work has focused, 
for example, on studies by Allsop and Turner (1986) on the inter-relationship between 
public transport fares, motorcycle use and accidents in London in the early 1980s, as well 
as the work of Hillman et al. (1990) and others on the decrease of cycling and walking 
and the increase in car use for the journey to school. Accident savings have been 
highlighted as a benefit of many new rail schemes, going back to the study of the Victoria 
Line in London by Foster and Beesley in the 1960s (1963) and Nash and Preston (1991) 
on how rail investment projects should be based on social cost benefit analysis including 
wider user and economic benefits. This thesis aims to show that CMS merits systematic 
consideration as a means of improving transport safety; and that it may be seen as a 
primary instrument of safety policy rather than as just a side effect of policies designed 
for other quite different purposes. In other words, CMS could be valuable in itself as a 
safety improvement tool. It will be argued therefore that it should be seen as an integral 
part of an overall optimal safety policy that considers all (practical) modes 
simultaneously. This is the innovative conceptual framework of the thesis, which will be 
evaluated using empirical data analysis in later chapters. 
 4.2.2  Intermodality and cross modal substitution 
Two concepts relevant in this framework which are useful to introduce and whose 
differences need clarification are intermodal transport and CMS.  
Intermodal transport  
Intermodal transport has been considered in the context of both freight movement and 
passenger transport. The European Commission (1997) in a document on intermodality 
defined it as “a characteristic of a transport system” (referring to the use of two or more 
modes in an integrated manner) and considered “a quality indicator of the integration 
between different modes” (quantifying the intensity of the integration and 
complementarity). Last and Manz (2003) also adopt this definition of using two or more 
modes during a single journey for passenger intermodality. The European Forum on 
Intermodal Passenger Transport (Link, 2011, p6) defines intermodality “…as a 
characteristic of a transport system that allows at least two different modes to be used in 
an integrated manner in a door-to-door transport chain.” This contrasts with their 
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multimodal definition which is the “use of different modes of transport at different 
opportunities (trips/trip chains); [and] policy principle not to stick to one single mode. 
The development of a seamless web of integrated transport chains, linking road, rail and 
waterways” (p7). More recently, the concept of co-modality is considered to be the 
“efficient use of different modes on their own and in combination. Policy principle of the 
Delphi 
(DG MOVE) includes the following areas…:  
1. Optimise each mode (clean & efficient)  
2. Integrate modes for seamless transport (intermodality)  
3. Modal shift (long-distance, urban areas, congested corridors)” (p8). 
Within the framework of this thesis the term “intermodality” (meaning mode 
complementarity) will primarily be used while acknowledging that, in the literature, there 
is not a rigid distinction between “multimodal” and “intermodality” (Bak et al., 2012). 
The intermodal transport system is shown in Figure 4-3 and would include:  
 an independent mode A; 
 an independent but complementary mode B; 
 a transfer point connecting the modes A and B; 
 a set of value-adding services, e.g. joint ticketing; 
 a legal and regulatory framework valid for all of them. 
 
Source: Last and Manz (2003) 
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Figure 4-3: Intermodal interdependencies  
The transport suppliers’ perspectives on intermodal transport systems are mainly focused 
on the integration of competing modes. They regard intermodal transport systems as 
beneficial if there are compelling operational and or strategic economic advantages. 
Intermodal co-operations lead to the strengthening of this individual economic potential. 
In Germany, for example, Lufthansa German Airlines, Deutsche Bahn German Railways 
and Fraport, the owner of Frankfurt/Main Airport, signed a memorandum of 
understanding to co-operate on intermodal services. The motivation for this was that 
Lufthansa wanted to remove unprofitable short haul flights into the hubs, Deutsche Bahn 
expected access to new customer segments and Fraport wanted to strengthen Frankfurt 
Airport’s domestic and European position. An important determinant, however, of 
intermodal transport is the ease of interchange. Users are limited due to constraints, habits 
and disabilities (for example the needs and requirements of a business traveller vary from 
those of a leisure traveller). For that reason, users’ needs, limitations, preferences and 
competence all require careful consideration when supplying intermodal services. For an 
extensive discussion on intermodal transport systems and intermodality see Manz and 
Last (2003), Goetz and Vowles (2000), Alt, Forster and King (1995), Oberstar (2003), 
Bak et al. (2012) and Laparidou and Alander (2014)38. 
Historically, CMS and intermodal interdependencies have not been considered when 
assessing safety matters. This could be primarily due to the fact that the various modes of 
transport have not developed simultaneously. The different modes of transport also have 
quite different infrastructures and operational requirements and therefore intermodal 
comparisons have not been feasible or straightforward. This is highlighted in the case 
study presented in the article by O’Sullivan and Patel (2004) on fragmentation in transport 
operations. The study outlines the problems of interconnections and inter-ticketing for a 
specific rail/ship route (Fishguard-Rosselare) and the lack of system integration in 
general. 
                                                 
38 There have been a number of projects and activities funded by the EU in the last 12 years including 
CIVITAS Intermodality in urban areas (2002-2009), Towards European Passenger Intermodality (2004), 
MODAIR Measure and development of intermodality at airports (2005-2006), Air and Rail Competition 
and Complementarity (2006), eMOTION Europe-wide multimodal on-trip information (2006-2008), KITE 
Knowledge Base on Intermodal Passenger Travel (2007-2008), WISETRIP – Wide scale network for multi-
modal journey planning (2008-2011). 
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Cross modal substitution 
Cross-modal substitution is when passengers decide to swap one mode of transport for 
another to make the same journey. An example of this is passengers who normally travel 
from London to Paris by air deciding to use rail as their main mode of transport. It is thus 
quite a distinct concept from intermodality. However it may be noted that in many cases 
where substitution among modes is being considered in practical terms by a consumer of 
transport, often what is being compared is not a straight choice such as rail versus air but 
rather a choice of a number of composite intermodal journey options. For example, 
travelling from Tilehurst (just outside Reading in the UK) to Paris could plausibly involve 
any of the following travel options:  
 Car door to door plus train (Eurotunnel); 
 Car plus ship (ferry); 
 Train for the whole journey (plus perhaps a short walk or taxi ride at each end); 
 Coach to airports plus flight or even coach as the main mode; 
 Train to airports plus flight. 
In effect, on a closer examination almost every option for the desired journey is 
intermodal in character to a greater or lesser extent. 
 4.2.3  Pareto and optimising cross-modality  
Having considered optimal safety policy in earlier chapters it would be useful to examine 
if optimal safety policy can be determined across four modes of transport and thus used 
to support analysis of cross modality.  
Optimal policy is reached when investment has been pushed to the point where (MB-MC) 
or more precisely NPV = 0. Beyond this point it is not worthwhile making any further 
investment to improve safety since the costs exceed the benefits (both tangible and 
intangible). As noted previously, CBA/MCA can also be used as a tool for ranking 
projects in order of desirability. This ranking, in particular, can be used in an interesting 
manner to rank the desirability of various approaches to or instruments of an overall 
transport safety policy.  
Traditionally, transport policy in general, and especially transport safety policy, has been 
developed separately for each mode with safety projects being ranked for a specific mode 
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such as rail or sea. It is also evident that limited attention has been paid to other transport 
modes when setting safety policy within a specific mode. That is to say, no account has 
been taken of what policies exist in other transport modes and what impact (for example 
conflicting policies) they may have on the transport mode being considered.  
In instances where no substitution (modal switching) is possible among the various modes 
of transport that have been outlined, there are only two possibilities that can be envisaged 
for an overall approach to transport safety. Firstly, it would be possible to promote MB-
MC=0 in each mode if that condition had not been met in some specific modes but had 
been attained in others. When assessing various safety projects in terms of their marginal 
net benefit (MB-MC) and where (MB≥ MC) there is a potential to make a Pareto 
improvement. It is also possible that marginal benefit may not exceed marginal cost if 
substantial levels of expenditure are required to make sufficient transfers between modes 
to have a significant effect on overall safety levels. In this case, or if only limited safety 
benefits/gains are possible, the review will consider if it is worthwhile to encourage modal 
shift. The MB-MC, or NPV for multi-period projects, can be established for each project 
using CBA or MCA. When this has been carried out for a number of transport safety 
initiatives the projects can be ranked for each mode; optimal policy is reached when 
investment has been pushed to the point where MB-MC=0, beyond which there are no 
possible safety improvements. It would be important to consider the physical volumes of 
modal shift in terms using average or country-specific risk rates.  
Transport safety policy on a cross-modal basis, i.e. considering all the modes together 
when the possibility of substitution (modal switching) for passengers is recognised, 
presents a more complex set of considerations regarding optimal policy. If there is the 
possibility of substitution (modal switching) across the modes of transport and the level 
of safety differs between modes, there is also the possibility of promoting greater safety 
by promoting safer modes at the expense of others. Passengers can be encouraged, 
through payment, persuasion or prohibition, to switch modes irrespective of their 
perceptions of risk if the objective is to decide safety policy on a rational basis. Such 
encouragement of cross-modal switching or transfer has been employed to date across 
various modes of transport for factors other than safety, notably for environmental policy 
reasons (see  4.3  for examples). Paying or encouraging people to switch to modes where 
the safety benefit is the greatest (i.e. modes with the highest safety in terms of 
fatality/injury per person km) could, per se, lead to improved safety. The modal switching 
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here would be promoted without the need to provide any extra resources to the mode 
which passengers are being encouraged to use, provided that sufficient spare capacity 
exists in the receiving mode. If, for example, users of road transport were being urged to 
switch to rail transport for purposes of increasing overall travel safety, then no extra 
resources (or at least no extra specifically safety-related resources) would be required in 
rail transport for the modal switch to improve safety39. There could, of course, be financial 
incentives from the government to encourage the switch; and if the numbers involved are 
large the train operators might have to increase capacity and thus costs; but unlike almost 
any other type of transport safety initiative there would be no costs associated with the 
safety gain per se. Whereas increasing car safety by installation of airbags implies an 
additional cost in the production process of cars, encouraging people to switch from road 
to rail has no directly attributable “production” cost.  
 4.2.4  Importance of passenger perceptions 
A counter argument to the proposal presented above could be that passengers who desire 
safety will inevitably have considered the greater perceived safety in certain modes when 
making their modal choice, along with other factors such as price, speed, convenience 
and quality (further discussion on user perceptions is provided later in this thesis where 
travel user surveys have been carried out). It is known that safety differs according to 
mode and it can be argued that individuals have balanced their perceived safety 
differential among modes against any inconveniences arising. In this instance there 
cannot be any net gain from government intervention to encourage modal switch on safety 
grounds. Passengers who fly with full service carriers, such as British Airways, do so to 
some degree because they appreciate the good safety record of the airline and perhaps 
perceive it to be superior to that of other airlines. The inconvenience they encounter, 
however, is usually in the form of the cost of travel, although even this is changing as 
these full service airlines are now competing with Low Cost Carriers (LCCs) and are 
therefore reducing their prices considerably. 
For the above counter-argument to be valid and to invalidate the case for use of modal 
switch as a tool of overall transport safety policy certain conditions need to hold true: 
a) that all users are sufficiently well informed about comparative safety levels; and 
                                                 
39 Here the modal shift is assuming zero infrastructure investments in rail transport. 
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b) that the only people whose safety is affected are those making the modal choice.  
In practice, the situation referred to in point (a) rarely occurs due to asymmetric 
information regarding safety on the various modes of transport; perceptions and reality 
can be dramatically out of line as regards risk of death or serious injury in the various 
modes. The statement in (b) is clearly not the case, as has been already established in 
Chapter 2 when developing the general arguments for state intervention to promote 
transport safety. The impacts (externalities) are often on third parties and it is in respect 
of these impacts that state intervention may become necessary since those affected have 
not exercised any choice.  
It has been argued that where the user can have some influence directly on the level of 
safety through their own behaviour (e.g. people driving their own cars) that figures for 
average deaths and serious injuries per person km are not particularly pertinent; the driver, 
in effect, feels that they can outperform the figures and that the safety figures do not apply 
to their case. While the driving safety record of different population groups varies, as 
reflected in insurance premiums, safety on the roads is also very much dependant on 
external factors beyond the driver’s control, not least the behaviour of other drivers and 
the weather.  
Consequently, we cannot discard the case for modal switch considerations in safety policy 
on the supposed ground that these will have already been taken into account in choices. 
Rather, modal switching should be seen as a new instrument for giving effect to a 
transport safety policy which, in turn, is based on the classic considerations of public non-
excludable externality, abuse of dominant position, asymmetries of information and 
harmonisation of standards. CMS specifically is most relevant as a policy tool for 
interventions to deal with public non-excludable externalities and imperfections of 
information; but against this possible limitation of relevance it should be noted that 
encouragement of modal switching will typically be a very low-cost policy instrument 
for the promotion of safety. The exact extent of this is something this work aims to 
explore; but a priori it is plausible to assume that a safety policy which involves some 
marginal shifting between modes without any need for construction of new infrastructure 
will effectively be low-cost. 
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 4.2.5  CMS and transport policy 
If there is a possibility of CMS which is accepted, then transport safety policies for 
individual modes cannot be developed rationally in isolation from one another. Rather, it 
would be appropriate for transport safety promotion policy to be set together for all modes 
in an integrated manner. Although the DETR (1998) and subsequent DETR (2000) 
transport policy in the UK addresses the integration of transport policy in general, it still 
examines transport safety only on a mode-specific basis. It outlines what is envisaged 
with respect to safety in road, rail, air and sea taken individually but does not mention 
any integration of transport safety policy or modal switching. If all the modes were to be 
considered together, both safety projects that concentrate on improving safety within a 
specific mode in the traditional way (for example ATP) and projects that would seek to 
improve safety by encouraging or requiring a modal switch for some groups of passengers 
would be included. More recently, Preston (2012) addresses the general issues concerning 
transport integration policies in the UK and in Europe and concludes that the 
implementation has been difficult and obstructed by competition among different modes 
of transport. 
It is accepted that that government funding for safety policies is limited due to budgetary 
constraints; therefore simultaneous consideration of safety policies across all modes 
(rather than a fragmented approach for each mode independently) can be useful to 
establish the projects that show notable benefit cost ratios (BCRs) overall.  
Regarding the modal switch, the benefits that can accrue to passengers from switching to 
an alternative mode of transport do not imply any extra resources being devoted to the 
safer mode. Any resources deployed would be purely to encourage users of one mode of 
transport to switch to another safer mode. This can be achieved in a number of different 
ways, for example through subsidised rail fares and through HGV driving restrictions in 
some European countries (France, Germany, Luxembourg and Italy). In the latter, there 
are two categories: the first comprises restrictions with a (series of) fixed calendar dates 
where the restriction on HGVs is in place. Information on this type of restriction is 
commonly well communicated in advance of the actual date of restriction; for example, 
general night bans and weekend driving bans, and holiday period or public holiday related 
driving restrictions. The second category is non-fixed calendar date restrictions, whereby 
although the specifics of these restrictions are well communicated, the calendar date 
normally is only known shortly before the actual occurrence. These restrictions relate to, 
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for instance, the current weather situation or the traffic density on a certain day (van den 
Engel 2010). This approach to considering optimal safety policy today is appropriate and 
in tune with calls for integrated transport solutions.  
For the North American situation, Litman (2014) highlights public perceptions that public 
transport is more dangerous than other modes and a resulting reluctance to use it and 
support its expansion. He confirms that these views are at odds with the risk statistics for 
public transport and result from the nature of the travel experience, media coverage of 
specific incidents, emphasis on danger rather than safety in messages transmitted. These 
views combine with an undue underestimation of car travel risks. 
Litman’s (2014) conclusions are based on a comparative review of the statistics for 
different transport modes. This also acknowledges the impacts of higher risk feeder 
modes such as walking and cycling but suggests that these high risks are offset by reduced 
risks to third parties and the health benefits to those undertaking them. Litman also notes 
from a 2012 review of 101 US cities that there is a link between greater public transport 
use and overall transport safety, though the strength of this relationship is higher in pro-
public transport cities such as Seattle and Denver compared with Dallas and Houston. 
The explanation given for this link is the wider implications for urban design, so increased 
public transport use tends to be linked to better and safer overall urban design. 
In policy terms he stresses the importance of better communication of safety benefits of 
public transport travel. Linked to this he recommends to encourage traffic safety experts 
to recognise public transport safety impacts and consider pro-public transport policies as 
potential traffic safety strategies. The logic of the links between increased public transport 
use and overall safety improvements is summarised by Litman (2014). 
He acknowledges that there can be multiple impacts emanating from a specific policy or 
planning decision (Figure 4-4). Improvement in commuter public transport can benefit 
those who shift mode directly and indirectly reduce risk through reduced vehicle 
ownership by some households, which in turn reduces their non-commuter vehicle travel. 
Various proactive public transport policies, including service improvements, 
transportation demand management (TDM) incentives, and support for transit oriented 
development can have cumulative effects when implemented simultaneously, as their 




Source: Litman (2014) 
Figure 4-4: Transit improvement and incentives’ traffic safety impacts 
Litman (2016) presents similar findings to Litman (2014) but in a more policy oriented 
document produced by the American Public Transport Association. The logic expressed 
in this paper aligns well with the overall approach of the present thesis. In summary the 
key points made are as follows: 
 “Transit supportive policies can provide substantial traffic safety benefits, which 
result in saving lives and reducing injuries. 
 Modest increases in public transit mode share can provide disproportionally 
larger traffic safety benefits. 
 Safety strategies intended to reduce higher-risk driving become more effective if 
implemented in conjunction with public transportation improvements. 
 Public transportation investment is among the most cost effective ways to enhance 
traffic safety for a community.” 
This review re-asserts the link between public transport use and overall safety levels. The 
implications of the Litman papers (2014, 2016) are that CMS can have an impact directly, 
but that there are also wider impacts on overall safety from improvements in public 
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transport provision and use. Some of these are indirect impacts resulting from a greater 
overall interest in the safety of the travelling public, and others affected by transport risk. 
 APPLICATIONS OF CMS 
This section reviews the literature on applications of CMS to improve safety, approaches 
and methods used to encourage modal switching and develop use of active transport 
modes, experience of CMS in Asia and India and EU transport projects which include 
CMS. The objective is to understand how modal transfer has been achieved and to 
consider the most effective methods applied to achieve CMS for safety as well as other 
applications. A particular consideration is how much modal transfer is possible from one 
mode to another, i.e. the net shift rather than suppressed or new demand, because this has 
important implications for CMS in this work with respect to quantifying the actual 
benefits of the modal transfer. 
 4.3.1  CMS on the basis of safety 
To date, the literature reporting studies carried out on CMS purely for safety has been 
limited. ATSB (2002) provide modal safety comparisons and outline the results from 
Australian and other studies. They note that comparisons have been limited by availability 
and reliability of data on risk exposure and that single safety risk measures can produce 
inconsistent results across different modes. Overall, they conclude that high capacity 
public transport modes are the safest forms of transport per person-km, particularly air; 
with rail and bus the safest land modes and motorcycling the least safe. 
Other work by Baanders et al. (2011) reviews efforts to promote substitution from car to 
public transport 20 years previously in the Netherlands and considers whether the 
arguments are still applicable. They argue that a measure affecting one mode neither 
causes a significant shift to or from the other (i.e. car and public transport are not 
“communicating vessels”) nor has an impact on how these modes evolve in the future. 
They conclude that the arguments for modal switching are still valid but that there is only 
real competition between car and public transport in certain parts of the network at certain 
times of day around major cities in the Netherlands. Their findings suggest that in the 
future this situation will not change (excepting drastic shocks in fuel supplies) but there 
remains a challenge for policy makers to counter increases in car dependency.  
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Evans and Addison (2009) provide more detailed investigation into CMS as a basis for 
safety improvements in their investigative work on how road and rail safety interact in 
Great Britain. The paper concentrates on two areas: namely, analysis of whole journey 
risks (with rail as main mode) including access modes used to and from the rail system, 
and the impact of safety risk of intermodal transfers between road and rail. They 
estimated, based on DfT statistics, that walking constitutes the highest proportion of risk 
for a door to door journey40 at 65%, followed by 21% for rail and 14% for all other access 
modes (i.e. percentage components of total door-to-door risk). They investigated the 
possibility of increasing rail fares to fund safety measures by combining the results of the 
modal split with corresponding casualty rates and considered two illustrative 
combinations: 
 (1)“a safety measure or set of safety measures, reducing all surface rail risk, 
including non-passengers, by 10%, funded by a 0.5% increase in fares; and 
(2) a safety measure reducing risk only to rail passengers by 10%, funded by a 5% 
increase in fares”(p53). 
The safety measure noted in (1) above was considered to be representative of a number 
of general safety measures or groups of safety measures on railways. They noted that any 
set of safety measures capable of preventing 10% of all casualties would be fairly 
substantial, however smaller sets of safety measures with the same benefit/cost ratio 
would give proportionally similar outcomes (e.g. a safety measure preventing 1% of 
casualties for a 0.05% increase in fares). The direct impact of the measures noted in (1) 
above would prevent 3.3 fatalities (or 4.6 fatalities plus weighted injuries) per billion 
passenger-journeys (equivalent to a 10% fall in overall rail casualty rates per year). These 
reductions are attributable to passengers and to non-passengers including rail staff and 
third parties (e.g. users of level crossings). The increase in rail fare would however result 
in a modal shift from rail to car. As expected there would be less rail journeys, less access 
to rail journeys and increased car journeys with a counterbalancing increase in casualties 
because of the higher risks associated with this mode. Ancillary effects would be small 
due to limited modal shift. The cost per equivalent fatality was estimated at £1.3 million, 
                                                 




similar to the official DfT 2003 valuation. The requirements for rail safety were contrasted 
with a lack of similar requirements for road. 
The safety measure noted in (2) above is representative of a “high-cost system” safety 
measure (e.g. in this case use of additional ATP). The results showed that the increase in 
fares (5%) would yield £130 million and support a capital sum for investment of up to £2 
billion (cost of ATP examined), taking account of the modal shift of passengers from rail 
to car due to the fare increase. Evans and Addison note that passenger casualties would 
not be reduced by more than 10% even though the measure would be effective, because 
it would only address yield reductions for certain types of train accidents. Other elements 
of the existing accident statistics such as falls and other accidents could not be prevented 
with the ATP measure. 
It was estimated that the direct impact of the measures in (2) would result in the reduction 
of rail passenger fatalities by 1.3 (or 2.2 plus weighted injuries) per billion passenger-
journeys: roughly 10% of the current numbers per year. The ancillary effects of the modal 
shift from rail to car would be greater than the measures noted in (1) above since the 
presumed fare increase is 10 times more. The reduction in rail journeys and access to rail 
journeys are compensated by the increase in casualties due to replacement car journeys. 
A net increase of 1 equivalent fatality per billion passenger journeys is estimated, showing 
limited rail safety benefit. The impact of the modal shift (rail to car) is also surprisingly 
restricted, since the whole-journey risk does not increase by a factor of 10 but rather 2+: 
as a reduction in rail travel also reduces access and on-rail risks. There are also some rail 
users who do not shift to car since there are households without cars or users without 
driving licences (estimated at 39%) and these therefore do not add to the high risk through 
modal transfer. The value of measure (2) above is not considered to be worthwhile due to 
the cost of £130 million safety measure versus the prevented 2 on-rail equivalent fatalities 
and serious injuries annually.  
Several studies have shown that risks to pedestrians and cyclists are non–linear; the more 
pedestrians and cyclists there are, the lower the risk posed to each group. If a very large 
transfer from motor vehicles to walking/cycling were to take place, the total number of 
accidents could actually be reduced. The ‘safety in numbers’ effect of pedestrians and 
cyclists combines with lower motor vehicle numbers and thus results in lower overall 
numbers of accidents. Elvik (2009) was the first to estimate the road safety effects of 
shifts from car to bicycle and walking using Accident Prediction Models (APMs) in which 
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a non-linear relationship between casualties and volumes is assumed. He also quantifies 
the level of transfer from motor vehicles to walking or cycling needed to pass the point at 
which the combined benefits of “safety in numbers” and a reduced number of motor 
vehicles lead to fewer accidents. No distinction is made between different modes of 
motorised transport (car, bus, tram etc.) although they have very different average injury 
rates.  
The findings in the study show that in the current transport system users of active modes 
of transport are exposed to a higher risk of injury accidents than motorists, especially car 
drivers. Non-linearity of risk faced by pedestrians and cyclists is suggested in several 
studies. In theory the total number of accidents could decrease if a significant share of 
motorised trips is transferred to walking/cycling. The effects on accidents of modal 
transfer are dependent on the degree of non-linearity of risk, i.e. the more linear the risks 
faced by pedestrians or cyclists, the likelier that increased use of active modes of transport 
will be linked with an increased number of accidents. Elvik’s estimates are only 
exploratory and do not take into consideration those reported in the official accident 
statistics or of accidents involving pedestrians and cyclists. 
Schepers and Henin (2013) examine the effect of modal shift from short car trips to 
cycling in Dutch municipalities. They use crash and mobility data to develop APMs that 
take into consideration the non-linearity of risk. Their findings noted that there is little 
effect on the number of road deaths from a shift from car to bicycle, although the number 
of serious injuries would be expected to increase mainly due to an increase in single-
bicycle crashes. Their study highlighted the large differences between age groups in the 
effect of a modal shift. Fatalities over the age of 65 were expected to increase while in 
the 18-24 age group the numbers were expected to decrease. The greatest road safety gain 
is for the 18-24 age group of young drivers per exchanged car kilometre. 
 4.3.2  Approaches and methods of CMS 
Andrejszki et al. (2014) identified the modal shift of passengers by analysing their 
preferences using stated preference methods and online questionnaires. They developed 
utility functions to identify the future impact of modes on regional development. Modal 
choice was based on five key factors: travel cost, travel time, comfort, safety and 
environmental efficiency. Some research was carried out on soft measures (DfT, 2009) 
that influenced growth and modal transfer to bus from car in England. The results 
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suggested that soft measures (safety, security, quality of in-vehicle experience, ease of 
use, etc.) have a positive impact on demand and come into play after hard factors such as 
frequency and reliability reach certain thresholds. They can also be independent, such as 
where there are low-floor buses on existing service frequencies. Important soft issues 
emerging from the research were safety and security. Zimmer and Schmied (2008) 
reviewed methodologies that can be used to determine the impact on traffic of a modal 
shift from road to rail and ship for passenger and freight transport, based on data from 
2000-2003 in Europe. The approaches considered for determining the modal shift 
potential used capacity calculations, transport demand modelling or analyses of surveys. 
They estimated a theoretical shift towards rail transport from 9.5% to 17.3% which they 
suggest is viable if combined with policies and measures to address travel costs, time and 
railway networks. 
Lalive et al. (2013) explored how modal shift in Germany can be enhanced through policy 
incentives, particularly subsidisation, to permit increases in frequency. They consider 
whether government support to the railways would reduce road traffic externalities, in 
view of a railway reform that enabled newly created regional agencies to procure regional 
passenger lines competitively. They analysed services on 551 regional passenger lines 
before the reform and then again a decade later, together with information on severe road 
traffic accidents, concentrations of local air pollutants, and infant mortality. Their results 
indicate that a large increase in service frequency on competitively procured lines 
observed over the 10 year period after the railway reform provided notable benefits in 
terms of reduced road traffic externalities. Road accidents were shown to reduce by 4.7% 
and nitric oxide emissions by 3.8% for every 10% increase in regional passenger railway 
services. Their findings also showed that an increase in service frequency by 10% reduces 
car and motorcycle use for commuting to work by 2.7% and by 2.8% for leisure trips. 
Overall the results showed that people did substitute from cars to trains because the 
passenger service frequency increased.  
 4.3.3  Modal shift to active modes of transport for health and environmental 
benefits 
Rabl and de Nazelle (2012) highlight the health and environmental benefits of shifting 
from car to more active transport modes (bicycling and walking). The estimated level of 
health impacts for a shift from car to cycling took account of the health benefits to those 
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who switch, health benefits for the general population due to reduced pollution, changes 
in exposure to ambient air pollution and changed risk of accidents. Walking effects were 
found to be similar, although fatality rates per km were higher for bicycles. Accident risk 
is dependent on local context with variations in rates between rural and urban areas. The 
study found that fatal accident risk increases were offset by the overall health benefits. 
Differences between different countries and cities with large bicycle culture (Netherlands 
and Denmark) and limited bicycle culture (Italy, France and Belgium) were also noted. 
Dekoster and Schollaert (1999) cite similar fatality rates for cars and bicycling in the 
Netherlands, although this is unlikely elsewhere. The main benefit of switching, by far, 
was health and, to a lesser degree, environment (reduction in noise and pollution) and 
congestion. 
Schepers et al. (2014) outline a conceptual road safety framework model consisting of 
interacting factors for risk exposure such as modal split due to travel behaviour and risk 
of accidents. Their model is then linked to research on cycle safety, to land use and 
infrastructure and to policy consequences. They examine the level of risk of injury and 
cite work carried out by Schepers and Heinen (2013), indicating that a shift from car to 
cycling means that individuals are less hazardous to other road users due to lower levels 
of kinetic energy in the event of an accident. The impact of public “bikesharing” (shared 
use of a bicycle fleet) in North America is examined by Martin and Shaheen (2014) within 
Washington D.C. and Minneapolis. Using surveys the study found that bikesharing, 
overall, led to a reduction in driving and use of taxis in highly densely populated areas. 
Shifts in public transport modes, such as rail and bus, were mixed. Those moving towards 
public transport modes lived in the urban periphery and shifts away from public transit to 
bike share cycles were notably in core urban areas with high population densities. 
Evidence suggested that bikesharing was a first and last mile option where the public 
transport network was less intensive (i.e. facilitating access to and from the public 
transport system). Bikesharing was considered to be complementary to public transport 
in small or medium size cities while a substitute in larger and more populated cities. 
 4.3.4  CMS in Asia and India 
CMS experience from Asia and India has also been examined in the work of Nurdden et 
al. (2007), Satiennam et al. (2015) and Bajracharya (2008). The effect of transport policies 
on modal shift from car to public transport was evaluated by Nurrdden et al. (2007) using 
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a survey and a binary logit model for three modes (car, bus and rail). Modal choice factors 
included gender, age, car ownership, travel time and income. The work concluded that 
appropriate incentives were required for commuters to switch to public transport (bus and 
rail) such as reduced travel time, fare subsidies and a short distance from home to public 
transport stations. In Thailand, the modal shift from car and motorcycle users to Bus 
Rapid Transit (BRT) for Khon Kaen City (Satiennam et al., 2015) was examined. The 
findings were similar to those in Malaysia in that travel time and cost were significant 
factors in determining modal choice. The study concluded that the modal shift from cars 
and motorcycles to BRT could be further enhanced through priority lanes for buses, 
improved access, door to door services and increased service frequency. The reason for 
encouraging the modal shift was environmental, namely to reduce CO2 emissions. The 
impact of modal shift on the ecological footprint was highlighted in the work of 
Bajracharya (2008) using the case study of a proposed BRT in the city of Ahmedabad, 
India. A survey was conducted and discrete choice modelling used to estimate the shift at 
34% of two-wheeled vehicle users moving to BRT. Bajracharya suggested that the 
ecological footprint would be reduced by the introduction of a BRT that would represent 
a sustainable transport system. The reduction in environmental impact could be supported 
through further policy measures. 
 4.3.5  EU transport projects 
Some earlier EU projects have been undertaken in relation to the EU’s Common Transport 
Policy which emphasised modal substitution, albeit not specifically as a result of safety 
promotion. Examples of EU funded projects addressing aspects of modal switching are 
the AIUTO project (MIP Europe, 1999) on models and methodologies for the assessment 
of innovative urban transport systems and policy options, the CONCERT-P project 
(Barcelona Tecnologia, 1999) co-operation for the evaluation of city road pricing tools 
and TRANSPRICE (euroTRANS, 1999) trans-modal integrated urban transport pricing 
for optimum modal split. 
AIUTO aimed to develop a framework of models and methods for the simulation and 
evaluation of Transport Demand Management (TDM) measures. The TDM policies 
examined the fact that modal switching is not effective unless it is supported by incentives 
to switch, especially in the case of the modal switch from private cars towards public 
transport modes; although this was not examined with respect to safety. The CONCERT-
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P project evaluated the use of road pricing measures to change modal split in urban areas, 
in order to address problems of air pollution, congestion and noise in European cities. 
TRANSPRICE aimed to demonstrate and assess pricing strategies co-ordinated across 
modes, identifying effects on modal split and public acceptance. Demonstrations and 
modelling work in five cities showed that road-use pricing is an effective way of changing 
modal split from private car to public transport and Park & Ride, giving city centre traffic 
reductions of 5 - 25% (for charge levels of 1 - 3 EUR).  This demonstrates the possibility 
of promoting modal switching, albeit not in these cases for a safety application. Arguably, 
most people are sensitive to cost rather than safety issues but it is clear that public sector 
pricing could be influenced to reflect safety policy through appropriate manipulation of 
charging structures similar to that for congestion. 
 4.3.6  Overview of findings from the literature 
Table 4-2 summarises the findings from the literature to provide an overview from the 
context-specific examples (Sections 4.3.1 to 4.3.5 ). 
Author/s CMS Context Findings 
Baanders et al. 
(2011) 
Modal transfer on the 
basis of safety 
 Review over 20 years showed that significant modal 
switching in the Netherlands from car to public 
transport is only competitive on certain parts of the 
network at specific times (i.e. limited to certain 
situations).  
 Substitution of trips from car to public transport 
resulting from policy measures will differ strongly 
according to trip purpose, origin, destination and 
distance, since the availability and relative quality of 
public transport varies between market segments. 
Evans and 
Addison (2009) 
Impact of safety risk 
of intermodal 
transfers between 
road and rail 
 Assessed a safety measure preventing 1% of casualties 
funded by a 0.05% increase in fares that would result in 
10% fall in overall rail casualty rates per year. 
 Corresponding modal shift from rail to car would lead 
to a counterbalancing increase in casualties because of 
the higher car travel risks. 
 A “high-cost system” safety measure assessed (e.g. use 
of additional ATP) reducing risk to rail passengers only 
by 10%, funded by a 5% increase in fares, was not 
considered to be worthwhile due to the cost of £130 
million safety measure versus the prevented 2 on-rail 
equivalent fatalities and serious injuries per annum. 
 The impact of the modal shift (rail to car) is also 
surprisingly limited since the whole journey risk does 
not increase by a factor of 10 but 2 as reduction in rail 
travel also reduces access and on rail risks.  
 Additionally some rail users do not shift to car as there 
are households without cars or users without driving 
licences (estimated at 39%) and these do not add to the 
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Author/s CMS Context Findings 




Modal transfer of 
active modes of 
transport and their 
safety impacts 
 APMs used to suggest that in theory a large modal shift 
from car to cycling results in reduced total number of 
accidents.  
 Reason for counter-intuitive outcome thought to be 
reduced car numbers and ‘safety in numbers’ for 
additional cyclists. 
 The more pedestrians and cyclists there are, the lower 
the risk posed to each group (non-linear risk); 
conversely higher risk if less pedestrians and cyclists 
(linear risk). 
 The effect of modal shift from short car trips to cycling 
is examined in the Netherlands considering non-
linearity of risk using crash and mobility data to 
develop APMs. 
 The findings show that there is little effect on the 
number of road deaths from a shift from car to bicycle, 
but an increase in the number of serious injuries mainly 
due to an increase in single-bicycle crashes.  
 Noted large differences between age groups in the 
effect of a modal shift. Fatalities over the age of 65 
were expected to increase while in the 18-24 age group 
the numbers were expected to decrease. 
 The greatest road safety gain is for the 18-24 age group 
of young drivers per exchanged car kilometre. 
Andrejszki et 
al. (2014)  
Zimmer and 
Schmied (2008) 





 Modal shift of passengers determined by analysing 
stated preferences in online questionnaires. 
 Modal shift potential towards rail determined using 
capacity calculations, demand modelling and analyses 
of surveys. 
 Estimated shift towards rail transport from 9.5% to 
17.3% considered viable if combined with policies and 
measures to address travel costs, time taken and 
changes to the railway network. 
 Road accidents in Germany are shown to reduce by 
4.7% and nitric oxide emissions by 3.8% for every 10% 
increase in regional passenger railway services. 
 Findings also show that a 10% increase in rail service 
frequency reduces car and motorcycle use for 
commuting by 2.7% and for leisure travel by 2.8%. 
Rabl and de 







Modal transfer on the 
basis of health and 
environmental 
benefits 
 Modal transfer from car to more active transport modes 
(bicycling and walking) investigated. 
 Small increases in fatal accident risk (in monetary 
terms) offset by the wider overall health benefits. 
 Differences observed in the effects between 
countries/cities with different bicycle cultures. 
 Incentives such as “bikesharing” a first and last mile 
option where public transport network less intensive. 
 “Bikesharing” considered complementary to public 
transport in small or medium size cities but a substitute 
in larger and more populated cities. 
 Nurdden et al. 
(2007), 
Satiennam et al. 
Modal transfer for 
environmental 
reasons and 
 Modal shift in Malaysia from car to public transport 
(bus and rail) required incentives such as fare subsidies 
or reduced travel time. 
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from Asia and India 
experiences 
 Modal shift from car and motorcycle users to BRT in 
Thailand concluded that cost and travel time were key 
factors for modal choice. 
 In India discrete choice modelling estimated that a 34% 
shift from two-wheeled vehicle users to BRT for a 




Modal transfer on the 
basis of pricing 
 Projects considered pricing mechanisms as a basis for 
promoting use of different modes and hence provide 
useful background for the approaches considered later in 
this thesis. 
Source: Author’s own 
Table 4-2: Overview of findings from CMS literature 
 SUMMARY 
This chapter has highlighted that safety policy in transport has hitherto been considered 
on a mode specific basis without considering policies set in other modes and that this 
could result in the development of sub-optimal safety policies. The reasons for this are a 
mixture of limited government funding, the fact that many aspects of transport safety are 
necessarily mode specific and because although substitution factors have been considered 
to some extent for other applications, this has been very limited as regards safety policies. 
The main conceptual innovative framework in this work is advocating the move away 
from single mode policies towards developing an optimal safety policy that spans all 
transport modes simultaneously including (but not just confined to) by means of CMS of 
passengers from modes that yield limited safety benefits to those modes that yield the 
highest safety benefits. 
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 5  ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY 
 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter sets out the objective and overall rationale for the analysis conducted in the 
thesis, describes the approach and details the methods used to test its hypothesis. Figure 
5-1 outlines the logical flow of the approach from the primary and secondary data sources 
through the analysis process to the expected outcomes. 
 
Figure 5-1: Overview of data sources, analysis method and outcomes 
Overall the thesis examines the extent to which effective promotion of CMS can enhance 




 RATIONALE AND APPROACH TAKEN 
 5.2.1  Rationale 
As established in Chapter 2, the rationale for the thesis is underpinned by two viewpoints. 
The first is that transport safety policy gains from a rational approach, taking a long term 
perspective rather than short term responses to specific incidents. Secondly, that transport 
safety policies have previously been developed largely with reference to single modes in 
a tightly compartmentalised manner. Although some work has been undertaken at the 
multimodal level which recognises that safety should be considered as part of the overall 
evaluation of multimodal projects, much of this seems to be at a cursory level. European 
Commission (2013) passenger transport thematic research summary looks at safety 
considerations but focused mainly on road safety. Most studies on multimodal transport 
focus on time savings, health benefits and environmental benefits with limited emphasis 
on safety aspects. 
By treating modes independently and not taking full account of the options within a 
specific journey, policy has hitherto disregarded a potentially important contribution to 
overall passenger safety, a contribution which, for many journeys, could be achieved at 
relatively low cost. 
 5.2.2  Overview of approach 
Based on the premises set out above, the thesis sets out to consider whether CMS is worth 
promoting (safety differences between modes) and if so, whether such promotion is likely 
to be effective (in practical terms). The overall approach showing links to where each 






Figure 5-2: Overview of approach 
Firstly, the two initial areas are considered: 
Transport safety policy: Prior to the consideration of the two elements above, the overall 
approaches to transport safety are examined as context. The logic is that a rational 
response to transport safety, of the type typified by CMS, is a more effective one than 
being driven by major events, even if these events are prominent to the general public. 
Appraisal mechanisms for CMS: A second preparatory section is needed to examine 
and select the most appropriate appraisal tools with which to consider the success or 
failure of CMS approaches. 




Topic Question Tasks/Objectives 
CMS basis The key question needed to 
justify the use of CMS is 
whether some modes are 
significantly safer than others 
when used for equivalent 
journey types. 
This requires an analysis of the 
basic accident statistics, with 
consideration of full ‘end to 
end’ journeys including all 
necessary transfers.   
Steps involved in this include: 
 Analysis of statistics from national surveys 
o Review of accident and KSI statistics 
for all major transport modes 
o Identification of safest modes 
 Review of end to end journey statistics for a 
wide range of typical journeys 
 Identification of transfer hazards 
Risk differences on different odal 
combinations for the same journey types 
suggest value of switching 
CMS practicality The second key question is 
whether it is practical to expect 
some people to switch modes 
in response to incentives. 
CMS can only be realised if 
people are willing to switch 
modes and can be incentivised 
to do so.  
 
Topics which need to be considered to 
establish this are: 
 Preferences and willingness to switch 
(considered via questionnaires) 
 Safety perceptions (also considered via 
questionnaires) 
 CPEs  
 Incentives necessary for these modal 
switches 
Result – what incentives are needed to enable 
switching? 
CMS value  
 
What would be the outcome of 
such switches in terms of 
overall safety improvements? 
 Appraisal tool outcomes as per Chapter 4  
 Use of CBA as an appraisal tool to 
determine if CMS is worth promoting 
 Statistical review of CBA outcomes 
Practical 
recommendations 
What are the practical 
learnings from the earlier 
analysis that could be used to 
improve CMS implementation 
 Identify which mode to mode switches 
would be recommended. 
 Consider how changes could be 
incentivised. 
 Determine what rate of benefit (safety 
improvements) could be expected.  
Table 5-1: Objectives and tasks to appraise the value of CMS 
Starting with the potential value of CMS, the thesis firstly seeks to develop this insight at 
a theoretical level, setting it within the literature on transport safety. It investigates the 
safety gains on specific journey types which can be achieved by modal switching or by 
changing the modal mix. This process has been undertaken for a wide range of possible 
journey types and for different modal combinations within each of these types. By 
comparing the risk of death/serious injury per passenger km in different modal 
combinations, the work establishes the extent to which levels of safety differ between 
modes. This includes analysis of the sequence of different travel modes normally 
necessary to complete an end to end journey. If significant differences in safety between 
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substitutable modes can be established, then overall transport safety can be improved by 
encouraging travellers to switch to safer modes for at least part of their journey.  
To support the overall appraisal, the initial comparisons of risk are then monetised to 
provide a basis for CBA, the selected policy appraisal tool. At this stage, the benefits are 
defined to allow the CBA to be undertaken once the practicality and cost of the 
promotional methods are known. 
The next stage in the assessment is to consider practical aspects necessary to make CMS 
potential achievable. These include the levels of substitutability between modes and the 
CPE of demand. These are addressed through two questionnaire surveys providing data 
from users in a range of mode/journey type combinations, together with one expert survey 
linked to follow-up qualitative interviews with experts and users. The results of this data-
gathering are combined with reviews of the literature to test the validity of the approach.  
If a valid basis for CMS, and an optimal way to apply it, can be established, the final stage 
is to consider the implications for overall transport safety policy. The work has significant 
implications for a wide range of transport types: from road and rail travel through to the 
more recent efforts to promote urban cycling as a way to reduce emissions and congestion. 
The specific components of the thesis method are now considered in more detail section 
by section. 
 RISK EVALUATION FOR COMPOSITE JOURNEYS 
The thesis evaluates a number of practical cases where a priori there may be good grounds 
for advocating modal switch as an approach to transport safety policy. These cases are 
analysed within a framework of consumer choice theory and the theory of goods 
characteristics. The journey categories selected are shown in Table 5-2, with a number of 
specific examples examined in each case.  
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Journey Category Definition of categories 
International 
(e.g. London to Paris) 
 
The International category aims to capture a range of European inter-
city journeys, including not only major centres, such as London and 
Paris, but also smaller centres such as Bristol and Birmingham. 
Routes from the United Kingdom (large cities) to European 




International dual-mode long 
distance 
(i.e. including two long journey 
legs in different modes e.g. 
Newbury to Seville via London 
Stansted airport) 
This group of journeys considers travel within Europe by air but 
which involve complex travel to the airport including a number of 
modes. This is a useful approach to aviation risks because, although 
the aviation risk rate per unit distance is very low, travel to the 
airport involves many feeder routes which may render the overall 
journey risks comparable with other modes. The distances range 
from 392 km to 1,849 km. 
 Domestic long distance (e.g. 
London to Edinburgh) 
 
This category considers a mixture of both leisure and business 
journeys for longer-distance travel, mainly between large cities, in 
the UK. A mixture of routes is included to illustrate different 
combinations of major trunk routes (such as London to Edinburgh) 
with very good connections in all modes, as well as ‘cross-country’ 
routes (such as Aberdeen to Bournemouth). This group of journeys 
also consider using domestic air travel as a modal option. The 
distance range is from 403 km to 725 km. 
Inter-Urban 
(e.g. Reading to York) 
 
This category considers a mixture of both leisure and business 
journeys between large and medium sized cities in the UK. The 
distance range is from 55 km to 394 km.  
Inter-Urban Commute (e.g. 
Milton Keynes to London) 
This category covers commuting routes between 20-130 km using 
car and various public transport modes, to reflect inter-urban 
commuting in the South East of England. 
Urban Commute 




This category covers a regular urban commuting route (suburb to 
city centre) under 20 km and allows for cycling to be a main mode 
for the selected trip. 
The example chosen is Kingston upon Thames in South West 
London to a central London location. With increased pressure on 
parking, traffic congestion and, in London, the Congestion Charge, 
rail travel is now running at close to capacity on these routes. As a 
result, four of the five routes are based on a rail commute and are 
differentiated by the feeder modes. The fifth example, and one that is 
increasingly used in this area, is the bicycle commute. 
Source: Author’s own 
Table 5-2: Journey category definitions 
In each case, composite risk assessments have been calculated for a range of modal 
options for each journey. For each option the composite risk was calculated as a distance-
weighted average of the risks for each modal segment. These calculations are derived 
from distance based average risk measures, but some risks are associated with each trip 
made rather than distance as such (e.g. take-off in the case of air travel and boarding and 
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alighting on buses and rail). These risks not related to distance are examined to see if they 
need to be included in the composite risk calculations and how this could be achieved.  
The risk assessments for each mode are drawn from national statistics on death and 
serious injuries from transport accidents. Sources from a range of transport modes are 
needed, so the analysis has standardised these to the greatest extent possible. This is 
particularly important given the range of assumptions which had to be controlled to ensure 
the analysis was meaningful. In particular, the definition of serious injuries recorded 
varies substantially according to the purpose and mode for which they are recorded. 
 CROSS MODAL SWITCHING: PRACTICAL APPLICABILITY 
Having established the theoretical basis and analytical tools and undertaken the analysis 
of potential CMS safety improvements for a range of journey types, the later stages of the 
work explore the detail and practical scope for CMS. 
The work includes an examination of the limited cross modal and multi modal safety 
literature to see if there is any empirical evidence already existing on modal substitution 
and safety. An initial approach based on CPE of demand measurement associated with 
modal choices was used, in order to try to establish the degree of substitutability.  
Some of the key issues addressed are listed below: 
(a) CMS presupposes that over a particular route there is a degree of substitutability 
among modes for the consumers. The review stage makes particular reference to the 
extensive values contained in Dargay’s ITC (2010) study on CPEs of demand between 
modes. This is the most recent study on long distance travel providing CPEs based on a 
consistent research method for various modes. 
(b) Original empirical data have been gathered using two questionnaires distributed 
online and extended associations covering some relevant travel routes where there is a 
fairly clear prima facie scope for modal choice. The results assess individuals’ awareness 
of alternative modal possibilities and their willingness to consider modal switch. 
(c) Where there is an indicated willingness to substitute, a case can be made for using 
modal switch as a policy tool. This possibility is addressed by a detailed examination of 
the elements relevant to modal choice by the marginal consumer: that is to say, a consumer 
who is just at the point of indifference between which modes to use for a journey. Drawing 
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on Lancaster’s theory of goods characteristics, the work enumerates the various 
characteristics of the transport good and seeks to evaluate them as a step towards defining 
an optimal modal switch policy. As in the previous point, some of the questionnaire 
elements also help to explore consumers’ willingness to change modes. 
Through the theory of characteristics of the transport good combined with some of the 
questionnaire responses it has also been possible to a make a comparison of consumers’ 
implicit perceived risk assessments for transport modes (transport good characteristics) 
with what may be called the “objective” risk figure from historical data on risk and safety 
in the various modes. From this, practical conclusions regarding the extent to which CMS 
may actually be used as an effective tool of transport safety policy can be drawn. 
One of the key issues determining modal choice is the price of the journey. Drawing on 
evidence for the CPE of demand between modes, it is possible to estimate the changes in 
fares that might be required to cause a substantial shift between modes. 
This thesis has a taken a direct approach to the assessment of substitutability among 
modes and its relation to transport safety by developing questionnaires distributed to 
different sets of users and experts. The questionnaire asked people directly about their 
actual travel decisions for a certain journey, and also explored the degree to which they 
have considered alternatives and why (including asking them directly if safety was a 
consideration in their modal choice). 
The questionnaires were intended to draw meaningful conclusions about substitutability 
in general among modes and to establish its relationship to safety. 
Information gathered from these questionnaires included the following: 
 Purpose and frequency of journey (context for analysis); 
 Ultimate origins and destinations; 
 Feeder modes used (enabling estimation of risk for end to end journey safety); 
 Alternatives considered (indication of perceptions and flexibility as well as basis 
for substitutability); 
 Monetary costs of journey (including feeder elements) and whether for single or 
return; 
 Ranking of modal choice factors (gives relative importance) including safety if it 
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is ranked as a consideration by people; and 
 The degree to which safety (and other aspects of the transport good) are 
dominated by the principal mode on a journey or the degree to which safety in 
the feeder modes is seriously considered. 
Overall, the data from these questionnaires allow a much more robust assessment of 
passenger perceptions and a measure of substitutability. 
 DETAILS OF SOURCES 
The data for this thesis have been derived from a mixture of primary and secondary data 
sources. The literature review has been carried out using secondary data already 
published. Composite risk assessment calculations for varying journey types have been 
compiled using a variety of secondary data sources. These include Transport Statistics 
Great Britain (for KSI risk rates), WebTAG Databook, Department of Transport for Value 
of Statistical Life (VSL) and Value of Serious Injury (VSI) and data provided directly by 
Transport for London for London Underground accident risk rates. 
The two quantitative data surveys carried out used the consumerdata database for long 
distance travel (online electronic survey) and the databases of a network of extended 
contacts/associations (“snowball” electronic questionnaire distribution) for long distance 
travel survey over a number of European journeys. 
The qualitative research was conducted using primary data sources. The expert 
questionnaire was carried out using the extensive University of Westminster data listing 
of air transport experts. A very small subset of these had direct or indirect experience with 
safety issues. The qualitative interviews were conducted directly with a sample from the 
expert’s questionnaire and a sample from the quantitative personal user questionnaires. 
 DESCRIPTION OF MODELS AND METHODS USED TO COLLECT 
DATA AND RATIONALE 
 5.6.1  Composite risk assessments 
Composite risk assessments (total journey risks) were calculated to make an initial 
assessment of the practical scope of the cross-modal switch policy by examining a number 
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of practical cases where a priori there may be good grounds for advocating modal switch 
as an approach to transport safety policy.  
The assumptions and generic variables such as risk rates for the journey calculations were 
compiled in an excel spreadsheet and provided in control tabs. The risk rates for the killed 
and seriously injured were separated according to the mode of transport. Mostly, the risk 
figures for each mode are per billion (1000M) person km from DfT (2014c) and are 
average risk rates. The risks rates for London Underground were provided by Transport 
for London directly and the road type risk rates per person have been calculated using 
Vehicle Occupancy Rate from DfT (2013a), Risk rate from DfT (2014a, Table 
RAS30017), Road Traffic Statistics (2013d, Table TRA0204). It should be noted that 
averages over the 10 years for the risks for different road types have been provided by the 
DfT. Provision was made in the control sheets for a sensitivity analysis in which the risk 
rates can be readily adjusted to explore the effects of different rates. 
In most of the literature to date, safety outputs have been defined for a specific mode 
taken in isolation and, in effect, derived for what are presumed to be seamless journeys. 
Yet, in practice, many journeys involve the combination of a number of modes; or they 
may involve stopping and taking connections at some point in the journey even when the 
whole journey is carried out in the same mode. Both of these can have a significant impact 
on the total risk exposure for the person making the journey. The analysis of total journey 
risk takes this into account. 
The calculation of the composite risk follows directly from the considerations given 
above regarding the most appropriate way to measure safety output on any given mode, 
which is considered to be deaths/serious injuries per passenger kilometre. The distance 
travelled is calculated for each mode during a composite journey and used to weight the 
risk for each mode to provide an overall weighted average composite risk for the total 
journey. Thus, if a commuter travels 1 kilometre on foot and 29 kilometres by rail daily 
then if x is the pedestrian fatality risk per kilometre and y the rail risk of fatality per 
kilometre the composite risk will be calculated as: 
   (x + 29y)/30 
Where the units are:   (km*(deaths / km) + km*(deaths / km))/km 
Which contracts in effect to:  ((deaths + deaths)) / km 
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and so to:    deaths per km. 
This example relates only to fatalities (K), but risks of SI (Seriously Injured) and other 
levels of risk severity were also considered applying the same principles.  
 5.6.2  Attitudinal and revealed preference quantitative/qualitative questionnaires 
Two main questionnaires were developed to cover representative categories of travel, 
namely: holiday, business, visits to friends and relatives and ‘other’ category. An online 
questionnaire based on the consumerdata41 traveller database was used to address 
primarily leisure travellers from UK to varying destinations, while a second snowball 
questionnaire was circulated to travellers in various European countries who travelled 
primarily for business. 
The electronic consumerdata questionnaire was conducted first in March 2013 followed 
by the snowball questionnaire survey in May to July 2014. Improvements and 
modifications were made to the snowball questionnaire using feedback from the 
consumerdata responses, but the key questions were designed to remain compatible 
across both so that the results analysis could be applied across both samples in selected 
cases. 
The consumerdata questionnaire was posted as an online survey and completed by 203 
respondents. There was a good uptake of most questions and most respondents completed 
the whole questionnaire. As expected, there was a strong bias towards leisure travellers 
in the survey. This, and the fact that the survey was UK-based, meant that a large number 
of respondents used air travel as the primary mode of transport, augmented by various 
access modes at the origin and destination of the journey.  
The questionnaire was designed to measure trip characteristics, safety perceptions and 
modal switching issues. Questions about accident safety were included among related 
issues such as personal security to help limit direct bias. Revealed preference questions 
were used to collate information on individuals’ actual choices while attitudinal 
preference questions presented a series of journey scenarios for respondents to select, 
                                                 
41 consumerdata is part of the privately owned Cadogan Information Group. Outside the UK and Europe 
they have a global reach extending to over 30 countries. They administer, collect and analyse self-completed 





rank and rate. The questions presented varying complexities for the respondent ranging 
from simple alternative choice questions to more complex questions requiring order of 
preference. 
Revealed and stated preference questions have advantages and disadvantages (Ahern and 
Tapley 2008). Revealed preferences show current situations better and choices made by 
respondents are recognised outcomes. In particular they permit one to examine real 
choices made by travellers and to describe how people really travel. Stated preference 
questions provided an understanding of how decision making varies when different 
characteristic profiles and levels are considered and when the suggested outcomes are 
probable outcomes. Stated preference studies allow us to examine how choices might 
change if there were changes in the available alternatives usually presented in 
hypothetical scenarios. Combining both types of questions allows for balanced responses. 
Cherchi and Ortuzar (2006) argue that a combination of revealed and stated preference 
studies allow the benefits of both to be maximised, while overcoming some of the 
limitations of each method.  
A small pilot was carried out to identify any difficulties in answering some of the 
questions. The draft questionnaire was distributed to a sample of 10 regular transport 
users known to the author and also some researchers of consumerdata who regularly 
designed and conducted large questionnaire surveys. The main revisions were to the 
wording and phrasing of some questions including a number of safety questions. The 
responses to the final questionnaire provided online were coded, analysed qualitatively 
and quantitatively and the results given in Chapters 7 and 8. 
The snowball questionnaire was developed to question individuals travelling for 
business/work. Modifications were made based on lessons from the consumerdata 
questionnaire, but questions remained compatible to allow for larger overall sample sizes 
with inputs from a wider range of user types. The second questionnaire asked respondents 
for demographic data, which was not possible in the consumerdata questionnaire. The 
number of questions asked was also slightly reduced. 
This sample for the snowball questionnaire consisted of 111 respondents. The survey was 
distributed using a network of contacts located in various parts of Europe who were 
undertaking business related distance journeys in Europe in excess of 200km. A 
snowball/extended associations sampling method was used. This is a special non-
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probability method that uses extended associations through previous acquaintances. A 
group or an individual receives information from different places through a mutual 
intermediary.  
Snowball sampling is so called because as more relationships are built through mutual 
association, more connections can be made through those new relationships and 
information can be collected, much like a snowball. Snowball sampling is a useful tool 
for increasing the number of participants and is therefore used when a restricted number 
of respondents or test subjects are available. So that more respondents can be acquired, 
snowball sampling depends on referrals and recommendations. Initial efforts to increase 
the sample size are augmented in later rounds by this process. Every study has issues of 
bias, and aggregating the amount of participants in this manner is no exception because 
of a tendency for acquaintances to have similar preferences in a way that may not be 
representative. Nevertheless, the results reveal a range of views, and attitudes revealed by 
the qualitative responses given at the end of the questionnaire provide some confirmation 
that the sample bias from the selection process is limited. 
 5.6.3  Transport expert Delphi style questionnaire and qualitative interviews 
To widen the inputs further and take advantage of the knowledge of a panel of experts, a 
third questionnaire was developed for use with this expert panel. This contained more 
general questions which allowed the experts to expand on some of the wider safety related 
issues and to rank some of the key related variables. 
Although not directly compatible with the other two questionnaires, this one was designed 
to complement the responses gained in the other two questionnaires (electronic online 
and snowball survey). For this qualitative questionnaire a Delphi style approach was 
deemed suitable. Experts were asked to complete the questionnaire and this was followed 
up by qualitative interviews with a sample of the expert group. Prior to the interviews 
being undertaken the experts were provided with the results of the questionnaire survey, 
which they could comment on and validate during the interviews. 
The Delphi method uses structured surveys to make use of the experience and knowledge 
of the participants, who are mainly experts. It provides both qualitative and quantitative 
information which supplements the results of the two principal questionnaire surveys. 
Opinions from the experts are sought to add context to and aid interpretation of the earlier 
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results, and to assist with the explanation of outcomes. Generally Delphi’s are constructed 
to help identify and prioritise policy goals.  
Cuhls (1998) states that Delphi is an “…expert survey in two or more 'rounds' in which, 
in the second and later rounds of the survey the results of the previous round are given as 
feedback.” 
This is the approach that was adopted in this case where the expert interviews followed 
from the expert questionnaire. A characteristic of this was that, as the results of the expert 
questionnaire were circulated prior to the interviews, in the second round the experts 
answered to an extent under the influence of their colleagues' opinions. This is a specific 
characteristic of Delphi as compared to standard opinion surveys. Respondents learn from 
the views of others, without being overly influenced. 
The Delphi method is a “relatively strongly structured group communication process, in 
subjects, on which naturally unsure and incomplete knowledge is available, are judged 
upon by experts”, according to Häder and Häder (1995, p12).  
Delphi studies tackle issues formulated in statements about which uncertain and 
incomplete knowledge exists, as is the case here. Delphi involves making judgments in 
the face of uncertainty and the people involved are only asked to give estimates on 
quantitative questions. 
To add explanation and further depth to the responses from the expert and user 
questionnaires, additional qualitative interviews were undertaken with a sample of five 
respondents from each questionnaire type. These responses were analysed and are 
reported in Chapter 7.  
 SAMPLING  
The population about which inferences are being made by these samples is clearly very 
large since it is, in effect, the travelling public across Europe. Accordingly the sample size 
is unlikely to approach the size necessary for formally significant testing. Nevertheless, 
by capturing primarily leisure travel in the first case and a wider selection focused more 
on business travel in the second, the surveys covered a wide range of travel types. 
Although the focus was on longer distance journeys, the use of feeder modes was also 
included and this addressed these shorter legs (with the exception of regular commuting 
travel). The consumerdata questionnaire was conducted in March 2013, the snowball 
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questionnaire May to July 2014, Delphi style expert questionnaire June 2014, the expert 
interviews October/December 2014 and the user interviews March/April 2015. 
The responses for the two main questionnaires and qualitative interviews were as shown 
in Table 5-3. 
Type of questionnaire/qualitative interview Responses 
consumerdata Online Questionnaire Survey 203 
Snowball extended associations questionnaire 111 
Expert Delphi Style Questionnaire 20 
Qualitative Expert/User Interviews 10 
Table 5-3: Summary of Questionnaire response rates 
 CONFIDENTIALITY ISSUES 
Confidentiality and anonymity was assured to all participants of the surveys. This has 
been preserved in the information presented in the thesis. 
 LIMITATIONS OF METHODOLOGY 
 5.9.1  Fares data limitations 
Originally, three approaches were considered to be suitable to establish the level of 
substitutability between the different modes by direct calculation of CPEs of demand in 
transport. 
These were calculation through multiple regression analysis using fare and data on load 
factors, direct elasticities using data from the empirical user surveys and published data. 
Initially, fares were collated for 16 months duration in order to calculate actual CPE for 
specific journeys over a given time frame. The original intention was to collect data on 
quantities demanded at the various prices using data on load factors, with a view 
eventually to calculating elasticities of demand from the data on quantity and price. 
However this multiple regression analysis was not possible because the necessary data 
were not available for commercial confidentiality reasons. 
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 5.9.2  Questionnaire survey and net benefit calculation limitations 
It should be noted that there were some known limitations of the questionnaire process. 
These points, which are noted below, should be taken into account when considering the 
results: 
 There was a lack of random sampling as the questionnaires were conducted 
using online and electronic surveys. This could lead to bias in the samples 
recorded and this must be acknowledged during the analysis of the results. 
  Online and electronic surveys rather than direct face to face interviews limited 
the degree of qualitative explanation available from the respondents, though in 
the ‘Snowball’ survey respondents were asked for open qualitative explanations 
of their choices which did provide some useful insights. 
 The consumerdata survey was mainly based on leisure travellers by air from the 
UK to other countries; this meant that the main mode alternatives for many of 
these travellers were very limited. This could have affected the sample of 
respondents citing alternatives and hence introduced a bias in the sample 
obtained. 
 It was not possible to obtain any socio-demographic data from the 
consumerdata survey sample. This restricted more detailed analysis such as age 
specific risks. 
 Data for the net benefit calculations were obtained from different sources as rail 
passenger volume data on specific routes was not available from ATOC. The 
results from the calculations hence were quite sensitive to the precise 
methodological assumptions made in respect of the consumer surplus.  
 STATISTICAL TOOLS USED 
The main statistical package used was IBM SPSS Statistics 20. Pearson’s chi-square was 




 6  CASUALTY RISK ASSESSMENTS 
This chapter considers the potential value of the CMS policy by analysing practical cases 
where a priori there may be good grounds for advocating modal switch as an approach 
to transport safety policy. These cases are analysed within a framework of consumer 
choice theory and the theory of goods characteristics. The information sources and the 
approach to the journey risk calculations are considered first. This is followed by a 
specific section on the additional risks which can occur on transfers between modes, i.e. 
during boarding and alighting. Based on these considerations the analysis is applied to 
different modal combinations within a range of journey types to identify the risk contrasts 
between modal combinations in each case. 
 INFORMATION SOURCES AND DEFINITIONS 
 6.1.1  General Data 
The scope for promoting transport safety overall by switching passengers between modes 
can be assessed using risk figures for deaths, serious injuries and overall injuries. There 
is now a rich level of resources in this respect both for the UK and for Europe as a whole. 
The Department for Transport (DfT) in the UK collects and publishes an extensive set of 
data on all aspects of utilisation of the various transport modes including safety 
information, while sources in Europe include the Union Internationale des Chemins de 
fer (UIC) for rail, and Eurostat, the EU statistical agency, which also has a section 
dedicated to transport. 
UK data for the cross modal comparisons were obtained from the DfT (2014c), which 
lists passenger casualty rates per billion passenger kilometre by mode. This includes 
figures for killed, seriously injured and for overall injury in each mode. The ways these 
figures are compiled differs between transport modes and, in some cases, the definitions 
are not the same. It has therefore been important to take account of these differences in 
the experimental design and when interpreting the results of analysis. 
Road accidents generally occur in an ‘uncontrolled’ environment for example, and often 
involve multiple parties. As a result, the police or other emergency services are the main 
source of the information. On the railways on the other hand, accidents occur in an 
institutional environment and so, in the UK, the statistics are collated and provided 
through the Rail Safety and Standards Board (RSSB)/Office of Rail Regulation (ORR). 
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Different definitions are applied as a result and these have been considered and provided 
in Appendix A.  
 6.1.2  International statistics 
Although in general UK transport risk statistics are applied, risk rates are also required 
for international journeys in some of the examples analysed. The approach to these is as 
follows: 
Rail 
To provide risk rates comparable to the UK equivalents, the document “Railway Safety 
Performance in the European Union” (ERA, 2014) has been used. This involved 
converting the current ‘per million train km’ data to ‘per 1000 passenger km’ data firstly 
using a 1000 conversion factor to get to billions and then dividing by the train passenger 
load for France and Spain (161 and 105 persons per train respectively; information 
available from the same source). For the Eurostar the Killed (K) rate was set to 0 because 
no passenger fatalities have occurred on that line since its inception. For the journey into 
Italy, the train is a TGV for the whole route and so the French values were used. 
The European rail Seriously Injured (SI) figures in the report were derived by using the 
ratio of the K value to the KSI total which is given for the EU as a whole. The EU average 
for KSI = 0.28 per million train km (= 2.61 per billion passenger km) and the EU average 
for K = 0.13 per billion passenger km. The split of the total is thus 4.98% killed to 95.02% 
seriously injured (Table 6-11). The K and SI outcomes for France and Spain are split using 
this ratio, thus giving an estimate of the SI figure in each case. The UK SI values were 
applied to the Eurostar (Table 6-8).  
Road 
French road fatality risks were applied to non-motorway routes in Europe since almost 
all non-UK travel was in France. Only a single fatality risk value was available for all 
roads in France, but it is too high to be representative on motorways (based on 
comparisons with the UK). It was therefore applied to the non-motorway roads by taking 
an average of the UK and French rates for non-motorway roads in cases where the journey 
was conducted in both countries. For seriously injured, the UK figures were used. This 
means that national risk figures are applied to the international journeys as far as possible 




Aviation statistics are already international and hence regular statistics could be applied 
to each flight route considered. 
 6.1.3  Modal safety differences 
Differences in the accident statistics exist, as highlighted in previous sections, yet these 
are sufficiently small enough that meaningful comparison of attained safety levels 
between modes over time may still be carried out. Comparing modes it is clear that there 
are large differences in the level of safety. The overall average killed rate per billion 
passenger km for the period 2004-2013 for rail was 0.0136; for bus and coach it was 0.3; 
for private cars it was 1.9; for walking (including collisions) 29; for pedal cycles 27 and 
for motorbikes 89 (DfT, 2014c, Tables RAS53001 - TSGB0107). A transfer of passengers 
between modes can thus significantly impact the level of safety for passengers, e.g. a 
person using train has significantly less risk of casualty (being killed or seriously injured) 
than a person using car. Nevertheless, there is a lack of consistency in the definitions of 
severity of casualty. The value of such transfers will, of course, depend on the overall 
combination of modes that make up the total journey. For example, if the train station is 
a much longer walk away than a bus stop then the safety impact of the longer walk may 
outweigh the impacts of the main modal transfer. Given the substantial differences in 
safety levels among modes that are practically substitutable there is, in principle, a fertile 
field for investigation of the potential for improving transport safety by switching 
passengers among modes. 
 RISKS UNRELATED TO DISTANCE 
This section examines issues associated with the distance based measures of risk used for 
the thesis. A particular area of investigation is the treatment of risks which are not distance 
related and may occur between modes, such as boarding and alighting for buses and 
trains, and take-off and landing risks in aviation. 
The potential significance of risks arising from transfers between the modes, how risks 
within modes which are not proportional to distance travelled should be handled and to 
what extent these transfer risks are already implicit in the risk assessments need to be 




Figure 6-1: Illustrations of transitions and risks for modal combinations 
These issues will be analysed for aviation, bus and rail travel in turn. 
 6.2.1  Aviation 
It is well known that within a flight the greatest risk of accidents is associated with the 
initial climb/take-off and landing phases of flight as shown in Figure 6-2. 
Source: Boeing (2015) 
Figure 6-2: Percentage of fatal accidents and on-board fatalities 
It follows that passenger risk will be higher on a journey between two points which 
involves an intermediate landing and taking a connecting flight than on a direct flight 
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between the same two points. For the latter journey a composite risk calculation would 
be appropriate although to date passenger safety figures for aviation are not readily 
available in a format that breaks down passenger risk by phase of flight. Some caution 
needs to be applied in using the statistics, especially when interpreting results. 
ETSC (2003c, Table 4, p24) provides relative fatality risks per flight, flight duration and 
distance which allows for non-cruise time and cruise time for certain flight durations and 
distances and a resulting accident risk index per flight, hour and distance. Figure 6-3 
shows that shorter distances have higher risk rates per unit distance than longer distance 
journeys due to a larger proportion of the journey in the take-off and climb phases and 
final approach and landing phases as highlighted in Figure 6-2. The values in Figure 6-3 
were calculated based on flight durations of 1 hour, 1.6 hours, 2.5 hours and 7 hours 
respectively, with 1.6 hours being the ‘standard’ European flight duration and thus having 
a risk weighting of 1. At averaged flying speeds these durations correspond to 320, 720, 
1,500 and 5,750 km respectively as shown in Figure 6-3. 
 
Source ETSC (2003c) 
Figure 6-3: Accident risk factor as a function of distance 
Using this approach, a risk factor which takes into consideration the higher risk phases of 
flight (i.e. take-off, climb, approach and landing) can be used to provide an adjusted air 
risk rate. For the air components of the journeys used in Section  6.5  adjusted air risk 
rates for fatalities were calculated for sensitivity to see if there were notable differences 




Source: Author’s Own using figures from ETSC, 2003c 
Figure 6-4: Comparison of adjusted air risk rates with original average air risk rates 
The differences in the air risks rates for the journeys considered with an air component 
are marginal even when applying a higher factor for journeys with shorter distances, as 
shown in Figure 6-4. Given that the differences were not material for the purposes of this 
thesis, the air risk factor was not applied to the average air risk rates used in Section  6.5   
 6.2.2  Bus 
Travel by bus is a relatively safe mode, but, as with aviation, there are specific risks for 
many users encountered when boarding and alighting from the bus. A recent study in 
Sweden, Berntman et al. (2010), found that: 
“Using public transport nevertheless means choosing a safe transport mode. However, if 
the whole travel chain is considered, accidents to and from terminals or stops must be 
incorporated…., the comparison reveals a less positive safety perspective…... However, as 
Vaa [1993] stated, the door-to-door or travel chain perspective reveals quite alarming risk 
estimates. Comparing the risk of travelling door-to-door solely by bus to walking the same 
distance door-to-door points at a risk ratio of over 100:1” 
The key results from the Berntman et al. (2010) study suggest that out of 1,261 injuries, 
38% were pedestrians moving to and from stops or terminals. 
So the number of injuries is as high for the pedestrian phases before and after the bus 
journey as for the bus journey itself. The authors also highlight the fact that the age profile 
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for bus users is high which tends to exacerbate the risk from boarding and alighting 
problems. There is also a strong seasonal influence as might be expected in Sweden. 
Against this background, the UK statistics also provide information on the relative role 
of problems of boarding and alighting. A comparison of STATS19 and HES (Hospital 
Episode Statistics) statistics yields specific information on the percentage of bus related 
injuries due to boarding and alighting as shown in Table 6-1. The proportion of casualties 
injured when boarding or alighting is lower in STATS19 compared to HES data. Perhaps 
such accidents are less likely to be reported to the police than other types of accidents in 
which bus occupants are injured. 
HES data provides a means of monitoring the number of road traffic accident casualties 
admitted overnight to hospital. This provides an alternative, but not equivalent, measure 
to the number of seriously injured casualties reported to the police and compiled by the 
Department for Transport under STATS19 (DfT, 2006).  
 
Source: DfT (2006, p32) 
Table 6-1: HES finished emergency admissions of bus occupants injured by accident type 
DfT (2013b, Table RAS30010) shows that the risk statistics used include boarding and 
alighting accidents for buses and coaches and hence are implicit in the risk rates used in 
this thesis. Yet, there is a problem in that the use of the per-km basis as the unit of 
measurement means that the risk figures do not differentiate between journeys with 
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transfers and those without. This is also the case for journeys involving rail transfers. The 
implications of this are further discussed in Section 6.2.4 . 
 6.2.3  Rail 
The issue of boarding and alighting injuries with trains is one which is closely related to 
the design of the trains and the platforms, and, to some extent, the ways these are operated. 
Clearly all stations have additional hazards, such as stairs, which are a problem when 
people are hurrying to catch trains departing at fixed times. Nevertheless, the main issues 
arise from the design of the trains, in particular the older manually operated train doors 
versus more modern, automatically controlled doors. Separation of platforms from trains 
is also an important issue here. 
Many of these problems have been addressed in recent years, yet are of importance 
because UK risk figures can include a long historical record. Therefore the risk rates 
reflect some problems that have now been resolved. Boarding and alighting remains 
important, but some of the worst aspects have now been improved.  
Some key aspects of boarding and alighting affecting UK trains are now discussed in turn. 
Train characteristics 
A particular historical example affecting UK rail journeys was the removal from service 
of the older ‘slam door trains’ with manually operated doors, particularly on London 
commuter routes with very high traffic volumes. While permitting shorter in station dwell 
times, these carriages required a level of user common sense and so posed a wide range 
of hazards to some passengers; for example, falling out when opening prior to arrival, 
hitting people on platforms when opening prematurely and attempting to board when the 
train is already moving. They also allowed for en-route hazards, such as passenger 
operated windows large enough for people to lean out of and hence fall. 
Statistical records going back more than 10 years will include some statistics related to 
the operation of these types of trains and so may over-represent the risks posed by current 
rolling stock. For example, the HSE (2003) Annual Report on Railway Safety stated that: 
“52% of train collisions involved the striking of open doors on slam-door trains... As more 
new sliding door trains are brought into service during 2003/04 in the South East, it is 
likely that the number of train collisions involving doors will continue to fall.”  
Similarly, a Health and Safety Commission document (1998) says that: 
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“There are also a number of fatalities, usually between two and four a year, and a larger 
number of injuries, resulting from falls from the slam doors of Mark 1 rolling stock, which 
do not have central locking. In addition, many people are injured every year as a result of 
being struck by open doors on Mark 1 trains” (p23). 
This report noted that the number of fatalities as a result of falling from slam door stock 
has dramatically reduced from the late 1990s to virtually zero today. This is probably 
attributable to the Mark 1 stock renewal programme in the last decade.  
Station characteristics 
Annual estimates of risks from station related incidents on the UK network are given from 
the Safety Risk Model42. These cover non movement incidents, i.e. those events not 
involving a moving train. Figure 6-5 highlights risk to passenger and public on trains and 
in stations by type of accident (derived from Safety Risk Model). Platform-train interface 
(PTI) includes injuries during boarding and alighting and also falls from the platform 
edge. This category contributes to a relatively high level of fatality risk but it should be 
noted that boarding and alighting seldom cause fatal injury. 
 
 Source: RSSB Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15 (Chart 33) 
Figure 6-5: Risk to passengers/public on train and in stations by accident type 
Similar to the bus/coach statistics, DfT (2014c, Table TSGB0806) on Railway movement 
accidents: passenger casualties and casualty rates: GB annual from 2001/02 to 2013/4 
includes “passenger casualties owing to train accidents and movement accidents 
                                                 
42 The Safety Risk Model (SRM) is a quantitative representation of the potential accidents resulting from 
the operation and maintenance of the UK rail network. It comprises a total of 121 individual models, each 
representing a type of hazardous event. A hazardous event is defined as an event or an incident that has the 
potential to result in injuries or fatalities (RSSB, 2015). 
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involving people on board trains or in the act of boarding or alighting from them…” The 
overall rail risk rates suggest that the statistics allow for the risk of boarding and alighting 
to and from trains, although as noted in earlier in Section  6.2.2 there is an issue of the 
lack of differentiation between journeys with and without transfers. Additionally, in the 
case for rail, in station risks such as slips, trips and falls and some PTIs are not considered 
in the casualty statistics. The implications are examined in Section 6.2.4 . 
 6.2.4  Implications 
This section presents a discussion of some of the main issues which affect the specific 
and non-distance related risk profiles for aviation, bus and rail travel. These are important 
considerations because, in some cases, they cover elements of risk which may not be 
included in the analysis in its current form. A review of the basis for the statistics in the 
three transport modes considered established that for bus and rail travel, boarding and 
alighting figures are already implicit in the overall totals43. As noted in the earlier sections 
there is an issue of how risk should be addressed when considering journeys with 
transfers. To date there are no established transfer risk rates that are readily available 
which could be applied to reflect this additional risk at the transfer stage/s. A possible 
solution may be to apply an additional constant risk factor to the different transfer stages. 
To illustrate this, a risk factor was applied to a journey from Cardiff to London using 
different modal variations. Table 6-2 shows the composite risk rates for a journey from 
Cardiff to London, not considering the transfer stages in Case A and C. 
 
Journey Modes Used Original Original 
  Composite Risk (K) Composite Risk (SI) 
Cardiff - London Case A  W-LB-R-M-W 0.29 3.77 
Cardiff - London Case B C 1.75 24.29 
Cardiff - London Case C  W-LB-CO-M-W 0.54 10.72 
Table 6-2: Original journey composite risk rates for Cardiff to London not including 
transfer risks 
                                                 
43 Railway movement accidents: passenger casualties and casualty rates: GB annual from 2001/02 to 
2013/14; Rail Safety and Standards Board (RSSB), Updated: December 2014 
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Table 6-3 shows an illustrative example of applying a risk factor per transfer stage (0.1), 
which results in an aggregate risk factor of 0.4 for Case A and C since they have the same 
number of transfers (4). As transfer risk for K and SI is not proportional (i.e. no significant 
numbers will be killed as a result of transfers) an allocation of 5% for K and 95% for SI 
has been assumed and allocated. The incremental risk is shown in the table, which is the 
result of applying the risk factor for K and SI followed by the new composite risk rates, 
and calculating the resulting percentage change from the originals rates in Table 6-2. From 
the illustration one can see that there are changes in composite risk rates that include the 
transfer stages versus the original rates, but these are not notable.  
As expected, shorter journeys are penalised when compared to longer journeys: in Case 
A, the composite risk increases by 7% and 10% for K and SI respectively compared to 
4% only for both K and SI in Case C. The higher allocation for SI rather than K also leads 
to a consistent result as it reflects a higher increase of SI than K. Case B shows no change 
to the original values as only one mode of transport was used and no transfer risk factor 
applied.  
 
Table 6-3: New journey composite risk rates for Cardiff to London including transfer risk 
factor 
For this study, as only average published risk factors have been applied, it follows that 
the journey analyses and net benefit assessments do not take account of all of transfer 
risk. Further research would be necessary to quantify the specific transfer related risk per 
mode of transport. Overall using the illustrative calculation it has been shown that 
allowing for the additional risk factor for transfers does not change the total composite 
risks substantially. 
For aviation there is no indication that the figures include boarding and alighting effects. 
Boarding and alighting occurs in a much more controlled environment however, and so 
the likelihood of such injuries occurring is much smaller and can therefore be discounted 
Journey Modes Used Amount of Risk factor Aggregate
 Transfers  per transfer transfer risk K * SI * K SI K SI
Cardiff - London Case A W-LB-R-M-W 4 0.1 0.4 0.02 0.38 0.31 4.15 7% 10%
Cardiff - London Case B C 0 0.1 0 0 0 1.75 24.29 0% 0%
Cardiff - London Case C W-LB-CO-M-W 4 0.1 0.4 0.02 0.38 0.56 11.10 4% 4%
* Proportional allocation of total incremental Risk for K and SI.
Killed Seriously injured
5% 95%
Incremental Risk New Composite Risk Percentage Change
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as an additional source of K and SI impacts. The journey distance issue remains important 
to address for aviation assessments overall as noted in Section  6.2.1 , but in this case it 
has been demonstrated that applying a risk factor to allow for increased risk probabilities 
in the high risk phases of a flight yields only marginal differences, and hence requires no 
specific treatment for comparative purposes. 
 JOURNEY RISK CALCULATIONS 
 6.3.1  Total journey risk calculation 
Total journey risk has already been defined in the literature review as the total risk 
incurred by a person throughout the whole journey from door to door.  
The calculation of risk is based on a weighted average and will include such factors as 
for example the pedestrian risk in walking to a railway station or bus stop, or a car or 
coach-ride to an airport etc. The total journey risk is most appropriately calculated as a 
weighted average of the risks of the various modes involved in a journey where the 
weights are the distances travelled on each mode during the journey. The formula used is 
therefore a summation from 1 to n (the total number of modes within the journey) of the 
product of the distance travelled (D) and the risk (R) for each mode (i) divided by the total 
distance travelled. Generalising, this gives the following expression where the results are 















This is, essentially, a weighted average of the distances for each mode multiplied by the 
risks for that mode. Dividing by the total distance converts the outcome into the risk rate 
overall for that journey. 
For this analysis, total journey risk has been evaluated for different modal combinations 
used to travel equivalent journeys for six different journey types. The aim is thus to 
identify whether there are sufficient modal differences in each category to make CMS 
worthwhile. In some cases more than one journey is considered in each category. The 
journey types considered are categorised as shown in Table 6-4. 
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Journey Category Definition of categories 
International (e.g. London to 
Paris) 
 
The International category aims to capture a range of European inter-
city journeys including both major centres, such as London and 
Paris, and smaller ones such as Bristol and Birmingham. Routes 
from the United Kingdom (large cities) to European destinations 
(cities) are covered. The distance ranges from 450km to 1,700km. 
International dual mode long 
distance (i.e. including two long 
journey legs in different modes 
e.g. Newbury to Seville via 
London Stansted airport) 
This group of journeys considers travel within Europe by air but 
which involve complex travel to the airport including a number of 
modes. This is a useful approach to aviation risks because, although 
the aviation risk rate per unit distance is very low, travel to the airport 
involves many feeder routes which may render the overall journey 
risks comparable with other modes. The distance ranges from 392km 
to 1,849km. 
Domestic long distance (e.g. 
London to Edinburgh) 
 
This category considers a mixture of both leisure and business 
journeys for longer distance travel mainly between large cities in the 
UK. A mixture of routes is included, in order to illustrate different 
combinations of major trunk routes (such as London to Edinburgh, 
with very good connections in all modes) and ‘cross country’ routes 
(such as Aberdeen to Bournemouth). This group of journeys also 
considers using domestic air travel as a modal option. The distance 
range is from 403km to 725km. 
Inter-Urban (e.g. Reading to 
York) 
 
This category considers a mixture of both leisure and business 
journeys between large and medium sized cities in the UK. The 
distance range is from 55km to 394km.  
Inter-Urban Commute (e.g. 
Milton Keynes to London) 
This category aims to cover commuting routes between 20km 
and130km using car and various public transport modes to reflect 
inter-urban commuting in the South East of England. 
Urban Commute (e.g. Kingston 
to City of London) 
This category aims to cover a regular urban commuting route 
(suburb to city centre) under 20km and allows for cycling to be a 
main mode for the selected trip. 
Table 6-4: Journey category definitions 
To illustrate total journey risk calculations, an example of an Inter-Urban has been 
considered. This shows the differing impact on the total journey risk measure of the 
different modal combinations for the journey. For longer journeys the total risk 
calculation can be expected to be less affected by short walking/pedestrian elements or 
short bus rides. 
The illustrative example is Reading to York. It assumes that this journey is from a 
suburban house in Reading (UK) to a central hotel in York (UK). Let us suppose that the 
house in Reading is 3km from Reading railway station. The distance by train from 
Reading to York is approximately 278 kilometres and there is a further 2 km to the hotel 
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in York. The total journey is thus 283 kilometres. Two options for making this journey are 
examined: 
Option A 
Option A is based mainly on a train journey, starting with walking and bus travel and 
ending with a taxi ride as follows: 
Walk from house to bus-stop:  1 km 
Bus to Reading station:  2 km 
Train to York:    278 km 
Taxi to hotel in York:   2 km 
For this option, the total journey risk is calculated as follows. The risk figures are taken 
from the DfT (2014c, Table TSGB0107) and are shown in this thesis in Table 6-7 and 
Table 6-8. To avoid the potentially distortive effect of major accidents on any one year’s 
figures, a ten year average figure for 2004-2013 is taken from the table which provides 
these figures along with the annual figures. The selected 10 year horizon was used to 
avoid including long term trends that would make outcomes less relevant to the current 
situation. This means that the result is more relevant for CMS purposes while still taking 
account of transport technology changes. It is, however, accepted that if a longer horizon 
was used then the outcomes would be different.  
The composite journey risk for Option A for “killed” is therefore: 
(1*29 + 2*0.3 + 278*0.01 + 2*1.9) / 283 = 0.13 per 1000M person km over this 
particular route. 
The composite journey risk for Option A for “seriously injured” is therefore: 
(1*313 + 2*8.7 + 278*0.9 + 2*16.10) / 283 – (killed) = 2.03 per 1000M person 
km over this particular route.44 
Option B 
Option B is to undertake the whole journey door to door by car with 377km distance. In 
this case, the journey is split according to different risks on different road types 
(motorways, rural roads, other roads and urban roads). As well as differences in risks 
                                                 
44 Person km is used instead of passenger km to take account of car drivers, those walking and cyclists. 
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when switching between modes, there are also notable variations in risks when switching 
between certain road types for a specific journey. For example, motorway risk is 
significantly lower compared to using urban roads with a more diverse range of road 
users. Furthermore, although different road types partially capture the differences in risk 
for different journeys, there is still a simplification involved in the risk rates. Other factors 
such as the time of day (day or night times have not been considered), the type of user 
(young or aged persons) and even transitions between road types (roundabouts, traffic 
lights and other junctions) will also play a role. The distances on each different road type 
were estimated using Google Maps for this Reading-York car journey. The composite 
journey risk for Option B for “killed” is therefore: 
(337*0.97 + 15*6.65 + 15*2.19 + 10*8.33) / 377 = 1.44 per 1000M person-km 
over this particular route, where the weights reflect the distance travelled on each 
of the four road types. 
The composite journey risk for Option B for “seriously injured” is therefore: 
(337*7.24 + 15*48.56 + 15*45.96 + 10*183.69) / 377 – (killed) = 13.67 per 
1000M person-km over this particular route. 
The sharp divergence between the risk figures between options A and B is to be expected. 
What is more interesting to note is how the total composite journey risk in option A comes 
out at 0.13 per 1,000M person km whereas an estimate which assessed the risk purely as 
train risk (since this accounts for the bulk of the journey distance) would yield a figure of 
just 0.01 deaths per 1,000M person km. This underlines the value of including total 
journey risk as a composite figure because even the addition of small transfers by other 
modes can change the overall risk profile substantially. The seriously injured figure is 
also lower by walking, local bus, train and taxi than by car. This is because, although car 
journey injuries via motorway are dominant and also much lower than injuries via other 
road types at 7.24, this is still higher than the equivalent for mainline rail which is 0.90. 
The killed and injured rates for mainline rail have fallen significantly since the major 
accidents of 1999, and the early 2000s have fallen outside the timeline for the calculation, 
which now starts with 2004. 
 6.3.2  Monetising total journey risk 
To assess the safety value of a modal shift in a way that can be traded off against the costs 
needed to effect this safety improvement, it is necessary to monetise the change in total 
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risk for a given route as a result of changing modes. The change in total journey risk 
between Option A and B for the Inter-Urban example above (Reading-York) is:  
 Killed: The difference in composite risk (Option B – Option A, i.e. car – rail) 
is 1.44 - 0.13 = 1.31 (per 1000M person km). This means 1.3 fewer deaths per 
1000M person kilometres and is hence a safety gain. 
 Seriously Injured: The difference in composite risk (Option B – Option A, 
i.e. car – rail) is 13.67 – 2.03 = 11.64 (per 1000M person km). This means 
nearly 12 fewer injuries per 1000M person km. 
The changes in composite risk for both killed and seriously injured can then be monetised 
using the appropriate values of statistical life and injury, which are € 2,338,398 and 
€262,770 respectively using DfT valuations (at 13 November 2014 exchange rate). 
Multiplying these values by the change in composite risk while remembering that a 
reduction in risk of death represents a positive benefit gives a positive benefit of 
€3,061,626 for killed per 1000M person km and €3,057,115 for seriously injured per 
1000M person km for this route. 
Taking the killed and seriously injured values together gives an overall benefit of € 
6,118,742 per 1000M person km. The positive figure indicates that it is beneficial overall 
to have a modal shift from Option B (travelling the whole route by car) to Option A 
(walking, local bus, rail, taxi) in terms of the combined killed and seriously injured 
element. Since this gain is still expressed in terms of per 1000M person km, the extent of 
this positive outcome would also depend on the number of passengers switching (and 
hence the total distances travelled), and also on the costs required to achieve these 
transfers. 
To determine the monetised benefit for the actual journey it is necessary to multiply by 
the journey distance (which was divided out for the weighted average) and divide by 
1,000,000,000 to give the risk for the actual number of km travelled. 
 DATA AND ASSUMPTIONS USED FOR THE SPECIFIC JOURNEYS 
A composite risk spreadsheet in excel was developed to implement the methodology set 
out in this chapter. The spreadsheet consists of two primary tabs (control and main) which 
perform the calculations (Table 6-7, Table 6-8 and Table 6-12) and three additional tabs 
which present the outputs in the required formats (these are incorporated in Section 6.5). 
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The aims of the journey calculations performed by the spreadsheet are as follows: 
 To demonstrate the extent to which overall journey risks can vary according to the 
different modal combinations used; 
 To assess six journey types which are designed to cover the main types of journey 
made;  
 To break each journey into its component parts, assess actual risk for each part 
based on distance travelled and combine results to give an overall risk profile. 
Structure 
The spreadsheet is set out as follows: 
 Control – The overall control tab defines the K and SI risks per mode and 
references these to the original sources. This allows for updating because all other 
sheets refer back to control for these values. Monetisation values for K (VSL) and 
SI (VSI) are also included and referenced to the source. 
 Main – provides the overall risk calculation for each of journey type and within 
these considers the various modal options. The journey types are: 
 International – 5 routes with 2 or 3 modal combinations 
 International dual mode long distance (travel via hub to remote airport) – 
4 routes each with 2 modal combinations 
 Domestic long distance – 4 routes with 2 or 3 modal combinations 
 Inter-Urban – 6 routes each with 2 or 3 modal combinations 
 Inter-Urban commute – 5 routes each with between 3 and 5 modal 
combinations 
 Urban commute – 1 route with 5 modal combinations 
For each of the routes within each journey type, one of the modal combinations is 
specified as the base case. This is in recognition that this is the ‘standard’ or expected 
default mode for this journey as far as it is possible to define this.  
A total composite risk of K and SI is calculated for each modal combination within each 
journey type. The change in risk for each of the modal combinations in relation to the 
base case is then calculated. Differences between all the modal combinations are assessed. 
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The differences for K and SI are then monetised using the values set out in the control tab 
to express the benefits or disadvantages of the modal shift for each in terms of €/1000M 
passenger km. The K and SI benefits are then added to provide the overall monetised risk 
in €/1000M passenger km, and finally this is converted to the overall monetised risk 
differences between modal combinations. 
The headers in the main sheet of Table 6-12 are described in Table 6-5: 
Heading Description 
Journey type Modal combination 
Actual journey Indicated using a code which sets out the sequence of modes used for that 
journey. The legend is provided in Table 6-9. 
Modes A series of columns, one for each mode, which contain the total number of km 
travelled in that mode for that modal combination. 
Total distance Sum of the distance in each mode, giving the total journey distance in km. 
Total composite 
risks 
Two columns, one for K and one for SI, which in each case are the sum of the 
distance for each mode multiplied by the risk for each mode in K or SI per 
1000M person km. 
Comparisons For specified pairs of journeys, the difference in K and SI risk between the two 
modal combinations for the same journey. Units are risk of K or SI per 1000M 
person km. 
Valuations for the 
benefit of the 
modal switch 
This takes the values from the Comparisons, and multiplies each by the VSL for 
K and monetised value of SI respectively. The units are thus € per 1000M person 
km. 
Combined total This is the combined valuation of the K and SI differences between the modal 
combinations (the sum of the two valuations in the row above). 
Combined 
difference 
This is the Combined Total multiplied by the actual distance travelled and then 
divided by 1,000,000,000. This gives the actual difference between the modal 
combinations for the journey in €. This is the final monetised benefit in € of the 
given modal switch per traveller for the specified journey. 
Table 6-5: Main sheet header descriptions 
The remaining tabs are designed to show the output from the ‘main’ tab in graphical 
format. Accordingly, they take values from the ‘main’ tab, organise them in a suitable 
format and present them as a graph. In some cases, unit conversions are applied so that 
the outputs are as required. These presentation tabs are shown in Table 6-6: 
Heading Description 
Results Risk 
K & SI 
This tab presents the results of risk of K and SI. Individual charts are presented for 
each journey type. Within these, the K and SI risk values are given for each of the 
modal combinations for each of the routes. 
Results - € 
combined 
This tab provides the monetised risk differences between routes in €M per 1000M 
person km and for the actual journey distance for the route under consideration. 
Results - € K 
& SI 
This tab displays charts of the monetised value of the modal switch for K and SI for 




Ranking This provides a ranking of the modal combinations in terms of the safety related 
benefit of the switch per traveller. 
Table 6-6: Presentation tab descriptions 
It should be noted that only the headers ‘journey type’, ‘actual journey’, ‘modes’, ‘total 
distance’ and ‘total composite risks for K and SI’ are shown in Table 6-12. The results 
from all other headers above are shown in Section 6.5 . 
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Risk (Killed) 




















W Walking 29.00  1 29.00 DfT (2014c, Tables RAS53001 - TSGB0107) 
B Bicycle 27.00  1 27.00 DfT (2014c, Tables RAS53001 - TSGB0107) 
TX Taxi 1.90  1 1.90 DfT (2014c, Tables RAS53001 - TSGB0107) 
LB Local Bus 0.30  1 0.30 DfT (2014c, Tables RAS53001 - TSGB0107) 
CO Coach 0.30  1 0.30 DfT (2014c, Tables RAS53001 - TSGB0107) 
T Tram 0.41  1 0.41 
Transport for London – Data forwarded by Colin Shepard on number of killed and injured and 
person km (1000M) 2003-2014 Travel in London Report Figure 3.12 and Figure 5.2 
M Metro 0.41  1 0.41 
Transport for London – Data forwarded by Colin Shepard on number of killed and injured and 
person km(1000M) 2 003-2014 Travel in London Report Figure 3.12 and Figure 5.2 
R Mainline Rail (UK) 0.01  1 0.01 
 
DfT (2014c, Tables RAS53001 - TSGB0107) 
 Mainline Rail (F) 0.03  1 0.03 RAILWAY SAFETY PERFORMANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2014 - ERA) 
 Mainline Rail (ES) 0.09  1 0.09 RAILWAY SAFETY PERFORMANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2014 - ERA) 
 Mainline Rail 
(Eurostar) 
0.00  1 0.00 Used same figure as for UK - DfT (2014c, Tables RAS53001 - TSGB0107) 
A Air 0.01  1 0.01 DfT (2014c, Tables RAS53001 - TSGB0107) 
S Sea 0.40  1 0.40 DfT (2014c, Tables RAS53001 - TSGB0107) 
Cars by Road Type           
MR Motorways (Car) 0.97 1.57 1 0.97 
Vehicle Occupancy Rate from DfT (2013a), Risk rate from Road Casualties (DfT, 2014a, Table 
RAS30017), DfT (2013d) Road Traffic Statistics (Table TRA0204) 
RR Rural Roads (Car) 6.65 1.57 1 6.65 
Vehicle Occupancy Rate from DfT (2013a), Risk rate from Road Casualties (DfT, 2014a, Table 
RAS30017), DfT (2013d) Road Traffic Statistics (Table TRA0204) 
OR All Minor Roads (Car) 2.19 1.57 1 2.19 
Vehicle Occupancy Rate from DfT (2013a), Risk rate from Road Casualties (DfT, 2014a, Table 
RAS30017), DfT (2013d) Road Traffic Statistics (Table TRA0204) 
UR Urban Roads (Car) 8.33 1.57 1 8.33 
Vehicle Occupancy Rate from DfT (2013a), Risk rate from Road Casualties (DfT, 2014a, Table 
RAS30017), DfT (2013d) Road Traffic Statistics (Table TRA0204) 
FR All Roads (France) 3.60 1.57 1 3.60 2007-2008 figures 
Table 6-7: Risk rates by mode (Killed) 
 
 137 



















W Walking 313.00  1 313.00 DfT (2014c, Tables RAS53001 - TSGB0107) 
B Bicycle 568.00  1 568.00 DfT (2014c, Tables RAS53001 - TSGB0107) 
TX Taxi 16.10  1 16.10 DfT (2014c, Tables RAS53001 - TSGB0107) 
LB Local Bus 8.70  1 8.70 DfT (2014c, Tables RAS53001 - TSGB0107) 
CO Coach 8.70  1 8.70 DfT (2014c, Tables RAS53001 - TSGB0107) 
T Tram 15.68  1 15.68 
Transport for London – Data forwarded by Colin Shepard on number of killed and injured and 
person km(1000M) 2003-2014 Travel in London Report Figure 3.12 and Figure 5.2 
M Metro 15.68  1 15.68 
Transport for London – Data forwarded by Colin Shepard on number of killed and injured and 
person km (1000M) 2003-2014 Travel in London Report Figure 3.12 and Figure 5.2 
R Mainline Rail (UK) 0.90  1 0.90 DfT (2014c, Tables RAS53001 - TSGB0107) 
 Mainline Rail (F) 0.57  1 0.57 RAILWAY SAFETY PERFORMANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2014 - ERA) 
 Mainline Rail (ES) 1.73  1 1.73 RAILWAY SAFETY PERFORMANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2014 - ERA) 
 Mainline Rail 
(Eurostar) 
0.90  1 0.90 Used same figure as for UK - DfT (2014c, Tables RAS53001 - TSGB0107) 
A Air 0.00  1 0.00 DfT (2014c, Tables RAS53001 - TSGB0107) 
S Sea ("Water") 53.60  1 53.60 DfT (2014c, Tables RAS53001 - TSGB0107) 
Cars by Road Type           
MR Motorways 7.24 1.57 1 7.24 
Vehicle Occupancy Rate from DfT (2013a), Risk rate from Road Casualties (DfT, 2014a, Table 
RAS30017), DfT (2013d) Road Traffic Statistics (Table TRA0204) 
RR Rural 48.56 1.57 1 48.56 
Vehicle Occupancy Rate from DfT (2013a), Risk rate from Road Casualties (DfT, 2014a, Table 
RAS30017), DfT (2013d) Road Traffic Statistics (Table TRA0204) 
OR All Minor Roads 45.96 1.57 1 45.96 
Vehicle Occupancy Rate from DfT (2013a), Risk rate from Road Casualties (DfT, 2014a, Table 
RAS30017), DfT (2013d) Road Traffic Statistics (Table TRA0204) 
UR Urban Roads 183.69 1.57 1 183.69 
Vehicle Occupancy Rate from DfT (2013a), Risk rate from Road Casualties (DfT, 2014a, Table 
RAS30017), DfT (2013d) Road Traffic Statistics (Table TRA0204) 






W = Walking T = Tram 
B= Bicycle CO = Coach 
LB= Local Bus A =Air 
R = Mainline Rail TX= Taxi 
C = Car M=Metro 
Table 6-9: Legend for Tables 6.6, 6.7 and 6.12 
 
 
Monetisation  Euro  Source 
VSL for Killed  2,338,398  Web TAG Databook November 2014 (Table A 4.1.1 ) Average Value of prevention per casualty 
VSI for Serious Injury 262,770  Web TAG Databook November 2014 (Table A 4.1.1 ) Average Value of prevention per casualty 






Table 6-11: Risk of rail Killed and Seriously Injured derived for France and Spain 
  
Working for European rail safety assessments France Spain 
 
Train km (B km) 0.512 0.189 
 
Passenger km (B km) 85.2 20.8  
Passengers per train 166.4 110.1 
 
   
 
European KSI figures   
 
(Figure 2)   
 
   
 
K and SI (per M train km) 0.1 0.2  
   
 
Per B passenger km 0.60 1.82 Ratio 
K only per B passenger km 0.03 0.09 0.0498 
SI only per B passenger km 0.57 1.73 0.9502 
Ratio based on fatality risk (0.13 per billion passenger km) / overall railway SI (2.61 per billion passenger km) and K (0.0498 per billion passenger km) 
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1) (Risk of death per 1000M km for this combination of modes) 
2) (Risk of serious injury per 1000M km for this combination of modes) NB KSI used, so prev. column subtracted to give only injuries) 
  
International                                       
London-Paris Case A  W-M-R-M 1                   5 495     501 0.06 1.61 B-A 
London-Paris Case B  C-S-C      352  18 50    33  453 1.56 30.08  
Paris- Milan Case A W-M-R-TX 1                 4 1 641     647 0.09 1.09 A-B 
Paris-Milan Case B  W-M-A-LB 1  6        16   644 667 0.07 0.86 C-B 
Paris-Milan Case C  C-A-C         35.4     644 679 0.32 9.25 A-C 
Bristol-Barcelona Case A  C-A-TX             8   4.4 16.5       1180 1209 0.11 1.10 B-A 
Bristol-Barcelona Case B  LB-R-TX   6       10  1683   1699 0.04 0.65  
London – Dublin Case A  TX-A-TX                   25.3       476 501 0.11 0.71 B-A 
London – Dublin Case B  C-S-C      458   20    107  585 1.12 20.64 B-C 
London – Dublin Case C  LB-R-S-TX   3       4  364 107  478 0.12 12.76 C-A 
Birmingham-Geneva Case A  C-A-TX           8   2 4         893 907 0.06 0.92 B-A 
Birmingham-Geneva Case B  W-R-M-R-TX 1         7.6 1 1017   1027 0.07 0.93  
International Dual Mode Long Distance                                       
Newbury – Seville via Stansted Case A C-A-TX           156 3.5   8 11       1670 1849 0.15 1.45 A-B 
Newbury – Seville via Stansted Case B  W-R-M-R-A-TX 2         11 7 128  1670 1818 0.06 0.51  
Newbury – Seville via Heathrow Case A  W-R-CO-A-TX 2       45         11   25   1630 1713 0.06 0.65 B-A 
Newbury – Seville via Heathrow Case B  C-A-TX      68   8.2 11    1630 1717 0.10 1.17  
Bournemouth via Southampton– Barcelona via Girona Case A  C-A-CO         91 52.6     2         1050 1196 0.09 1.20 B-A 
 141 

























































































































































Bournemouth via Heathrow – Barcelona Case B  C-A-C      152  10.4 6     1150 1318 0.17 1.87  
Guildford -Luxembourg Case A  W-R-M-A-TX 1                 10.3 9 44   483 547 0.11 1.10 B-A 
Guildford -Luxembourg Case B  W-R-M-R-M-R-TX 1         10.3 4.3 907   923 0.07 1.09  
Guildford – Paris via Stansted & Paris Beauvais Case A  C-A-CO-M         92 128.5     4.5   2     272 499 0.39 4.80 A-B 
Guildford – Paris via Gatwick Case B  C-A-R      51   3  2 30  306 392 0.20 2.27  
Domestic Long Distance                                       
London – Edinburgh Case A W-T-M-R 1                 2 4 532     539 0.08 1.57 A-B 
London – Edinburgh Case B C-A-TX      20   20 19    541 600 0.38 6.50  
Bristol – Newcastle Case A  C-A-TX             5   7 7       412 431 0.25 3.56 B-A 
Bristol – Newcastle Case B  W-R-LB 3  3         397   403 0.23 3.05 C-B 
Bristol – Newcastle Case C C      472   12      484 1.15 10.47 C-A 
Aberdeen -Bournemouth Case A B-R-TX   5               3   714     722 0.21 4.68 A-B 
Aberdeen -Bournemouth Case B  C-A-TX         2 8    715 725 0.05 0.63  
Cardiff - Newcastle Case A  W-LB-R-M-W 2   2               1 402     407 0.16 2.35 A-B 
Cardiff – Newcastle Case B  TX-A-TX          4    420 424 0.03 0.13 C-B 
Cardiff - Newcastle Case C C      490  3 22      515 1.29 13.71 C-A 
Inter Urban                                       
Reading – York Case A  W-LB-R-TX 1  2       2  278   283 0.13 2.03 B-A 
Reading – York Case B  C      337 15 15 10      377 1.44 13.67  
Reading – Swindon Case A  W-LB-R-TX 1   2             4   58     65 0.58 6.29 A-B 
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Reading – Swindon Case B  W-LB-CO-TX 1  2  65     4     72 0.79 12.55 C-B 
Reading – Swindon Case C  C      65  5 5      75 1.54 20.05 C-A 
Cardiff - London Case A  W-LB-R-M-W 2   1.5               3 209     216 0.29 3.77 B-A 
Cardiff - London Case B C      214  4 25      243 1.75 24.29 B-C 
Cardiff - London Case C  W-LB-CO-M-W 2  2  237      2    243 0.54 10.72 A-C 
Manchester - Liverpool Case A W-T-R-W 2     3               50     55 1.09 11.97 A-B 
Manchester - Liverpool Case B  C-R-TX         4 1  50   55 0.65 13.82 C-B 
Manchester - Liverpool Case C  C      46.7   9.3      56 2.19 34.35 A-C 
Liverpool – Ipswich Case A  W-R-TX 3                 3   316     322 0.30 3.65 B-A 
Liverpool – Ipswich Case B  C      373  7 14      394 1.25 12.95  
Cardiff-Leeds Case A C           307   20 38           365 1.80 25.93 A-B 
Cardiff – Leeds Case B  W-R-W 6           281   287 0.62 6.81  
Inter-Urban Commute                                      
Kingston – Guildford Case A  B-R-B   6.8                   26     33 5.61 112.86 E-A 
Kingston – Guildford Case B  W-R-W 5.5           26   32 5.07 50.32 E-B 
Kingston – Guildford Case C  W-R-LB 2.4  3.8         26   32 2.21 22.87 E-C 
Kingston – Guildford Case D  C         36.2      36 8.33 175.36 E-D 
Kingston – Guildford Case E B  37.3             37 27.00 541.00  
Milton Keynes-London Case A B-R-B   6                   72     78 2.09 42.43 A-B 
Milton Keynes-London Case B  LB-CO-LB   15  84          99 0.30 8.40 C-B 
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Milton Keynes-London Case C  C      74   12.7      87 2.05 31.04 A-C 
Brockenhurst – Guildford Case A  W-LB-R-LB 1   5                 84     90 0.35 4.45 B-A 
Brockenhurst – Guildford Case B C-R-TX         16 4  84   104 1.37 28.24 B-C 
Brockenhurst – Guildford Case C  C      83 13  5      101 2.07 19.23 C-A 
New Malden -Swindon Case A  C-R-M-R-W 2               5 4   127     138 0.79 11.70 B-A 
New Malden -Swindon Case B  W-R-M-R-LB 1.6  1         127   130 0.37 4.44 B-C 
New Malden -Swindon Case C  C      112 12  8      132 1.93 19.76 C-A 
Basingstoke-Guildford Case A  C-R-LB     3           8     36     47 1.45 31.06 B-A 
Basingstoke-Guildford Case B  B-R-W 3 8          36   47 6.46 110.89 B-C 
Basingstoke-Guildford Case C C      38   12      50 2.74 46.85 C-A 
Urban Commute                                       
Kingston – Central London Case A  W-R-W 4.8                     16     21 6.70 66.22 E-A 
Kingston – Central London Case B  W-R-M 1.6          3.2 16   21 2.30 24.88 E-B 
Kingston – Central London Case C  W-R-LB 1.6  3.2         16   21 2.29 23.82 E-C 
Kingston – Central London Case D  C-R-M         1.6  3.2 16   21 0.71 16.52 E-D 
Kingston – Central London Case E B  18.6             19 27.00 541.00  
Table 6-12: Journey composite risk 
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 ANALYSIS OF SPECIFIC JOURNEYS 
This section presents the results of the journey analyses introduced in Section 6.3 . This 
is performed for six groups of journeys defined in in Table 6-4 which aim to represent a 
wide range of frequently undertaken journey types at national and international level 
taking full account of multiple mode use in cases where single mode end to end travel is 
not possible. Modal comparisons within these groups identify the impacts that CMS can 
have for similar journey types, and this can help ensure that any subsequent policy 
recommendations can be targeted effectively. The basis for the trips selected was to 
explore whether modal change can make a substantial difference to overall safety on one 
or more of a wide range of travel routes. Trips were selected to show total journey risk 
for different travel type combinations on identical door to door examples within each 
journey category, and allow for different but realistic modal combinations to understand 
how the risks compared on specific journeys. Trips were also selected to reflect a range 
of users, from commuters through to leisure travellers (implied in choice of O and D 
pairs). Lastly, the selection was made to show changes including the risks of “low risk 
modes” when combined with “higher risk modes” for the total journey. 
In each case, the assessment is supported by two graphics and a table which show the 
outcomes of the assessment from different perspectives: 
 A graphic showing K and SI risk per 1000M person km for each of the journeys 
assessed. 
 A table showing the differences between monetised risk rates for similar journeys 
using different modes as a basis for the assessment of CMS. In these tables, the 
initial column uses the journey letters to show the different modal combinations. 
The second column then provides detail of the comparison by listing the two 
journeys being compared using the nomenclature given in the key to list the modes 
used. 
 A graphic showing the differences between modes in terms of monetised risk of 
both K and SI, highlighting the fact that the differences for killed and serious 
injuries can operate in different directions to one another, even within the same 
comparison. 
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 6.5.1  International 
The International category aims to capture a range of European inter-city journeys 
including both major centres, such as London and Paris, and smaller centres such as 
Bristol and Birmingham. Travel between the UK and Ireland is included, as this requires 
sea or air transport. It should be noted that the risk rates applied to these European 
journeys are as set out in Section 6.1.2 . Figure 6-6 sets out the journeys and their 
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Figure 6-6: International risk 
The London to Paris journey compares rail and metro with a car equivalent, though with 
the car using the ferry crossing between Dover and Calais. The risk of K and injury are 
both higher with the car journey, with death being 26 times as high (1.56 compared to 
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0.06) while injury rates are 19 times as high (30.08 compared to 1.61). This is an 
interesting comparison because the reasons for the modal choices are likely to be 
different. Here a typical car journey would be for a holiday, perhaps for a group of people 
or a family with luggage, while the rail journey could be taken for a variety of reasons 
and perhaps more likely by individuals. 
The Paris to Milan journey highlights the near zero risk rating applied to air travel such 
that in both cases, the real comparison is effectively between the ‘feeder’ journeys, i.e. 
walk/metro/local bus in one case and car in the other. Between these two, the K rate is 
substantially higher in the case of the car journey. The air and rail journey rates for both 
SI and K are similarly low.  
The Bristol to Barcelona example illustrates the impact of very similar figures for rail and 
air, with the difference between the journeys based on the feeder modes. In this case, the 
rail journey would not be considered by most people, for practical reasons of cost and 
journey time. Some fluctuations have existed because of specific accidents in the past, 
e.g. in Spain, cited earlier in this chapter where a single multi-fatality accident had a 
significant effect on the fatality rate45. The use of time averaged figures helps to offset 
this. 
The London to Dublin journey again emphasises the risks of car travel, though it also 
shows the effect of using ships for approximately 20% of the journey distance. The effect 
is to increase the risk for the rail/ship journey to a slightly higher level than the 
taxi/air/taxi journey in terms of K and to nearly 18 times higher for SI. The car/ship 
journey remains the most risky. 
The comparison of rail and air for journeys between Birmingham and Geneva highlights 
the impacts of feeder modes when low risk main leg modes are used. The impact of the 
walking and taxi legs is to raise the rail based journey to a higher level of risk than the air 
based alternative, though not by much. Notably, the injury risks for these two examples 
are unusually similar. Table 6-13 and Figure 6-7 provide monetised risk comparisons for 
international journeys. Negative results mean that the second case has a higher monetised 
risk than the first from which it is subtracted, e.g. the Paris to Milan case where 
                                                 
45 For the European journeys the 2012 risks rates for rail have been used from the European Railway 
Agency’s (ERA) Railway Safety Performance in the EU 2014 report. 
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walk/metro/rail/taxi carried a lower overall monetised risk than the car/air/car equivalent 
for the same journey and hence produced a negative outcome. 
 Journey Comparison 
Combined KSI 
difference in 
monetised risk (€ 
per 1000M person 
km) 
Difference in 
monetised KSI for 
actual journey (€) 
B-A 
London-Paris Case B (C-S-C) minus 
London-Paris Case A (W-M-R-M) 
10,977,673 5.50 
A-B 
Paris- Milan Case A (W-M-R-TX) minus 
Paris-Milan Case B (W-M-A-LB) 
108,706 0.07 
C-B 
Paris-Milan Case C (C-A-C) minus 
Paris-Milan Case B (W-M-A-LB) 
2,801,086 1.87 
A-C 
Paris- Milan Case A(W-M-R-TX) minus 
Paris-Milan Case C (C-A-C) 
-2,692,380 -1.83 
B-A 
Bristol-Barcelona Case B (LB-R-TX) minus 
Bristol-Barcelona Case A (C-A-TX) 
-278,572 -0.34 
B-A 
London – Dublin Case B (C-S-C) minus 
London – Dublin Case A (TX-A-TX) 
7,604,825 3.81 
B-C 
London – Dublin Case B (C-S-C) minus 
London – Dublin Case C (LB-R-S-TX) 
4,411,075 2.58 
C-A 
London – Dublin Case C (LB-R-S-TX) minus 
London – Dublin Case A (TX-A-TX) 
3,193,750 1.53 
B-A 
Birmingham-Geneva Case B (W-R-M-R-TX) minus 
Birmingham-Geneva Case A (C-A-TX) 
32,538 0.03 
Table 6-13: Monetised risk differences for international journeys 
 
Figure 6-7: International comparisons of monetised KSI (€M) 
Here, the greatest differences are for the London to Paris and London to Dublin cases. In 
each of these examples, the safety gain of up to €5.50 and €3.81 respectively per 
passenger per journey is derived from a switch from a car based journey to one centred 
on rail or air. The differences in all other cases are much smaller. 
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 6.5.2  International dual mode long distance 
This group of journeys considers travel within Europe by air but which involve complex 
travel to the airport including a number of modes (Figure 6-8). This is a useful approach 
to aviation risks because, although the aviation risk rate per unit distance is very low, 
travel to the airport involves many feeder routes which may render the overall journey 
risks comparable with other modes. For the Guildford to Luxembourg case, a rail version 
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Figure 6-8: International dual mode long distance risk 
Guildford to Paris via Stansted and Paris Beauvais which includes car, coach and metro 
as feeder modes is most notable. The risk rates for killed and seriously injured are double 
that of the equivalent journey via Gatwick with car as the feeder and rail as the second 
supporting mode. This is because of the very long car and coach components in the former 
and the very low rail risks in the latter case. The Guildford to Luxembourg examples are 
notably lower because of the different feeder modes and the similarity of the risk rates 
between air and Long Distance Rail (LDR). 
 149 
The majority of these journeys involve substantial air components with very low risk 
rates, meaning that these journeys carry only the risks associated with their feeder legs. 
As a result, the Newbury to Seville examples are separated by the extent and nature of 
the journeys to Heathrow or Stansted, since the same taxi ride is included at the Seville 
end in each case. In this case, however, the long distance of the main leg means that all 
of the combinations have a low overall risk rate for K but higher SI risks for the Heathrow 
or Stansted options by car. 
The Bournemouth to Barcelona examples again are differentiated by the extent of the car 
component of the journey and remain relatively low-risk overall, again because of the 
influence of the longer overall distance. Table 6-14 and Figure 6-9 provide monetised risk 
comparisons for dual mode long distance. 















Newbury – Seville via Stansted Case A (C-A-TX) minus 
Newbury – Seville via Stansted Case B (W-R-M-R-A-TX) 
469,181 0.87 
B-A 
Newbury – Seville via Heathrow Case B (C-A-TX) minus 
Newbury – Seville via Heathrow Case A (W-R-CO-A-TX) 
221,533 0.38 
B-A 
Bournemouth via Heathrow – Barcelona Case B (C-A-C) minus 
Southampton – Girona via Bournemouth Case A (C-A-CO) 
366,918 0.44 
B-A 
Guildford -Luxembourg Case B (W-R-M-R-M-R-TX) minus 
Guildford -Luxembourg Case A (W-R-M-A-TX) 
-93,665 -0.05 
A-B 
Guildford – Paris via Stanstead & Paris Beauvais Case A (C-A-CO-
M) minus Guildford – Paris via Gatwick Case B (C-A-R) 
1,098,364 0.55 
Table 6-14: Monetised risk differences for international dual mode long distance 
 
Figure 6-9: International dual mode long distance comparisons of monetised KSI (€M) 
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These examples have notably small overall safety gains per journey from the switch. This 
is because, despite the impact of the feeder modes, the dominant force remains the long 
distances using low risk forms of transport, i.e. air and rail. 
 6.5.3  Domestic long distance 
This case considers longer distance travel between major towns/cities in the UK (Figure 
6-10). A mixture of routes is included to illustrate different combinations of major trunk 
routes with very good connections in all modes, such as London to Edinburgh, and 
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Figure 6-10: Domestic long distance risk 
The London to Edinburgh route in this comparison shows the effects of the very low risk 
of air travel, but that this is largely offset for both K and SI by the longer car and taxi 
feeds needed for the air travel. This is a general characteristic of air travel because, despite 
the growth in regional airports, access to rail stations remains far better and hence longer 
taxi or car journeys tend to be included in the air travel mix. 
For Bristol to Newcastle, the feeder for air travel remains longer than rail and this offsets 
the slightly lower air risk rates to give a very similar outcome for both of these 
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combinations. The comparison with the car journey highlights the high K rates as the risk 
is almost five times as great in this mode.  
The Aberdeen to Bournemouth case shows the effects of rail risk weighted over long 
distances. The overall journey risk is heavily influenced by the 5 km initial bicycle ride 
included prior to the rail journey. Short car and taxi feeds have only a very limited 
influence over the very long distance of the main journey leg by air. 
On Cardiff to Newcastle the notable modal combination is by taxi and air, which because 
of the short (4 km) taxi journeys and the almost zero rated risk for air travel, is almost a 
risk free journey. Comparison of the other two journeys (car vs. rail) shows the same 
pattern of higher K and SI risk for car. It should be noted that the taxi risk, in the absence 
of specific DfT figures for this mode, has been averaged across all four different car travel 
risk levels based on the four different road types. This approach was taken after discussion 
with the DfT statisticians. 
Table 6-15 and Figure 6-11 provide monetised risk comparisons for domestic long 
distance journeys. 
 Journey Comparison 
Combined KSI 
difference in 








London – Edinburgh Case A (W-T-M-R) minus 
London – Edinburgh Case B (C-A-TX) 
-2,001,857 -1.08 
B-A 
Bristol – Newcastle Case B (W-R-LB) minus 
Bristol – Newcastle Case A (C-A-TX) 
-183,667 -0.08 
C-B 
Bristol – Newcastle Case C (C) minus 
Bristol – Newcastle Case B (W-R-LB) 
4,104,896 1.65 
C-A 
Bristol – Newcastle Case C (C) minus 
Bristol – Newcastle Case A (C-A-TX) 
3,921,229 1.90 
A-B 
Aberdeen -Bournemouth Case A (B-R-TX) minus 
Aberdeen -Bournemouth Case B (C-A-TX) 
1,424,993 1.03 
A-B 
Cardiff - Newcastle Case A (W-LB-R-M-W) minus 
Cardiff – Newcastle Case B (TX-A-TX) 
889,310 0.36 
C-B 
Cardiff - Newcastle Case C (C) minus 
Cardiff – Newcastle Case B (TX-A-TX) 
-612,412 -0.26 
C-A 
Cardiff - Newcastle Case C (C) minus 
Cardiff - Newcastle Case A (W-LB-R-M-W) 
5,638,778 2.90 
Table 6-15: Monetised risk differences for domestic long distance 
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Figure 6-11: Domestic long distance comparisons of monetised KSI (€M) 
These show relatively small safety gains between journey combinations which would 
only be partly offset by the number making the journey since these numbers are likely to 
be relatively limited. 
 6.5.4  Inter-urban 
This inter-urban category considers a mixture of both leisure and business journeys 
between large and medium sized cities in the UK. A range of distances is included from 
Manchester – Liverpool to Liverpool – Ipswich (Figure 6-12). 
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Figure 6-12: Inter-urban risks 
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The Reading to York journey by car shows a higher risk of K and also a higher risk of SI 
compared to the mainly rail alternative. The risk of K on the rail journey is very small 
because the distance is dominated by rail and the more dangerous feeder modes, mainly 
walking, are only over short distances. 
The Reading to Swindon rail vs. coach vs. car trade-offs shows better safety by rail for 
both K and SI compared to bus/coach, which has a risk rate of 0.3 deaths per 1000M 
person km compared to the mainline rail risk of 0.01. The car journey gives a higher risk 
of K and SI than both of the other options. 
Comparing the walk/local bus/rail/taxi journey from Reading to York with the journey 
from Reading to Swindon illustrates the impacts of the ‘feeder’ modes in relation to 
different overall distances. Risks are higher to Swindon because the walk, local bus and 
taxi elements are larger in proportion to the 65 km journey to Swindon than the 283 km 
journey to York. The Taxi element is 4 km for the Swindon journey as opposed to York 
where it is 2 km and thus is again much bigger relatively. This stresses the relative 
importance of feeder journeys as part of the overall journey risk profile for non-car trips. 
This is an important issue to explore in the development of CMS policy. 
For Cardiff to London, the risk by rail is lower than the coach trip in terms of mortality 
risk and, particularly, injury risk. The car journey carries a much higher risk than either 
form of public transport for K and also for SI. 
In the case of Manchester to Liverpool, the tram and rail combination shows a K rate just 
over half that for the car alone. This is mainly because the 2 km walk (a high risk mode) 
is higher as a proportion of the overall distance of about 55 km. The car/rail/taxi journey 
is the lowest combination for death risk, yet the highest for injury at 13.82; this is probably 
attributable to 4 km car use on urban roads, which have high rates for SI. 
On Liverpool to Ipswich a similar comparison is made as was carried out for Bristol to 
Newcastle, although the final link for the rail journey uses taxi rather than local bus. Slight 
differences resulting from the overall distances and the change from the taxi to local bus 
feeders were evident but the outcome is similar and again much lower than the car only 
journey which, in this case, has 5 to 7 times the risk level. 
The Cardiff to Leeds journey by car has the highest overall risk of this journey group. 
This is compared with a standard walk/rail/walk mode whose risk rate, though higher than 
most of the other rail travel combinations, is still three times smaller than that of the car 
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only case. As the longest car only journey, this also has the highest injury risk of the 
overall group. 
Table 6-16 and Figure 6-13 provide monetised risk comparisons for the inter-urban cases 
discussed above. The monetisation is based on the summation of the value of life and 
serious injury rates applied to the risk/distance components of each journey. The results 
are then differenced. 
 Journey Comparison 
Combined KSI 
difference in monetised 
risk (€ per 1000M 
person km) 
Difference in monetised 
KSI for actual journey 
(€) 
B-A 
Reading – York Case B (C) minus 
Reading – York Case A (W-LB-R-TX) 
6,118,742 1.73 
A-B 
Reading – Swindon Case A (W-LB-R-TX) minus 
Reading – Swindon Case B (W-LB-CO-TX) 
-2,119,119 -0.14 
C-B 
Reading – Swindon Case C (C) minus 
Reading – Swindon Case B (W-LB-CO-TX) 
3,736,587 0.27 
C-A 
Reading – Swindon Case C (C) minus 
Reading – Swindon Case A (W-LB-R-TX) 
5,855,706 0.44 
B-A 
Cardiff - London Case B (C) minus 
Cardiff - London Case A (W-LB-R-M-W) 
8,802,527 1.90 
B-C 
Cardiff – London Case B (C) minus 
Cardiff - London Case C (W-LB-CO-M-W) 
6,396,479 1.55 
A-C 
Cardiff - London Case A (W-LB-R-M-W) minus 
Cardiff - London Case C (W-LB-CO-M-W) 
-2,406,048 -0.58 
A-B 
Manchester – Liverpool Case A (W-T-R-W) minus 
Manchester - Liverpool Case B (C-R-TX) 
533,566 0.03 
C-B 
Manchester - Liverpool Case C (C) minus 
Manchester - Liverpool Case B (C-R-TX) 
8,999,333 0.49 
A-C 
Manchester - Liverpool Case A (W-T-R-W) minus 
Manchester - Liverpool Case C (C) 
-8,465,767 -0.47 
B-A 
Liverpool – Ipswich Case B (C) minus 
Liverpool – Ipswich Case A (W-R-TX) 
4,672,384 1.50 
A-B 
Cardiff-Leeds Case A (C) minus 
Cardiff – Leeds Case B (W-R-W) 
7,796,265 2.85 
Table 6-16: Monetised risk differences for inter-urban 
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Figure 6-13: Inter-urban risk comparisons of monetised KSI (€M) 
These examples highlight the significant differences in K and SI risk profiles for the 
journeys under different modal combinations but also the relatively small per journey 
gains in monetary terms. 
 6.5.5  Inter-urban commute 
This group of journeys is based mainly on cross country travel between towns in the UK. 
This includes some examples of frequent longer distance commutes (e.g. Milton Keynes 
to London or New Malden to Swindon) as well as shorter outward commutes such as 
Kingston to Guildford and longer distance commutes between smaller centres (e.g. 
Basingstoke to Guildford and Brockenhurst to Guildford). On the whole, these would 
normally be undertaken by car unless a rapid rail service is available, as in the case of 
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Figure 6-14: Inter-urban commute risk 
The Kingston to Guildford journey provides an interesting comparison with the Kingston 
to Central London commute. In this case, the bicycle journey is also included and once 
again represents by far the highest risk for both K and SI. In fact, although the risks remain 
undeniably high and the journey is relatively unusual because of the distance, the risks 
would appear to be much lower than for the urban commute because of the much lower 
traffic hazards.  
Of the remaining approaches to this journey, the others with moderately high risk are the 
walk/rail/walk or bike/rail/bike, where the risks mainly arise from the pedestrian/bike 
element, and the car journey where the risk of death is comparatively high overall and is 
applied to the whole journey distance. 
The journey from Milton Keynes to London is included for comparison. Although the 
distance is greater, the safer road type means that the car journey is much safer, though in 
practice, this would depend on the extent to which the journey passes into London. The 
use of a bicycle at either end of the rail commute is enough to raise the risks substantially 
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compared with the combination of local bus and coach although, in practice, the network 
of segregated cycle routes at the Milton Keynes end would help to offset this. 
None of the remaining journeys involve bicycles and are therefore comparatively safe in 
comparison with the Kingston to Guildford journey. The Brockenhurst to Guildford 
journey is a typical long distance rural commute and here the trade-off between cars with 
high K risk vs. rail with high SI rates holds true. The overall rates are low because, 
particularly for the cars, motorways are considered relatively safe. 
The New Malden to Swindon example again follows this pattern. It is interesting that 
travel via London (Journey A) carries a higher risk than the same journey via Reading 
with no metro leg. The car journey has the highest risk of the three, though this would 
likely be the preferred option for cost and convenience reasons. 
Basingstoke to Guildford shows car and rail as broadly similar, but again the introduction 
of a bicycle feed to the rail leg raises both the risk of K and of SI to levels well over 
double the other modal combination with safer feeders, and to a level greater than the car 
only approach.  
Table 6-17 and Figure 6-15 provide monetised risk comparisons for urban to urban 
journeys. 











Kingston – Guildford Case E(B) minus 
Kingston – Guildford Case A (B-R-B) 
162,524,442 5.33 
E-B 
Kingston – Guildford Case E(B) minus 
Kingston – Guildford Case B (W-R-W) 
180,206,518 5.68 
E-C 
Kingston – Guildford Case E(B) minus 
Kingston – Guildford Case C (W-R-LB) 
194,121,860 6.25 
E-D 
Kingston – Guildford Case E(B) minus 




Milton Keynes-London Case A (B-R-B) minus 
Milton Keynes-London Case B (LB-CO-LB) 
13,127,533 1.02 
C-B 
Milton Keynes-London Case C (C) minus 




Milton Keynes-London Case A (B-R-B) minus 




Brockenhurst – Guildford Case B(C-R-TX) minus 
Brockenhurst – Guildford Case A (W-LB-R-LB) 
8,624,021 0.78 
B-C 
Brockenhurst – Guildford Case B(C-R-TX) minus 




Brockenhurst – Guildford C (C) minus 




New Malden -Swindon Case B (W-R-M-R-LB) minus 
New Malden -Swindon Case A (C-R-M-R-W) 
-2,880,130 -0.40 
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New Malden -Swindon Case B (W-R-M-R-LB) minus 




New Malden -Swindon Case C (C) minus 




Basingstoke-Guildford Case B (B-R-W) minus 
Basingstoke-Guildford Case A (C-R-LB) 
32,689,938 1.54 
B-C 
Basingstoke-Guildford Case B (B-R-W) minus 




Basingstoke-Guildford Case C (C) minus 
Basingstoke-Guildford Case A (C-R-LB) 
7,165,891 0.36 
Table 6-17: Monetised risk differences for inter-urban commute 
 
Figure 6-15: Inter-urban commute comparisons of monetised KSI (€M) 
The range of benefits achieved per journey is not a surprise given the range of possibilities 
considered in this category. This is mainly because, as with the urban commute, the 
comparison for Kingston-Guildford journey used bicycle and hence the alternatives are 
much safer. The other notable case is the Basingstoke to Guildford case where the use of 
cycling as a feeder mode increases the overall risk considerably. 
 6.5.6  Urban commute 
This journey type covers one of the most commonly undertaken journeys, the daily or at 
least regular commute from a suburb into the centre of a city. The example chosen is 
Kingston upon Thames in South West London to a central London location, in this case 
the Barbican area of the City (Figure 6-16). With increased pressure on parking, traffic 
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congestion and the Congestion Charge in central London, rail travel is now running at 
close to capacity on these routes. As a result, four of the five routes are based on a rail 
commute and are differentiated by the feeder modes. The fifth example, and one that is 
used in this area, is the bicycle commute. Although bicycle is commonly used as a feeder, 
whether at one end of the journey or both, it is also increasingly common for commuters 
to cycle the whole distance in response to the extensive government promotion of cycling 
as a healthy solution to the congestion problem (DfT, 2015) 46. This may be intermittent 
and more regular in the summer.  
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Figure 6-16: Urban commute risk 
These examples compare five different approaches to a daily commute from a London 
suburb to the centre of London. Most of the examples centre on the use of rail travel 
because it is the quickest and cost effective mode, particularly for well served centres 
such as Kingston, which has a choice of routes, including a 17 minute service to central 
London from the south of the town (from Surbiton) and a good frequency of service from 
the town centre itself. The example used here assumes a 1.6 km distance to the local 
station with 3.2 km journey within Central London which is typical. 
                                                 
46 This example is supported by the Cycle Superhighways which are part of a plan by TfL and the London 
Mayor to encourage more people to commute by bike. The provision of twelve cycle-only lanes, clearly 
marked blue, aims to increase cycling in London by 400 percent by 2025 compared to 2000 levels. AECOM 
is working on the planned route between Kingston Vale in the south west and Westminster. 
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Comparison of journeys A to E shows the high risk levels associated with pedestrian 
travel. The walk/rail/walk example (journey A), in particular, shows a high K and SI risk. 
The use of the metro or local bus for the travel within Central London provides a 
significant improvement in terms of both K and SI risk. 
The impact of making the same journey by bicycle shows one of the most dramatic 
changes in risk profile of all the comparisons provided. The risk of K for this journey by 
bicycle is 27, with 541 for SI. This compares with the next most risky mode of 
walk/rail/walk which gives 6.70 and 66.22. Car, rail and metro on the other hand gives 
0.71 and 16.52 which is 38 times less than cycling for K and eight times less for SI. 
This example is very topical because of the current highly successful attempts to promote 
cycling, particularly in London. In this case, the argument is that although cycling KSI 
rates are very high relative to other modes, the absolute risks are not sufficient to offset 
the longer term health benefits from cycling as well as broader benefits such as reduced 
congestion and pollution. In this context, the safety assessments are a valuable input to a 
broader debate. 
Table 6-18 and Figure 6-17 provide monetised risk comparisons for urban commute 
journeys. 
 Journey Comparison 
Combined KSI 
difference in 
monetised risk (€ per 
1000M person km) 
Difference in 
monetised KSI for 
actual journey (€) 
E-A 
Kingston – Central London Case E(B) minus 
Kingston – Central London Case A (W-R-W) 
172,221,073 3.58 
E-B 
Kingston – Central London Case E (B) minus 
Kingston – Central London Case B (W-R-M) 
193,370,578 4.02 
E-C 
Kingston – Central London Case E (B) minus 
Kingston – Central London Case C (W-R-LB) 
193,687,468 4.03 
E-D 
Kingston – Central London Case E (B) minus 
Kingston – Central London Case D (C-R-M) 
199,283,951 4.15 
Table 6-18: Monetised risk differences for urban commute 
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Figure 6-17: Urban commute comparisons of monetised KSI (€M) 
The very large safety gains in this category per unit distance stem from the selection of 
the cycling mode as the base against which the other options are compared. Given the 
shorter distances involved; however, the benefits per journey are not so large, at €3.58 to 
€4.15 per journey. What is notable in practice is that the modal switches in London are 
presently very much in the opposite direction as solutions to carbon emissions; air quality 
reductions and congestion are all prioritised. For example, the HEAT Framework (WHO, 
2011) aimed at developing guidance and practical tools for economic assessments of the 
health effects from (a) cycling and (b) walking.  
 6.5.7  Overall comparison 
Table 6-19 ranks all the journey types considered above with a composite risk of death of 
1 death per 1000M person km or more. Nevertheless if journeys of varying distances 
serve the same purpose (e.g. visiting a friend) then it should be noted that risk per distance 
is not the only metric that is of concern to some travellers but the risk per journey. 
Journey type Journey 
Modes 
used 
Total Composite Risk 
(Risk of K per 1000M km 
for this combination of 
modes) 
Urban commute Kingston – Central London Case 
E 
B 27.00 
Inter-urban commute Kingston – Guildford Case E B 27.00 
Inter-urban commute Kingston – Guildford Case D  C 8.33 
Urban commute Kingston – Central London Case 
A  
W-R-W 6.70 
Inter-urban commute Basingstoke-Guildford Case B  B-R-W 6.46 
Inter-urban commute Kingston – Guildford Case A  B-R-B 5.61 
Inter-urban commute Kingston – Guildford Case B  W-R-W 5.07 
Inter-urban commute Basingstoke-Guildford Case C C 2.74 
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Journey type Journey 
Modes 
used 
Total Composite Risk 
(Risk of K per 1000M km 
for this combination of 
modes) 
Urban commute Kingston – Central London Case 
B  
W-R-M 2.30 
Urban commute Kingston – Central London Case 
C  
W-R-LB 2.29 
Inter-urban commute Kingston – Guildford Case C  W-R-LB 2.21 
Inter-urban Manchester - Liverpool Case C  C 2.19 
Inter-urban commute Milton Keynes-London Case A B-R-B 2.09 
Inter-urban commute Brockenhurst – Guildford Case C  C 2.07 
Inter-urban commute Milton Keynes-London Case C  C 2.05 
Inter-urban commute New Malden -Swindon Case C  C 1.93 
Inter-urban Cardiff-Leeds Case A C 1.80 
Inter-urban Cardiff - London Case B C 1.75 
International London-Paris Case B  C-S-C 1.56 
Inter-urban Reading – Swindon Case C  C 1.54 
Inter-urban commute Basingstoke-Guildford Case A  C-R-LB 1.45 
Inter-urban Reading – York Case B  C 1.44 
Inter-urban commute Brockenhurst – Guildford Case B C-R-TX 1.37 
Domestic Long 
Distance 
Cardiff - Newcastle Case C C 1.29 
Inter-urban Liverpool – Ipswich Case B  C 1.25 
Domestic Long 
Distance 
Bristol – Newcastle Case C C 1.15 
International London – Dublin Case B  C-S-C 1.12 
Inter-urban Manchester - Liverpool Case A W-T-R-W 1.09 
Table 6-19: Ranked journey risks 
The specific key modal points which emerge from this analysis are as follows: 
 Urban journeys dominate the risk profile, partly because their shorter distances make 
more risky forms of travel such as walking and cycling practical. Rail is also a 
common component of urban journeys, but here again the regularity with which 
cycling and walking are used as feeders increases the risks overall.  
 The relatively high risk of car journeys which form the bulk of the non-urban journeys 
is noted. 
 What is interesting at present, given the substantial margin by which the risk of urban 
cycling exceeds that of any other modal form of transport, is that switching to cycling 
is by far the greatest modal switching effort evident at present in the UK and 
particularly in London. The cycling safety issue is often questioned by those who 
promote the mode, including questions over the years used as benchmarks and the 
undeniable reduction in risks compared to earlier decades, but based on the figures 
used here, the relative risks are evident. 
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 The impact of feeder modes on otherwise very safe long distance transport modes, 
notably air and rail, is considerable. 
 SUMMARY 
The casualty risk assessments show that feeder journeys often form a major component 
of the risk and must therefore be a target for CMS. Risks for the safer forms of transport 
such as aviation and rail are dominated by a very small number of specific incidents. In 
these cases, public policy needs to take account of the specific issues involved as well as 
the summary view provided by the statistics. Considering the transfer risks for aviation, 
rail and bus does not significantly alter the overall risk calculation, although these need 
to be acknowledged and further research is required to derive specific modal transfer 
risks. 
The active transport modes, particularly cycling but also walking, are substantially more 
dangerous than other modes. While noting that there are other evident benefits (health 
and environmental) that result from these modes, these clearly are not safety benefits.  
Overall, in terms of the modal comparisons, there is sufficient contrast between the 
options for journeys to warrant further investigation while accepting the limitation that a 
common accident risk for everyone does overlook the fact that there are higher risks for 
specific groups of the population (e.g. young motorists and older pedestrians). The risk 
gains are relatively small per person or per journey, but where measures could be put in 
place to support switching, the numbers involved could make this worthwhile.  
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 7  TRAVEL PREFERENCES & MODAL SUBSTITUTABILITY 
 BACKGROUND 
A prerequisite for CMS is a willingness on the part of the travelling public to switch 
modes in response to various stimuli. To test this, primary research was undertaken in the 
form of a series of questionnaires to help understand the views of individuals on transport 
safety, their willingness to switch modes and the reasons that would cause them to do this. 
Two primary qualitative and quantitative travel surveys (self-completing questionnaires) 
were designed to better understand individual travel perceptions of safety/risk and other 
factors affecting travel behaviour including main modes used, access/egress modes used 
and willingness to use alternative modes at certain percentage changes in price. The 
surveys were undertaken to predominantly capture different user groups (leisure and those 
travelling for work/business) and different geographies (from UK and other European 
countries). The approach is summarised in Figure 7-1. 
 
Figure 7-1: Approach mixed quantitative and qualitative 
The travelling public as a population is a very challenging target to sample adequately. 
Accordingly, the following questionnaires were developed and implemented during the 
course of the work: 
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 consumerdata survey – a web-based questionnaire circulated by a market 
research organisation to one of their databases of leisure travellers. The responses 
to this survey captured leisure travellers’ journeys and perceptions.  
 Snowball survey – a survey was designed with a questionnaire similar to the 
consumerdata survey but targeted more towards work/business travellers to 
understand the user group. This is referred to as a ‘snowball’ survey because it was 
initially sent to personal/professional contacts who were then asked to identify 
further targets to help obtain a greater sample size. This type of survey was 
undertaken to capture a wider geographical user group which otherwise would 
have been challenging to target. 
 Expert survey – an electronic survey distributed to transport safety experts using 
a University of Westminster database. 
 Qualitative interviews – Delphi style interviews were undertaken with a small 
number of respondents from the user and expert surveys. 
The types of questions used in the survey can be categorised three ways: revealed 
preference, ranking and attitudinal. In general, across both user questionnaire surveys the 
respondents were asked to report journey details including origin/destination, trip 
purpose, frequency and modes used (public such as air, local and LDR, underground, 
bus/coach, taxi, ferry/ship) plus private travel modes (car, bicycle, walking). Questions 
on factors affecting modal choice and alternative mode preferences were presented in the 
surveys. A specific question addressed the percentage reduction in price required for 
modal transfer. The questionnaires included risk perception (both accident risk and 
personal security) related to each of the aforementioned travel modes and how these 
varied from other factors, the impact of adverse weather and an option for respondents to 
provide any other specific comments. Some demographic questions were also asked in 
the survey mainly focused on those users who travelled for work/business purposes. The 














 Modes used 
Context for the 
actual journeys 
made as well as 
purpose and 
regularity 
QA – How often flown each 
year (1-4 times or 4-12 times) 
 
Q1a / Q1b – Journey start and 
ultimate destination 
Q1 – Journey profile in 
stages and modes used at 
each stage  
Q2 – Main purpose of the 
journey  
Q2 – Purpose of the journey 
Q3a – Transport modes used for 
the last overseas journey made 
 
Q3b – Description of actual 
journey (stages and modes used) 
 
Q4 – How often journey made 
between the same two points in 
last 12 months 
Q3 – Frequency with which 
this journey made in last 12 
months 
  
Q12 & 13 – Preferred main 
mode and most frequently used 
main mode 
Q10 – Mode used more 
often for this journey 








Q6 – Are alternative modes 
considered? 
Q5 – Are alternative modes 
considered? 
Q7 – Alternative modes 
considered and reasons 
Q6 – Alternative modes 
considered and reasons 
Pricing and impact 
on modal transfers 
To what extent is 
price a controlling 
influence? CPE 
calculation 
Q8 – Cost/Price of each segment Q7 – Cost/Price of each 
segment 
Q9 –Price changes needed for 
alternatives to be taken up 
Q8 –Price changes needed 






about the role of 
accident safety in 
the decision 
making process 
and context from 
other factors 
Q5 – Ranking of top 5 important 
issues influencing how to make 
the journey (1=Most and 
5=Least) 
Q4 – Ranking of top 5 
important issues 
influencing how to make 
the journey (1=Most and 
5=Least) 
Q10 – If safety important whole 
or main part of the journey 
considered? 
 
Q11 – Factors which may cause 
a reconsideration of travelling 
(delays, bad weather, security 
measures, long queues) 
Q9 – Factors which may 
cause a reconsideration of 
travelling (delays, bad 
weather, security measures, 
long queues) 
Q14a– Personal security as a 
deciding factor (which mode?) 
Q11a – Personal security as 
a deciding factor (which 
mode?) 
Q14b – Risk of accident as a 
deciding factor (which mode?) 
Q11b – Risk of accident as 
a deciding factor (which 
mode?) 
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Q15 – Impact of adverse 
weather (air, rail, car) 
Q12 – Impact of adverse 
weather (air, metro/local 
rail, LDR, car, bus/coach, 
taxi, ship/ferry) 
Q16 – Most important selection 
factors (Ranked Most important, 
Second Most important and 
Least important) 
Q13 – Most important – 
personal security or 
accident risk? 
Q17 – Risk factors most likely 
to affect modal choice 
 
Q18 & 19 – Modes used for 
journey considered safest: used 
and overall safest. Maximum of 
2 modes selected in each case  
Q14 – From modes used 
which modes considered 
the safest (Rank 1-3 with 1 
Safest and 3 Least safe) 
Q14, 18 and 19 – Comparative 
assessment 
 




Q20 – Additional comments 
from respondents 
Q15 –Profile of respondent: 
Occupation, Age, Gender, 
Country of residence 
Q16 - Additional comments 
from respondents 
Table 7-1: Overview of consumerdata and snowball survey questions 
The questions in the expert questionnaire were for long distance journeys (greater than 
200 km) and broadly categorised into the following topics: impact of major accidents; 
modal choice; travel behaviour; and (optionally) organisation profile of the expert. The 
experts were asked their opinions under each of the topics and also what they thought 
public perceptions in relation to modal choice and travel behaviour are. Table 7-2 provides 








Are there any changes in public 
behaviour in the aftermath of 
high profile accidents? 
Q1 – Impact of high profile accidents on public 
travel behaviour (Scale from Strongly Agree to 
Strongly Disagree or No Change options) 
Q2 – Is the behaviour change in transport modes 
and/or operator? 
Q3/4 – Duration of change in modal 






Do people realistically consider 
alternative modes when 
planning travel? 
 
Direct statements about the role 
of accident safety in the 
decision making process and 
context from other factors 
Q5/6 – Does the public take into consideration 
accident safety issues when selecting transport 
modes / carriers? (Scale from Very strong 
evidence to No evidence) 
 
Q7 – Modes most affected by accident safety 
considerations 
Q8 – Evidence that safety has a higher priority 
than other factors? (Scale from Very strong 
evidence to No evidence) 
Q9 – Influence of government in modal change? 
(Scale from Strong influence to No influence)  




Public travel behaviour and 
their view on safety 
Q11 – What are the top 3 factors public considers 
when considering mode to use? (Rank 1-3 with 1 
being the highest) 
Q12 – How often do people consider alternative 
modes? 
Q13 – Which modes the public perceives to be 
the safest (Rank from 1-8 with 1 being the safest) 
Q14 – Influence of safety as a factor in long run 
for developed/developing countries 
Organisational 
Profile 
Optional  Name, organisation, position, main modes used 
in work, country/countries of work 
Other  Q15 – Specific comments from respondents 
Table 7-2: Overview of expert survey questions 
The characteristic of the samples were examined using mainly descriptive statistics such 
as frequencies, significance testing through Pearson’s chi-square, and determining CPEs. 
Data were prepared for SPSS using Excel in which free text responses were classified 
into manageable categories and unusable responses treated to ensure coherent output. 
 CONSUMER DATA SURVEY 
This section considers survey findings from the web based questionnaire (described in 
Appendix B.1.1, Figures B.1-B.7). This was developed in conjunction with 
consumerdata, a travel survey organisation, sent to their database of 260,000 mainly 
leisure travellers and was completed in March/April 2013 (n=203). Initially an attempt 
was made to conduct real time, in-person questionnaires at airports and on board trains 
using random sampling. The permission of airport authorities and train operating 
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companies was sought for this but was not forthcoming despite several attempts due to 
security and confidentiality concerns. The web based survey through consumerdata was 
considered the next best option. The advantage of this approach was that it invited 
responses from a large database of travellers, from a wide range of UK locations. This 
organisation has considerable experience in travel surveys over a number of decades and 
provided advice on the types of questions that could reasonably be asked in such surveys. 
There were some overall limitations to the consumerdata survey which need to be noted. 
From the outset it was understood that the survey would address predominantly leisure 
travellers from the UK and would therefore have a large bias towards air travel because 
of limited alternatives. It was decided to proceed with this nevertheless because of the 
advantages and to use a separate survey (snowball questionnaire) to ask very similar 
questions to a more business/work traveller oriented sample with greater coverage of 
continental Europe, thus providing a more complete picture overall. Although the sample 
obtained generally used air travel for the main stage of the journey and there were limited 
long distance alternatives, it did yield a wide range of access mode travel and alternatives 
were normally given for these journey stages along with reasons for the choice. 
consumerdata were requested to seek socio-demographic information as part of the 
survey but were unwilling to do so because of confidentiality concerns. This limits the 
degree which results can be contextualised. 
Prior to the survey an announcement was made in an issue of CD-Traveller that a web 
based survey would be available to complete. The announcement summarised the 
survey’s aims and the type of journey being examined. It was then sent to participants 
with confidentiality assurances to increase respondent interest. There was a follow up a 
few weeks later followed by a final reminder another few weeks afterwards. As the survey 
was web-based it was presented as a University of Westminster questionnaire with the 
appropriate design and logo. To further increase respondent interest an incentive in the 
form of two airline tickets for randomly selected respondents was offered and 
subsequently provided. Non-responders to the initial survey were contacted two times to 
encourage them to participate. 
 7.2.1  Journey characteristics 
Respondents were asked for the location of the origin and final destination for their 
journey using free text entries. For presentation purposes a regional classification was 
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applied to the responses to limit the range of outcomes for display. The regional 
classification used was based on the CAA Passenger Survey, as nearly all of the 
respondents used air travel on one segment of the journey. It conceals some of the detail 
of journeys but this is for presentational overview and to allow a high level classification 
of user locations. It also allows for illustrative comparisons with the CAA statistics. 
From the 203 respondents the origin locations were relatively well distributed with just 
under 30% in the South East and 16.3% in the North West, and Scotland, the third largest 
start location, having about 13%. The vast majority of the journeys were outbound from 
the UK with only one journey being a ‘return’ from Gran Canaria. There were eight non 
responses to this specific question, representing 4% of the total. The regional breakdown 
of journey origin is illustrated along with the CAA (2012) breakdown by region of airport 
origin in Table 7-3. While it is recognised that the CAA data is not directly comparable 
with the survey journey origin data, the broad pattern of regional coverage is similar.  
For example the CAA data indicates that 51.3% of UK leisure traffic emanates from the 
South East (which includes the major airports of London Heathrow, Gatwick, Stansted 
and Luton). There is also a large amount of leisure traffic from the North West through 
Manchester airport. Similarly, the combined traffic through East and West Midlands 
represented significant leisure traffic. 







South East 59 29.1 51.3 
South West  13 6.4 6.5 
West Midlands 17 8.4 5.5 
East Midlands 8 3.9 4.6 
East of England 3 1.5 9.1 
North East 5 2.5 0.4 
Yorkshire & Humber 8 3.9 3.1 
North West 33 16.3 7.0 
Wales 11 5.4 2.3 
Scotland 27 13.3 10.1 
Ireland 2 1 0.1 
UK 8 3.9 - 
Gran Canarias 1 0.5 - 
No Answer 8 3.9 - 
Total 203 100 100 
*Based on CAA Passenger Survey Classification Coding 2012 
Table 7-3: Regional breakdown of journey origins  
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For the destinations (Table 7-4), almost 60% were in Southern Europe and most of these 
were in the Canary Islands. Of the remainder, the three next most frequent destinations 
were Western Europe, Asia and North America, each with about 7% of the total. For the 
destinations there were only three non-responses, representing 1.5% of the total. 
Overall journey destination Frequency % 
Western Europe 14 6.9 
Eastern Europe 7 3.4 
Southern Europe 115 56.7 
Africa 12 5.9 
Middle East 5 2.5 
Asia 15 7.4 
Australasia 2 1 
North America 16 7.9 
South America 2 1 
Central Americas and Caribbean 12 5.9 
No Answer 3 1.5 
Total 203 100 
Table 7-4: Regional breakdown of journey destinations  
As expected, the main purpose of journeys was for holidays with over 83% in this 
category. Of the remainder, just under 6% were business trips and just over 5% Visiting 
Friends and Relatives (VFR). The results are provided in Figure 7-2 and compared with 
CAA statistics in Table 7-5. 
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Figure 7-2: Main journey purpose  
Comparing the journey purpose of the electronic survey conducted with CAA (2012) 
results, overall, the large proportion of journey purpose is for leisure travel. Some airports 
(London Heathrow and London City) have a larger proportion of journeys made for 
business purposes, whereas the more regional airports (East Midlands and Bristol) have 
more leisure travellers (see Table 7-5 below). In the consumerdata survey conducted 
there is a skew towards leisure passengers, since the databases used have predominantly 
leisure travellers. 
CAA Passenger Survey 2012 Journey Purpose 
Airport Business Passengers % Leisure Passengers % 
Birmingham 18.0 82.0 
Bristol 13.6 86.4 
Cardiff 14.0 86.0 
East Midlands 9.4 90.6 
Exeter 18.0 82.0 
London Gatwick 15.3 84.7 
London Heathrow 29.8 70.2 
London City 54.0 46.0 
Luton 15.5 84.5 
Manchester 18.6 81.4 
Stansted 14.6 85.4 
Survey (for comparison) 6 94 
Source: Compiled from CAA (2012) Survey Data 
Table 7-5: Comparison of journey purpose with the CAA 2012 statistics 
 
In addition to source and destination, the survey also requested information about the 
modes of transport used for the journey, with respondents again being allowed to provide 
free text (Figure 7-3). 
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Figure 7-3: Input request on journey modes used 
The origin/destination inputs were cross tabulated against the initial journey description 
to validate and this allowed the information to be completed properly where there were 
inconsistencies in the original entries. The respondents were allowed to provide only three 
modes, though in a number of cases they continued to provide additional modes instead 
of a destination. This was a limitation of the questionnaire design which did not allow 
space to fill more entries for more than three journey segments. Again, cross tabulating 
with previous origin/destination responses was helpful. Responses were highly consistent 
with only a few discrepancies, with a cross tabulation in SPSS conducted to validate. 
These discrepancies only reflected more detail being given in one response compared to 
the other. Depending on the journey profile, air travel was present in almost 100% of 
cases, confirming the information provided for the previous journey. The most frequently 
used access modes were car/taxi and rail/metro respectively. 
The majority of respondents’ journeys had air travel as the main mode with a variety of 
access modes to and from the airport. Accordingly, air is described as the ‘main mode’ 
and is mainly represented in the second stage of journeys where 87% are air. In 17% of 
cases there are two initial access modes and air travel is then in the third stage. 4% of 
respondents indicated air for both stage 2 and 3, suggesting interconnecting flights. For 
rail/metro there is a single instance of multiple access where a respondent has used 
rail/metro for the access stage and main stage of the journey. 
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Cross tabulating using SPSS showed a range of successive access modes. Bus/coach users 
in stage 2 of the journey primarily used it as a means of travelling from rail/metro or 
car/taxi to an airport. The most common combination overall was car/taxi to the airport 
in stage 1, followed by air travel in stage 2 and car/taxi in stage 3 from the airport to the 
final destination. The use of bus/coach in the third stage is thought to be airport to hotel 
transfers given that the majority of travellers were holidaymakers. The small number of 
entries in stage 4 should be treated with caution since, as noted above, space was not 
available for respondents who completed journeys with two access modes at either end 
of the journey (Figure 7-4). 
 
Figure 7-4: Summary of modes used by respondents at different stages of the journey 
Frequency of making journey 
This information was not included in the analysis because the responses were ‘no answer’ 
in more than 99% of cases. This reflects the fact that for holiday travellers a return to the 
same destination within a 12 month period is unlikely. 
Frequency of flying 
Respondents were asked about their frequency of flying (Figure 7-5). This question 
acknowledged the fact that most of those replying had recently completed a journey 
centred on a flight. The options provided were as follows: 
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 First flight 
 1-4 times a year 
 4-12 times a year 
 Over 12 times a year 
In most cases this was a holiday flight. Responses to this question were over 80% in the 
1 to 4 times per year category which may reflect the typical profile of holiday travellers. 
No respondents replied with 4 to 12 or more than 12 flights per year. The remaining 18% 
did not answer the question. 
The frequency of flight responses for a low annual flight number in the consumerdata 
survey are similar for instance when broadly compared to NTS (DfT, 2013a), as expected. 
The NTS data includes persons that did not fly at all during the year and all age groups 
are randomly selected. There is intercept bias in the consumerdata survey as it does not 
consider persons who did not fly at all, and, among those who do fly, is likely to intercept 
the more frequent flyers. Hence taking only the sub-section of those that travelled by air 
in the NTS survey (DfT, 2012a), 88% of the respondents said they had made at least one 
to three international flights in the last 12 months.  
 
Figure 7-5: Number of flights per year for consumer preference survey respondents 
Transport modes used for the last overseas journey you made 
Respondents were also asked about the last overseas journey they had made and the 
options provided were the standard transport modes. In this case, selection buttons were 
used, so a yes indicates that the button was clicked for a specific mode while a no answer 
effectively means ‘no’. 
The aim of asking about the most recent journey was to provide some context to the actual 
journey. The responses are presented in Figure 7-6, and the normalised percentage share 
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of total possible observations per mode excluding air in Figure 7-7. The percentages were 
calculated based on the total observations for each mode, excluding air, divided by the 
theoretical maximum of all possible observations (i.e. 4 x 203 respondents equalling 812). 
Almost all of the respondents, over 99%, said that their previous journey had involved air 
travel. There was no restriction on the number of boxes the respondent could tick. Car/taxi 
was the second most frequent at 77% and rail/metro third at just under 20%. Cycling had 
a 0% response while walking, for which it is difficult to define a minimum qualifying 
distance, was included by 11%.  
 
Figure 7-6: Frequency of use for transport modes 
Comparing the survey data with the CAA (2012) data on modes of transport used in their 
survey, it is clear that access modes used to reach regional airports (Birmingham, East 
Midlands, Bristol, Exeter) tended to be more private transport modes (car/taxi), at 
between 80-90%, while at the larger airports in the South East there was almost a 50% 
use of public modes of transport due to greater accessibility and availability.47  
 
                                                 




Figure 7-7: Normalised share of total possible observations per mode 
Preferred main mode and most frequently used main mode 
This question asked for the main part of your journey which type of transport was 
preferred and secondly which was the most frequently used mode (Figure 7-8). 
This question covered the main mode of the journey. It was originally included for a wider 
survey of a range of route types but here the response confirms the relatively uniform 
travel itineraries of the respondents, which concentrated on medium to long distance 
holiday travel. 
Following on from the previous question, this one asked in a more general sense what the 
preferred mode for the main journey mode was, i.e. not specifically to the journey being 
undertaken. In this case the results are very similar, though car/taxi is slightly more 
prominent here. This again fits with holiday travel which tends to be dominated by air 
travel, but with car/taxi as the prominent access mode. 
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Figure 7-8: Preferred and most frequently used mode for main part of journey 
 7.2.2  Potential for modal switching  
Having explored the specific journey characteristics, the next step was to explore the 
potential for alternative modes to be considered. The alternative modes that are 
considered and the possible motivations for switching are addressed in subsequent 
questions. 
The initial question was simply to ask what alternative modes had been considered for 
any of the journey legs and, hence, to start exploring the basis for CMS. The fact that 63% 
of respondents did not look at an alternative mode suggests that alternatives are not often 
considered. This outcome does, however, need to be interpreted with some care. This is 
because many of the destinations are Southern European holiday destinations (e.g. Canary 
Islands) and in other cases Asia, North America or other long distance destinations. As a 
result there is rarely a viable alternative to air travel as the main mode for the journey, 
either on schedule or cost grounds (Figure 7-9). 
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Figure 7-9: Percentage of respondents considering alternative modes 
Alternative modes considered and reasons 
Respondents were then asked if they would have considered an alternative means of 
transport for any part of their journey and if so, what the mode would have been and the 






Price Convenience Safety Availability Other 
       
Referring to those who did consider an alternative mode together with those considering 
alternatives for the more minor ‘access’ modes, this question seeks to identify which 
modes could be substituted and the reasons that could drive such a substitution. For up to 
four cases the question provided free text for current and possible alternative modes and 
then allowed for ticks to describe the reasons. Free text responses were later classified 
into the main modal groups used in the analysis. 
It is important to note that the ‘no’ answer rates for modes 1 and 2 were 52.7% and 82.3% 
respectively and the response rate for mode 3 was so low that the analysis was not 
included for this case. This reflects the fact that only 34% of the total respondents said 
they would consider an alternative mode. 
For the mode 1 response, air travel represented only 11.8% of cases, which again reflects 
the lack of alternatives for the long distance holiday travel that is mainly the subject of 
the responses. Of the remainder the most prominent modes considered were car/taxi at 
25.6% followed by rail and bus at the much lower levels of 5.4% and 3.9% respectively. 
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Rail was considered as an alternative in 16.7% of cases with car/taxi at 13.8%. The main 
reasons for changing were convenience at 27.1% and price at 23.2%. Safety was only 
given as the reason in 2.5% of cases. 
The numbers entering a second mode alternative were much more limited and these were 
quite evenly distributed. Here, car/taxi travel was the most commonly specified mode for 
substitution but only at 7.4% while air travel was second at 4.9%. Of the alternatives, 
car/taxi was the greatest at 6.9%. Once again, convenience at 11.8% and cost at 7.9% 
were the top reasons with safety only reaching 1.5% on this occasion. 
Figure 7-10 summarises the results for the mode alternatives, giving the current mode on 
the x axis with the possible alternatives given in each case shown by the coloured bars. 
 
Figure 7-10: Alternative modes considered  
Substitution for Air 
For users who currently use air, two main alternative modes were proposed, rail and 
ship/ferry (Figure 7-11). Of the 24 respondents who would be willing to switch from air 
as the current form of transport, 54% would switch to ship/ferry, 38% to rail and 4% to 
car/taxi. Given that most respondents were UK based, it is assumed that these responses 
refer mainly to cross channel ferries; for example, for a European touring holiday by car 
as opposed to going directly by air travel. The respondents’ answers were compared to 
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the origins and destinations they had indicated. This showed that the comparisons given 
were not related to the origin/destination described elsewhere in their response, for which 
the users could not have used any primary mode other than air. It has, therefore, been 
assumed that in Figure 7-11 the alternatives are what the users, in general, would prefer 
and not for the actual journey they have undertaken. 
 
Figure 7-11: Substitution for air users 
Reasons for responses 
The reasons given for choosing an alternative at each of the four levels plus other category 
are as shown in Figure 7-12 and this is mainly driven by convenience. 
 
Figure 7-12: Reasons given for potentially selecting alternative modes 
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 7.2.3  Safety and accident risk perceptions 
Having explored the wider modal shift drivers, this section considers the safety related 
factors which could drive modal shifts. 
Respondents were initially asked to rank the top 5 issues they considered most important 
when deciding how to make the specific journey under consideration, including all stages 
from start to finish, in order of importance. 
The first question in this group aimed to determine overall priorities when selecting 
transport modes. It was posed by asking respondents to identify the top 5 issues for them 
when selecting journey modes. As a result, care is needed when interpreting the results 
because the ‘least’ important is in fact the 5th most important out of the 9 options given. 
Figure 7-13 shows the breakdown of the factors specified as most important. Here price 
has the highest frequency with 31% of responses giving this as the top priority. Time taken 
and schedule were almost equal second, with 13.8% and 13.3% respectively. Accident 
safety was specified as a top issue by only 4.4% of cases, just over half of the 8.4% 
specifying personal safety as the top priority. Personal safety rather than accident being 
considered as a priority for respondents may be attributable to perception of risks in recent 
years due to the combination of extensive media coverage of threats to personal security 
from acts of terrorism and crimes such as muggings when travelling. Personal safety and 
security messages can often highlight risks without putting them into perspective, and the 
nature especially of public transport, which requires passengers to share sometimes 
crowded and uncomfortable spaces with strangers. 
Accident safety priorities were 2.0% as second priority, 2.0% for third priority and 4.4% 
and 4.9% for fourth and fifth priority. The other options were relatively evenly distributed 
with no major peaks at the second to fifth levels, although the ‘no answer’ frequency did 
increase towards the 30% mark as people exhausted their priorities in some cases before 
they got to five options. 
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Figure 7-13: Priorities in making the journey 
It is also possible to express these outcomes as single values by calculating weighted 
overall values (Figure 7-14). By applying a weight of 5 to the frequency of highest 
ranking for a stated priority, 4 to the second highest and so on through to 1 for the fifth, 
priority-weighted totals are given. The outcomes are shown in the following graph. The 
main bars show the overall totals resulting, while the data labels show for each priority 
the results expressed as a percentage of the maximum total possible, i.e., 203 (the sample 
size) * 5 (the maximum weight). The percentages are thus individual percentages of the 
total of 203 and hence do not add to 100. 
 
Figure 7-14: Weighted totals for journey priorities 
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Importance of safety for door to door or main part of the journey 
This question asked whether, if safety was an important issue for the journey, the 
respondent considered the whole journey door to door or just the main part. The question 
sought to understand whether travellers considered safety as an ‘end to end’ issue for the 
whole journey or simply considered the main mode, in this case largely air. Of the 69% 
who replied, 48% did consider the whole door to door journey safety. 
 
Figure 7-15: Safety consideration for whole or only main part of journey 
Causes of modal changes 
This question asked if any of the following issues ever caused the respondent to re-
consider which travel method they planned for a subsequent journey, compared to one 
where they experienced the problem: 
 Severe delays (technical problems, shortage of staff) 
 Bad weather (e.g. fog, heavy rain, snow) 
 Security measures (inconvenience and comfort issues) 
 Long queues at check in for rail or airports  
This question was asked in a general sense to understand if any additional factors had 
driven consideration of modal change in the past, though no actual change in selection 
was required to answer yes. The questions were tick boxes so a yes is a positive response 
while a no answer is a no/not relevant. In summary the results are shown in Figure 7-16. 
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Figure 7-16: Percentages considering suggested reasons for alternative modes for 
consumer survey 
This suggests that delays certainly motivate re-evaluation of transport modes, even if 
ultimately other reasons determine the final choice. 
Personal security as a deciding factor 
The question asked was whether personal security risk has ever been a deciding factor in 
choice of transport type for a journey. Respondents were asked to say yes or no for each 
of the standard mode combinations (Figure 7-17). 
This question was asked partly to disguise the question about accident safety so that the 
answers to that question were more neutral. Personal security was an issue for 25.1% of 
air passengers, 14.3% of rail/metro travellers, 30% of bus/coach travellers, 18.2% of 
car/taxi users, 25.1% of those walking and 26.6% of those cycling. 
The high level of concern for air travel was presumably centred on terrorism while 
concerns on other public transport were more likely to be motivated by more conventional 
forms of violence (e.g., muggings). Car/taxi travel raised the lowest levels of concern, 
though this may mask a significant difference between private cars and taxis for this issue. 
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Figure 7-17: Personal security as a consideration by mode 
Risk of accident as a deciding factor 
The question examined whether accident risk has ever been a deciding factor in the choice 
of transport type for a journey (Figure 7-18).  
This question is a key issue when considering the prospects for CMS for safety reasons, 
as it directly asks what the prospects are of making a modal change based on accident 
safety concerns. The outcomes in this case were 10.8% for air, 4.9% for rail, 10.8% for 
bus/coach, 12.3% for car/taxi, 9.9% for walking and, perhaps not surprisingly, 25.1% for 
cycling. These relatively low levels of concern also mirror the British Social Attitudes 
Survey (2013) expected levels of perceived risk with cycling and car use being highest 
and air and especially rail being lowest. Since 2005/06, only one passenger has been killed 
in a train accident DfT (2013e) while 59% of people responding to a British Social 
Attitudes Survey (DfT, 2013f) agreed or strongly agreed that it was too dangerous for 
them to cycle on the roads. The relatively low importance of accident risk as a deciding 
factor when travelling could mean that individuals are not concerned about safety per se 
since they rely on operators and providers to ensure safety standards are met and enforced. 
On the other hand individuals who are in control of a mode of transport (e.g. car) have 
the perception that they themselves are the safest, as noted in the additional comments 
from respondents for this survey (Appendix B-2).  
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Figure 7-18: Accident risk as a deciding factor by mode 
Impact of adverse weather 
This question asked whether, if adverse weather conditions were likely to cause delays or 
to increase accident risk safety, the respondent would still be prepared to make the 
journey. For each option of air, rail and car respondents were asked to state yes, maybe or 
no (Figure 7-19). 
For air travel the prospect of bad weather would cause 7.9% to consider not making the 
journey. For rail this is 11.3% and for car 28.1%. The extent of the bad weather would, of 
course, be a factor here since in some cases air and rail services could be curtailed in such 
conditions. It is also notable that the ‘maybes’ were 46.3%, 44.3% and 44.3% respectively 
which confirms that if conditions are bad enough, most respondents would consider 
alternative plans. The percentage values are individual percentages of the total of 203 
respondents in each case and thus do not total to 100% overall. 
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Figure 7-19: Effects of adverse weather on likelihood of still making the journey 
Most important selection factors 
The respondents were asked the three most important factors which affected their choice 
of transport service in order of priority, with 1 being the most important and 3 the least 
important. The options provided were: 
 Comfort of the journey 
 Time or duration of the journey 
 Cost of the journey 
 Safety factors 
 Catering facilities 
 Other (please specify) 
This question returned to the theme of the key factors behind the choice of journey mode. 
As in earlier questions, it should be noted that the ‘least’ important factor is, in fact, the 
third most important out of six. This question was answered by almost all respondents 
with very few ‘no answers’ (Figure 7-20). 
The most prominent top priority factors were time/duration (39.9%), cost (36.5%) and 
comfort (17.7%). Safety was only given as top priority in five cases, i.e. 2.5% of total 
cases. Safety was second priority in 13 cases (6.4%) and third in 23 cases (11.3%). The 
last result shows that safety is an important ‘background’ concern once cost and 
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convenience have been addressed, though even here it is well behind catering facilities, 
which was third priority in 70 cases (34.5%). 
 
Figure 7-20: Factors affecting choice of transport service 
Risk factors most likely to affect modal choice 
Survey respondents were asked which risk type they personally consider more likely to 
affect their decision to travel by a particular type of transport. 
 Personal safety (terrorist) 
 Personal safety (mugging) 
 Risk of a transport accident (safety) 
 Other (please specify) 
This question is an interesting counterpoint to the risk questions which asked separately 
about the impact of personal safety and accident safety on journey mode selection. In that 
case, personal security was highlighted as the more important concern (Figure 7-21). Here 
though, personal safety concerns are split into terrorist risks and mugging risks. As a 
result, accident risk is considered to be the second highest: at 35% of total risk just behind 
terrorist risk at 38.4%. Given the dominance of air travel with its protected environment 
this is perhaps an expected result. Nevertheless, mugging risks are also considered to be 
relatively high at just under 20%. These dominated the response with others at 2.5%. 
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Figure 7-21: Risk types most likely to affect selection of transport mode 
Modes used for journey considered safest (used and overall) 
For the standard transport mode types, the following two questions were asked: 
 Considering the types of transport you have used for this journey which do you 
think were the safest (less risk of accident)? (Maximum of 2) 
 Which type of transport do you think in general the safest (less risk of accident) 
to travel? (Maximum of 2) 
The earlier questions asked about the relative importance of accident safety concerns and 
found that these were comparatively low. Given these low levels, however, this question 
asked about the relative safety credentials of the different modes as applied to the journey 
in hand (Figure 7-22). 
Air with 87.2% is considered to be the safest mode by quite a margin. The next highest 
was car/taxi with 31% while - surprisingly given earlier answers - rail/metro was third 
with 30.5%. Bus/coach travel was only seen as safest by 7.9%, worse than walking at 
8.4% while cycling was at only 1.5%. 
The second question followed from the safest mode used, but here the question is posed 
for the more general case, which would affect future decisions. Once again, air comes top 
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with 86.7% considering this the safest mode, very similar to the 87.2% achieved in the 
question on the safest mode used. 
Of the remainder, the split here between car/taxi and rail/metro is much different. Car/taxi 
is considered safest of the remainder by 36% while rail/metro only by 12.8%. Walking is 
similar at 9.9% but bus/coach is only 3.9%, only just ahead of cycling which is a fraction 
higher at 2%. 
 
Figure 7-22: Modes considered to be the safest 
Comparative assessment 
The following questions in the survey approached the safety aspect from slightly different 
perspectives and, hence, it is useful to consider the outcomes together. 
 Q14 asked whether (a) personal security or (b) accident risk had ever been a 
deciding factor in the choice of mode for a journey (yes or no for each mode); 
 Q18 asked which modes the respondent considered the safest for the specific 
journey under consideration (maximum of two); 
 Q19 asked overall which modes the respondent considered the safest (maximum 
of two). 
The outcomes of these questions are plotted in Figure 7-23 and Figure 7-24, firstly with 
the outcomes presented by mode and secondly with the outcomes presented by question. 
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In general, it would be expected that the responses to the first of these, which asked if 
security was an issue, would be the inverse of the other two which asked which the safest 
modes are. This was not always the case, however, as discussed. 
For the first question it was possible for a respondent to reply yes or no to all of the cases. 
With the latter two, on the other hand, only a maximum of two safest modes could be 
identified. 
Figure 7-23 and Figure 7-24 show that air travel stands out as the perceived safest mode 
in the latter two questions, i.e. both for the journey being considered and for the general 
case. At 87% in both latter questions, it is substantially ahead of the second choice (rail) 
at 36% for the specific journey, and rail plus car/taxi as equal second for the general case. 
Contrasting the outcome of the personal security/accident risk question for air with the 
responses to the other two is interesting. While air was the second lowest in accident risk 
at 11%/22 responses, it was substantially higher in personal security at 25%/51 responses. 
Since personal security in air travel, in the sense of direct attacks on a person, is extremely 
well controlled, it is highly likely that these concerns relate to the perceived terrorism 
threat. The opposite would be the case for cycling (27% for Q14a) and walking (25% for 
Q14a) where direct attacks on the person such as mugging would be a much greater 
perceived risk. The other interesting response for personal security was for car/taxi (18%), 
but this is likely to relate to the taxi part of the category. One respondent did point out 
that taxi risk varies considerably between countries, so that while UK taxis may be 
perceived as relatively safe, taxis in some other countries may be perceived as more risky, 
whether justifiably or not. In general, responses on the specific journey are biased 
according to the modes actually used for the journey. As mentioned, cycling was rarely 
used and walking was also rarely identified. The high (31%) rating for taxi therefore could 
be partly related to the high frequency with which this mode is actually being used. 
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Figure 7-23: Comparison of safety influences on modal choice – by factor 
 
Figure 7-24: Comparison of safety influences on modal choice – by mode 
Of the remaining modes, cycling was the least selected. In the specific journey case it 
received only 1% (3 responses) for the specific case, where in any case it is unlikely to 
have been a practical feeder mode, but only 2% (4 responses) in the general case. This 
corresponds well with the fact that it was the most selected in the personal/accident 
question with 27% (54 responses) stating personal safety as a concern for cycling and 
25% (51 responses) stating accident safety as a concern; in both cases the largest response 
for a single mode. 
In summary therefore, air travel is perceived to be the safest mode by the survey 
respondents, both for the specific journey they made and also for the general case. While 
only 11% of travellers had concerns about accidents, 25% had concerns about their 
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security when travelling by air. By contrast, cycling is the reverse, being selected as safest 
by only 1% to 2% and raising the greatest number of safety and even security concerns. 
Specific comments made by respondents are given in Appendix B-2. 
 SNOWBALL SURVEY 
This section considers the survey findings from the snowball survey which was completed 
between May and August 2014 (n=111). This additional survey was conducted to capture 
business/work travellers not covered by the consumerdata survey as noted above and 
hence to provide a more complete overall picture. 
Although ideally a real time questionnaire survey would be more appropriate, the 
snowball survey provided access to business/work travellers in the UK and Europe which 
otherwise would not have been possible. The selection bias and lack of random sampling 
for this type of survey is acknowledged. A very similar questionnaire format and question 
structure to consumerdata was used to allow the results of the two surveys to be 
considered together as far as possible. 
The snowball survey is described in Appendix B.1.2. Prior to the snowball survey a short 
email was sent to targets summarising the aims of the survey, the type of journey being 
explored (long distance in excess of 200 km in Europe) and confidentiality assurances to 
increase respondent interest in the survey. In this case it was possible to request 
demographic information and in addition a more comprehensive written commentary was 
provided by many respondents that provided insightful information to back up the choices 
specified. 
 7.3.1  Journey characteristics 
Frequency of making journey 
Respondents were asked to give the town or location starting area, including any 
interchanges at stations, airports, etc. and how they got from the arrival station to their 
final destination. Type of transport modes were: rail, car, taxi, bus/coach, walk/cycle, 
train, metro, air. 
They were firstly asked for the location of the start and the final destination for the journey 
and the modes used at each stage of travel. This allowed for free text entries. As with the 
consumer data traveller survey it was necessary to apply a classification to the responses 
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in order to limit the range of responses for analysis. A country classification was used 
which can be seen in Figure 7-25. This also shows the start locations by percentages. The 
overall absolute number of respondents was 111. 
Start locations (origin) were distributed with just under 40% in France, 16% in the UK, 
and the third largest start location of about 14% in Luxembourg. The majority of journeys 
were therefore outbound from France. Overall, there was a 100% response from 
respondents to this question. 
 
Figure 7-25: Journey start location 
The modes used at each stage of the journey provided an indication of the access and 
main modes selected (Figure 7-26). For Stage 1, most of the respondents used car (42%) 
and taxi (18%) closely followed by local rail/metro as the modes of transport. Stage 2 of 
the journey, normally considered the main leg (the most distance travelled) was 
dominated by air with 53% and 26% being LDR. Most respondents for Stage 3 of the 
journey used taxi (27%) followed by metro/local rail (23%) and car (19%) as the final 
access modes to reach their destination. The access modes at the beginning and end of the 
journey vary slightly. This can be attributed to differences in the cost of modes at start 
and end destinations48, and familiarity with specific routes at the start location vs. 
                                                 
48 For example car availability. If the own car is used as feeder to rail from the home end, then it is not 
available at the destination. 
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unfamiliarity at end destinations. For stage 2 and stage 3 there were 8% and 11% non-
responses respectively, attributable to some journeys made throughout by car. 
 
Figure 7-26: Mode types by journey stage  
For the destinations, as with the start locations, due to the broad range of places it was 
necessary to classify according to country (Figure 7-27). Over 24% were in the UK, 
followed by nearly 21% in France, just under 10% in Germany and 7% in Italy. Of the 
remainder, the three next most frequent destinations were the Netherlands, Switzerland 
and Spain, each with about 16% of the total.  
 
Figure 7-27: Journey destinations  
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Respondents were asked how often in the past 12 months they had made this journey 
between the same two points. Options given were weekly or more, monthly, several times 
per year or first time (Figure 7-28). 
In 45% of cases, respondents travelled several times per year on the same route, 
suggesting some work related travel. A large proportion (41%) also noted that in the last 
12 months they only travelled once on the route specified, suggesting that this could be 
to visit friends and relatives and for holiday purposes. 11% of the respondents travelled 
the same route on a monthly basis and 3% travelled weekly. The remaining 1% did not 
answer the question. 
 
Figure 7-28: Frequency of making the specific journey  
Purpose of journey 
Respondents were asked the main purpose of their journey (Figure 7-29). In this survey 
the main reason for travel was for work/business at 56%, secondly to visit friends and 
relatives at 23% and thirdly for holiday at 15%. This differs substantially from the 
consumerdata survey where the vast majority of travel was for purposes of leisure. It 
therefore allows a broader perspective on the prospects for modal switching for a wider 
range of journey purposes. 
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Figure 7-29: Purpose of the journey for the snowball survey 
 7.3.2  Potential for modal switching 
Consideration of alternative modes 
Respondents were asked when making journeys of the type described whether they 
normally consider alternative ways or methods of travelling for the main part of the 
journey. A Yes or No answer was requested (Figure 7-30). 
 
Figure 7-30: Snowball survey respondents who considered alternative modes 
The aim of this question was to begin exploring the basis for CMS by asking directly 
whether respondents would consider alternative modes. The fact that 66.7% of 
respondents do consider an alternative mode suggests positive prospects for modal 
switching among this more business oriented population. The remaining 33.3% did not 
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consider alternative options. This may be because for many of the long distance 
destinations there are limited or no alternatives. In particular, for the much longer distance 
air journeys there is rarely a viable alternative to air travel as the main mode for the 
journey, either on schedule or cost grounds. This was further supported by additional 
comments made by a number of respondents (comments listed in Appendix B-2 and B-
3). 
The alternative modes that were considered and the possible motivations for this 
switching are considered in the analysis of subsequent questions. 
Actual alternate modes considered and reasons 
If respondents would have considered an alternative means of transport for any part of 
the journey described, they were asked to say what the transport type would have been 
and to indicate the reasons needed to select it. 
Table 7-6 highlights the percentage of respondents willing to switch to alternative modes 
of transport and indicates the mode type they would switch to and from. 81% of air 
travellers willing to change mode would change from air to LDR and conversely 65% 
from LDR to air. As the journeys considered were of 200km or more within Europe, there 
is some choice from LDR as an alternate means to air for the main part of the journey, 
particularly for the journeys closer to the 200km distance. The second largest willingness 
to switch mode was from taxi to metro/local rail and vice versa, both at 67% as access 
modes for other parts of the journey. Bus/coach to LDR was significant at 50% (probably 
as a main mode) while bus/coach to metro/local rail was represented by 25% as access 
modes for shorter journey segments. The selection from using car to air was notable at 
33% followed by 28% to LDR (travellers substituting car to air or car to LDR for the 
main journey segment) and 22% to metro/local rail (substitution for shorter journeys as 
access modes).  
It should be noted that cycle to bus/coach is shown as 100% since there was only one 
respondent that wanted to shift from cycle to another mode of transport. 13% of bus/coach 
users would be willing to move to cycle. 
 200 
 
Table 7-6: Specific alternative modes considered for snowball survey respondents 
 
Figure 7-31: Alternative journey modes considered  
From Table 7-6 and Figure 7-31 it is clear that there is a willingness for a sizeable number 
of respondents to switch cross modally. This seems reasonable as there are a number of 
alternative modes of transport available, especially for selected pairings such as air and 
LDR, car/taxi and metro/ local rail.  
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Figure 7-32: Reasons for alternative modes being considered for the snowball survey 
The main reason given by respondents willing to swap modes was schedule of travel, at 
39% (Figure 7-32). The number was linked using cross tabulation to travellers for work 
or business reasons. Secondary reasons were price and convenience at 26% and 24% 
respectively. Safety considerations were limited to 7% and other factors attributed to 5%.  
 7.3.3  Safety and accident risk perceptions 
Rank top issues important when deciding how to make your journey  
 Table 7-7 shows the 5 most important issues considered by respondents when making a 
journey. 
Figure 7-33 shows the breakdown of the factors specified as most important. Here, time 
taken has the highest frequency with 38% of responses giving this as the top importance. 
Price was the second highest importance at 32% and schedule was ranked third at 26%. 
Convenience and comfort were equal at 23%. Accident safety was specified as a top issue 
by 9% of cases, and 6% ranked personal safety as the highest importance. 
Accident safety priorities were 3% as second and third priority, 2% for fourth priority and 
4% and 11% for fifth priority. The other options were relatively evenly distributed with 





Table 7-7: Ranking of top 5 issues when deciding to make a journey 
 
 
Figure 7-33: Most important issues for journey travel 
Causes of modal changes 
Figure 7-34 highlights the main reasons travellers would be willing to change mode due 
to unforeseen circumstances. The main reasons selected for change were severe delays 
(42%) and bad weather (41%). Travellers would be less likely to change mode on the 
basis of security measures (21%) and long queues (24%). Where travellers are subject to 
security measures at airports it is not possible at that stage of their journey to change mode 
of travel, as they would normally incur penalties or would not have any reimbursements 
for their flight/s49. Nevertheless, bad experiences of delays or objections in principle to 
being searched could lead to the selection of alternatives. 
                                                 
49 This is dependent on the type of luggage (e.g. with liquids)  
Rank Time taken Accident safety Personal security Environmental 
concerns
Comfort Price Convenience Schedule
1 38% 9% 6% 2% 9% 21% 17% 12%
2 24% 3% 4% 5% 14% 32% 12% 15%
3 14% 3% 5% 5% 10% 14% 21% 26%
4 8% 5% 5% 4% 15% 16% 23% 18%
5 7% 11% 9% 11% 23% 11% 15% 12%
6 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1%
7 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 0% 0%
8 0% 0% 0% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0%
No answer 8% 69% 71% 71% 28% 5% 12% 16%
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Figure 7-34: Percentages considering suggested reasons for alternative modes survey 
Personal security as a deciding factor 
Personal security was an issue for 11% of air passengers, 18% of local rail/metro 
travellers, 10% of LDR and bus/coach travellers, 14% of car/taxi passenger and 8% of 
ship/ferry travellers (Figure 7-35). 
Similar to the findings in the consumerdata survey, the level of concern for air was 
presumably centred on terrorism while concerns regarding other public modes of 




Figure 7-35: Personal security as a deciding factor, by mode – for snowball survey 
Risk of accident as a deciding factor 
The outcomes for risk of accident as a deciding factor (Figure 7-36) were 17% for air, 8% 
for LDR and ship/ferry, 11% for bus/coach, 7% for taxi and perhaps not surprisingly 34% 
for car. These levels of concern also mirror the British Social Attitudes Survey (DfT, 
2013f) results of expected levels of perceived risk, with car use being highest and taxi 
and metro/local rail the lowest. 
 
Figure 7-36: Accident risk as a deciding factor, by mode – for snowball survey 
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Impact of adverse weather 
The key interest in Figure 7-37 is the ‘no’ response, which was 51% for ship transport 
(although only one respondent used this as a main mode travel, it would appear that others 
are providing a ‘no’ response on the basis of risk perception) and 39% for air: the two 
modes where this issue would have been most expected because of the direct impact on 
passenger comfort. The bus/coach response at 25% is perhaps more surprising, though 
not so far ahead of taxi at 30% and car at 29%. Rail and metro are least impacted at 13% 
and 11% respectively. 
 
Figure 7-37: Impacts of adverse weather on journey choices by mode 
Most important selection factors 
Respondents were asked, of the two types of risk mentioned (personal security/accident 
risk), which they personally considered more likely to affect their decision to travel by a 
particular transport type. 
The main perceived risk for this survey was accident risk at 59%, while personal security 
risk represented only 33% of respondents and 7% did not respond to the question. 
 206 
 
Figure 7-38: Main perceived risk type  
Modes used for journey considered safest (used and overall) 
Respondents were asked, of the transport types used on the specific journey described in 
question 2, which they thought were the safest (i.e. with the least risk of accident). These 
were ranked from 1 to 3, with 1 being the safest, as shown in Figure 7-39. 
 
Figure 7-39: Safest modes as defined by snowball survey respondents 
Air with 44% is considered to be the safest mode by quite a margin. The next highest was 
rail with 37% while metro was third with 10%. Bus/coach travel and taxi were only seen 
as safest by 2%; worse than walking or cycling at 5% and car at 3%. 
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For the second safest mode of transport, the split here between car/taxi and rail/metro is 
much different. Rail is considered safest of the remainder by 20%, air by 18% while 
car/taxi was selected only by 14% and 12% respectively. Bus/coach is 12%, only just 
ahead of metro which is lower at 10%. 
Demographic information 
For this survey respondents were asked to provide personal information covering 
occupation, gender, residence/nationality and age range (Figure 7-40 to Figure 7-43). 
Most respondents (72%) were from the private sector followed by the public sector 
(20%). There was a skew towards male respondents (also reported in CAA passenger 
surveys) while the residence or nationality of the respondents was mainly France, UK, 
Luxembourg and Italy. As this survey was based on respondents contacted through 
extended networks there is a bias in terms of their residence and nationality, since random 
sampling was not possible for this survey.  
 
Figure 7-40: Occupation of respondents 
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Figure 7-41: Survey respondent gender 
 
Figure 7-42: Respondent country of residence/nationality 
 
Figure 7-43: Age of respondents 
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The age of the respondents is predominantly clustered around the 30-39 and 40-49 group. 
This again can be attributable to the selection bias inherent within the survey, but also due 
to the fact that most respondents were business/work travellers and hence the working 
population rather than the under 18 age group or the older population over 60. 
 7.3.4  Significance testing 
A range of cross tabulations was carried out for the snowball questionnaire to test the 
significance (using Pearson Chi-Square) of relationships between key variables. The aim 
of this was to understand the patterns within the data (using demographics such as age 
and gender) and also to support possible implementation measures designed to encourage 
modal switching (stated preferences against demographics). In doing this it should be 
noted that the snowball questionnaire sampling used a non-probability method with 
extended associations, meaning that the sample is not fully random and may thus have an 
element of bias. Any such bias will be acknowledged in the analysis. More detailed 
observed and expected frequencies are provided in Appendix B.5 (Tables B.1 to B.5). 
The relationship between the age of the respondent and the frequency of his or her travel, 
which could be useful in targeting modal switching incentives, was tested. A chi-square 
test was performed and no relationship was found: chi-square (8, N = 111) = 6.57, p =.58. 
The observed count in 9 out of 15 cells exceeded the expected count as indicated in Table 
B.1. The largest observed frequencies were in the 30-39 and 40-49 age groups; but this 
could be attributed to sample selection bias. Most respondents travelled several times per 
year or were travelling for the first time to a specific journey or destination, i.e. few were 
regular commuters. 
Significance of relationships between the age and gender of the respondent was examined. 
Although this has no direct bearing on modal choice, the test helps to understand the 
characteristics of the dataset used. A chi-square test was performed and no relationship 
was found: chi-square (4, N = 111) = 9.06, p =.06. The observed count in 4 out of 10 cells 
exceeded the expected count as indicated in Table B.2. 
Table 7-8 displays the significance of the relationship between the frequency and purpose 
of travel. A chi-square test was performed and a highly significant relationship was found: 
chi-square (2, N = 111) = 13.85, p =.001. The results suggest that a fairly large proportion 
of those surveyed travelled several times a year for work/business. However a number of 
respondents who travelled for leisure or to visit friends and relatives were doing so for 
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the first time. There were also leisure travellers who were making journeys several times. 
These findings seem to align with general transport survey trends on purpose and 
frequency of travel. 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 13.851a 2 .001 
Likelihood Ratio 15.516 2 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 13.714 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 111   
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.95. 
Table 7-8: Frequency and purpose of travel 
Regarding the significance of links between the gender of respondents and their purpose 
of travel, a chi-square test was performed but no relationship was found. 
Accident and personal security risks (personal security risk associated during the course 
of travel) were explored against the purpose of travel and age. The significance between 
the types of risk and the purpose of travel was examined. A chi-square test was performed 
and no relationship was found: chi-square (2, N = 111) = 0.77, p =.68. The observed count 
in 3 out of 6 cells exceeded the expected count as indicated in Table B.4. Two of the 
observed cell counts were very close to the expected cell counts.  
Table 7-9 examined the significance of relationships between the types of risk and age. A 
chi-square test was performed, and a highly significant relationship was found: chi-square 
(8, N = 111) = 20.93, p =.007. A number of the observed cell counts were very close to 
the expected cell counts. The significance in this instance could be attributable to varying 
perceptions of personal security and accident risk within different age groups. For 
example, the level of concern regarding accident risk seems to increase up to the 40-49 
age group; however the 50-59 age group were not found to be as concerned about accident 
risk. These findings could be used to target incentives more effectively by addressing 
different age groups in the most appropriate way. The main difference between observed 
and expected cell values are in personal security for the 0-29 age group, with a higher 
than expected regard for personal security (observed 7 vs expected 3.7) and less regard 
for accident risk than expected (observed 4 vs. expected 6.5). The concern for personal 
security is lower than expected (observed 9 vs. expected 12.7) for the 40-49 age group 
and higher than expected for accident risk (observed 25 vs. expected 22.6). Note however 
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that conclusions cannot be drawn for expected values lower than 5, as was the case for 
personal security for 0-29 age group. 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 20.925a 8 .007 
Likelihood Ratio 14.880 8 .062 
Linear-by-Linear Association 12.808 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 111   
8 cells (53.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .07. 
Table 7-9: Risk type and age 
Specific comments made by respondents are given in Appendix B-3. 
 EXPERT SURVEY  
This section considers the survey findings from the expert survey which was completed 
between June and July 2014 (n=20). The expert survey is provided in Appendix B.1.3. 
Similar to the other user surveys a short email summarising the aims of the survey was 
sent to participants in advance, including confidentiality assurances to increase 
respondent interest in the survey. The transport experts were mainly specialising in air 
transport (with roles ranging from engineers, safety specialist/analysts, flight/planning 
analysts to commercial and strategic) with some limited specialists in rail (strategy and 
safety) and in maritime transport (safety systems engineer). The experts worked or 
specialised in various geographies (Japan, Thailand, Asia, Mexico and Venezuela), 
although predominantly Western Europe (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, 
Portugal and UK) and Albania, Poland and Turkey. 
 7.4.1  Impacts of major accidents 
Respondents were asked about how major accidents impact public travel behaviour. They 
could respond on a scale from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’ as shown in Figure 
7-44. Overall, this confirms expert agreement that there is an impact on public travel 
behaviour. Although there was some disagreement (3 cases), there were 14 cases where 
experts either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement. 
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Figure 7-44: Do high profile major transport accidents lead to a change in public travel 
behaviour 
The experts were also asked to state, where there is a change due to high profile accidents, 
whether this involves a change in transport mode and/or a change in operator. 
Some expressed that individual behaviour would impact both mode and operator while 
others indicated only modal shift. Temporary suspension from long distance travel was 
also cited as a possibility. One respondent suggested that there would also be some 
“staycation’ promotions encouraging passengers to holiday domestically who are more 
likely to drive or use public transport”.  
Respondents cited limited modal shift due to the fact that often there is no other mode 
realistically available for the trips in question. After a major accident people may travel 
less: for example, the impact on air travel after the 11 September 2001 and Malaysian 
Airlines accident in 2014. In both cases there was a dramatic drop in air travel; however, 
it was only sustained temporarily, as air is the only mode available between Europe and 
USA and Europe and Asia. 
Major accidents also lead to new analysis of the specific transport mode processes and 
consequences which would have an impact on traveller behaviour, as well as longer term 
safety regulations changes on design. 
Three respondents suggested no change in behaviour except for a short term impact on 
operator selected. One respondent indicated that a single accident would not have any 
impact on mode or operator; however, a series of accidents by the same operator may lead 
to a change. For certain geographical markets for example safety has a higher profile and 
therefore it could have a more noticeable effect. The 787 Boeing aircraft battery issues 
caused a drop off in flights involving 787 for a period of time though no accidents 
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occurred. A further three respondents suggested that there would not be any change other 
than in extreme circumstances.  
The experts were asked how long a behavioural change would be sustained either for a 
modal shift (Figure 7-45) or change in operator (Figure 7-46). They could respond on a 
scale from few weeks to permanent. 
For a modal shift it is suggested that the impact is expected to be temporary with the 
majority considering a persistence of weeks or months rather than years. There was only 
one case in which a permanent modal shift was anticipated. 
 
Figure 7-45: Sustainability of modal shift in transport 
For a change in operator in general this would be expected to refer to aviation where there 
is the greatest choice of carriers, though it could also refer to bus and perhaps ferry travel. 
The responses here were markedly different to the modal shift case, with a much greater 
emphasis on long term or permanent changes. 50% of the respondents considered a 
change of two years or permanent change likely and only 2 of the 16 respondents 
considered an impact only to last a few weeks. 
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Figure 7-46: Sustainability of change in operator in transport 
 7.4.2  Modal choice and accident risk perceptions 
Respondents were asked if there was any evidence that the public considered accident 
safety issues when selecting transport modes. A scale was provided from ‘very strong 
evidence’ to ‘no evidence’. 
This is a key question for the thesis, covering the expected public perception of safety 
issues and the extent to which these are accounted for in planning travel. The responses 
to this are given in Figure 7-47. There is a relatively even distribution centred on ‘limited 
evidence’ rather than ‘some evidence’, with no experts citing ‘very strong evidence’ but 
two citing ‘no evidence’. Three cited strong evidence. This can be taken as confirmation 




Figure 7-47: Public consideration of accident safety issues in mode selection 
Respondents were also asked if there was any evidence that the public considers accident 
safety issues when selecting individual carriers/operators for a specific mode of transport 
(Figure 7-48). This indicates slightly stronger evidence than the mode version of this 
question, but only marginally. In this case, one expert cited ‘very strong evidence’ and 
none stated ‘no evidence’; but the emphasis here is on ‘some evidence’ rather than 
‘limited evidence’ as was the case with the mode question. 
 
Figure 7-48: Public consideration of accident safety issues in operator selection 
The modes most affected by accident safety considerations were noted by the experts. 
The key mode, which experts felt would be most affected by safety, was air; followed by 
rail, road (car, bus, coach, cycle) and shipping. Air was considered since most of the 
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experts are working in aviation but some indicated the media influence. Rail was also 
considered with one respondent indicating that in developing countries such as India 
safety was an issue. Bus was also considered to be affected by accident safety 
considerations for countries such as India and Thailand. Most answers were limited in 
explanation as the experts indicated the mode only (e.g. air, rail). 
The respondents were asked if there was any evidence that accident safety is, or has been, 
a higher priority than price, comfort, quality factors, particularly for longer distance 
journeys. The objective was to relate accident safety concerns to other priorities in travel 
selection, although this question is not precise since it compares accident safety to 
multiple factors. The scale of options available to respond ranged from very strong 
evidence to no evidence. 
Figure 7-49 shows a response centred on ‘some evidence’ but skewed towards limited or 
no evidence. Only one respondent cited strong evidence and none said very strong 
evidence. This is consistent with the responses to the user surveys undertaken in the 
thesis. 
 
Figure 7-49: Safety importance in relation to other factors 
Experts were asked if governments can influence transport modal change – an important 
issue for this work. Accordingly this question explored the level of government influence 
using options from strong influence to no influence. The responses centred on 
‘influential’, with three responses of ‘strong influence’’. No respondents said that there 
was no influence (Figure 7-50). 
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Figure 7-50: Government influence 
Experts were asked how age and gender affect choices of transport mode and whether it 
is necessary to take account of these aspects when proposing safety improvements. 
Respondents mainly commented on the impact of age rather than gender affecting modal 
choice. There was limited response as to whether age or gender should be considered 
when planning improvements in safety. 
Age was cited to have a small or minor effect on modal choice due to accessibility issues. 
It is considered important for air and rail travel since time and accessibility are important 
factors for those modes. It was thought that younger travellers would be more inclined to 
make more complex journeys and fly more often. Younger travellers would also be more 
likely to take cheaper options, e.g. coaches/public transport, over long distances. Age was 
also thought to impact choice of transport mode: younger people may want to go by train 
instead of air transport because it is more interesting and cheaper. The issues regarding 
safety improvements impact all passengers, aircraft and crew, and are not related to 
passengers’ age or gender. 
Gender was considered for urban train travel; for example, women only carriages in Japan 
and waiting rooms in the UK. Modal choice would impact women travelling alone who 
perhaps would not take long international coach journeys, dependant on the route and 
location. A respondent noted that women may be more aware of personal safety when 
travelling at night. 
One respondent expressed that age or gender was not relevant in making transport modal 
choice, but rather that travellers’ familiarity with the travel routes would make the 
difference. A single expert noted that age or gender did not have any impact on modal 
choice.  
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All modes of transportation should be suitable for all passenger types, ages and genders. 
Those aspects should be accounted for given that certain passenger types may refrain 
from using a transportation mode, or making the journey at all, as a result of any 
discomfort. 
Five experts did not respond to the impact of age, gender and whether it was necessary to 
take these into consideration in developing safety enhancements. 
 7.4.3  Travel behaviour 
To ascertain behaviour of the public, experts were asked to convey what they thought 
were the top 3 considerations for travellers when making their modal choice for long 
distance journeys in excess of 200km. They were asked to rank the most important 
consideration to the third most important consideration on a scale of 1-3 (Figure 7-51). 
The dominant responses were price followed by time taken, with accident safety 
registering as a 2 or 3 level of importance respectively. Overall, the third most prominent 
factor was convenience, which is closely linked to time taken and schedule. Comfort 
registers as a prominent third level priority. 
 
Figure 7-51: Main considerations for travellers 
The frequency with which travellers consider alternative modes was asked of the 
respondents. The available options were: making a journey for the first time; when 
substantial changes occur in the service offered (price, frequency, speed, etc.); rarely or 
never; when personal changes affect travel patterns (e.g. change of employer); in response 
to concerns regarding safety or security; or other.  
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The responses in Figure 7-52 indicate that substantial changes in the service is the most 
prominent driver for alternatives to be considered (16 cases) while making a journey for 
the first time (8 cases) and personal changes (7 cases) are the next most frequent 
selections. 
 
Figure 7-52: Consideration of alternative modes of transport when making a journey 
Experts were requested to provide their view on the public perception of modal safety, 
something which is also compared to the results of the user surveys earlier in this chapter. 
The options were car, taxi, rail, metro, bus/coach, walk or cycle or other to specify.  
The results are given in Figure 7-53. The results are presented by mode with the responses 
from safest to least safe shown from left to right in each case. Air travel received the 
strongest support as the safest mode, with rail and metro also showing relatively high 
support. Perhaps surprisingly, there is some support for all the modes being safest or 
second safest. This could reflect that some respondents, for example, separated walking 
from cycling. Car travel also received more safest or second safest support than might 





Figure 7-53: Public perception of safest modes 
A general question was posed on whether in the long run there would be more or less 
emphasis on safety as a modal choice factor (e.g. in developing countries where 
perceptions change with higher levels of income or increasing modal choice options). 
Most respondents indicated that there would be more of an emphasis on safety in the long 
run, with a few expressing that there would not be a change in developed regions. It was 
noted that, “their mode of transport may change as more choices are available and 
adequate information about safety of modes is given, comparing statistics, etc. (for 
instance different than from newspapers which look for spectacular accidents like “200 
casualties in plane crash!!!)”. A few respondents commented that in developing countries 
(India, China, Thailand) air is considered a safe form of transport but that cost is the main 
factor determining modal choice. In ascending order of preference related to income, bus, 
rail and air would be considered. It was commented that undoubtedly people become 
more concerned with safety matters as they become more affluent, but that cultural 
differences also exist in attitudes to risk and in particular, regarding transport, safety risks 
also play a role. One respondent also stated that, “safety is a luxury of higher incomes, 
usually in developed countries”, while others noted more emphasis on safety as a modal 
choice factor and that developing countries need to give more priority to this issue. 
An expert also expressed uncertainty that higher income would change the safety 
awareness in developing countries, at least not in the short term, and cited that travellers 
would only use established carriers in such regions. 
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 7.4.4  Comments from respondents 
A key comment from the respondents was that individuals’ safety perceptions are guided 
by geographical and political considerations and media response. For example, they note 
that air accidents are usually reported globally, while (in India and China) national train 
and bus accidents are only reported nationally unless there are foreign nationals involved 
or there is political interest. “…[F]or aircraft and trains it is the incidents that can 
damage the perception of transport, rather than the actual quantifiable safety. For 
airlines it is more the Airline that is affected, e.g. 9/11, Air France 447, Malaysia airlines 
370, Madrid train bombing, London underground bombing”. 
 7.4.5  Implications of expert survey 
This survey provides insights into perception of public from the observations of experts 
working in the modal sectors on factors influencing modal choice and travel behaviour. 
The findings are important for this study in terms of how modal shift can be encouraged 
(i.e. through individual behaviour or government influence), the constraints that can limit 
modal shift and the perception of safety from experts’ view of public behaviour. 
The survey findings suggest that modal shift is influenced by governments and by 
substantial changes in the service offered by an alternative mode or travellers considering 
more modal choice when undertaking a journey for the first time. 
Behavioural change does occur after major accidents although this temporary change is 
in operator rather than mode due to limited alternatives available (this result may be 
biased as the main expert respondents are from the aviation sector). Safety consideration 
as a factor of modal choice is limited, with price (especially in developing countries) and 
time taken being more dominant factors although the safety aspect is thought to become 
more important over time. The experts conveyed that individual safety is influenced by 
geographical, political and media responses. 
 QUALITATIVE INTERVIEWS 
Qualitative interviews were carried out with a sample of 5 experts and 5 users to augment 
the overall findings from the expert and snowball questionnaires respectively. 
The aim of these interviews was to complement the explanations provided in the main 
questionnaire responses and to add depth by discussing answers in more detail. 
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Accordingly the interview structures were aligned with the questionnaires. A 
corresponding limitation of this approach was that wider themes were not explored in as 
much detail. 
 7.5.1  Method 
Interviews were approximately one hour long and were carried out using an outline to 
provide a structure for the interview. The structures used are provided in Appendices 
B.4.1 and B.4.2, which also provides the interview transcripts. The interviews were 
analysed by grouping responses into common themes and key observations. 
Expert questionnaire interviews 
From the analysis of the interviews 10 main themes emerged and the observations from 
the interviews are therefore discussed below under these headings. 
Experience in transport mode/countries 
The 5 experts interviewed had experience covering commercial aviation, rail, shipping 
and aerospace engineering. Functionally their remits covered forecasting and statistics, 
air traffic management, flight delay analysis and exploring modal shift between air and 
rail. Geographically interviewees were Europe based but also had experience of travel 
issues in Asia, USA, Africa and Middle East. 
Modal choice factors 
Together with the factors already identified such as price, schedule and convenience one 
of the experts noted that the level of stress involved on a journey could also influence 
modal choice.  
Factors influencing the mode chosen could include the journey purpose, i.e. business, 
leisure, VFR or multi-purpose as well as the availability of options for route and access 
modes depending on journey origin. Experts highlighted that urban areas had more modal 
options than rural areas and that this also depended on the specific region or in some cases 
country, for example between the US and Europe. The frequency of available alternate 
modes was considered important, as was a preference for fewer transfers during the 
journey. The level of connections between modes would influence modal choice, 
especially from access mode to main mode: local bus or local rail connections to a main 
line rail station. Unreliability can also prevent a mode being chosen with an example 
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given as the Brussels to Amsterdam air route which is subject to frequent cancellations. 
Most interviewees emphasised seasonality and time of travel as factors. 
Regarding travellers themselves, age was considered relevant to the modes used for 
reasons such as time and comfort rather than price. 
Personal security considerations 
Two interviewees stressed that for air travel it is important to use reputable carriers and 
not those on the blacklist [i.e. the EU Air Safety List of banned carriers]50 although it 
was acknowledged that in general security at airports is high with limited exceptions 
where the security check was not so thorough. Specific concerns regarding personal 
security were noted in some countries, for example when driving in certain parts of 
South Africa, though this is not an area considered by this thesis. 
Accident safety considerations and priorities 
It was recognised that some risk is implicit in all transport modes. Air, rail and ship were 
modes considered to be most affected by large accidents, though their day to day average 
safety levels are high. For air travel it was observed that pilots’ self-preservation instincts 
indirectly assured passenger safety. Using reputable carriers for air travel was considered 
important for accident safety as noted under personal security. Safety concerns regarding 
LCCs were raised because of the need for them to reduce costs for commercial reasons. 
The negative impact of air accidents on air manufacturers was noted. One interviewee 
stated that approximately 95% of accidents are attributable to human error, though this 
was not backed up with a source. 
The issue of safety awareness for public VFR traffic was considered to be important as 
public misperception could limit use of certain modes. VFR users travel less frequently 
than others such as business travellers and therefore were thought to be less well 
informed. Road safety concerns were highlighted due to the risky behaviour of other road 
users and driving in unfamiliar environments. Safety variances between modes controlled 
by individuals and those controlled by specialists were also noted. In some cases 
accessing a relatively safe main mode such as air may involve using riskier access modes 
such as car or walking.  
                                                 
50 http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/safety/air-ban/index_en.htm  
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Attitudes to transport safety were seen as reliant on cultural background and reason for 
travelling, i.e. business or leisure, as well as individual attitudes to risk. Safety was viewed 
differently when considering long or short distance journeys because there are sometimes 
limited options on longer routes, for example only air. The public may consider modal 
options on the grounds of safety for shorter routes simply because more alternatives are 
available. 
Safety was considered to be a higher priority for those with a specific aversion to a 
particular mode, particularly fear of flying, those travelling in regions with consistently 
high accident risk rates, or where seasonal or diurnal factors cause temporary increases 
in accident risk. Noteworthy was one observation that developed countries tolerate only 
enhancements in safety but not increased risks. 
Impacts of major accidents on public behaviour  
The impact of media portrayal of major accidents affects user perceptions. In particular, 
the length of exposure given to a specific accident and distortions to the public image of 
aviation were commented on by most experts. It was accepted that public reactions are 
not usually based on full or accurate information, as a result of media distortions; or 
conversely in some cases the public are simply not aware of certain large scale events. 
In the aftermath of an accident there may be short term (1 week to 6 months) behavioural 
changes such as switching operators (mainly for air where options are available) and 
occasionally a change in mode. For road travel however there is normally no impact on 
those not directly involved: drivers do not stop driving unless they have had direct 
experience of an accident themselves. Changes in public behaviour as a result of major 
accidents are therefore a function of the mode affected as well as the type of accident and 
available alternatives. 
One reaction commented on was that for a limited time period the impacts of changes in 
travel behaviour could be counter-intuitive. A particular example quoted was that the 
closure of airspace in the US after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks led to more 
fatalities on the roads than those resulting directly from the attacks. 
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Government influence on mode of transport 
All the interviewees recognised that the government can influence the mode used because 
it has accurate information on modal safety and can inform the public of genuine safety 
concerns through safety campaigns. Taxation was stated to be a key instrument 
governments can use to influence modal choice. Current examples range from carbon 
taxes to ticket taxes on air travel. The latter are used in the Netherlands and Germany and 
have resulted in large numbers using alternative modes or airports in a neighbouring 
country. Other passenger taxes and even visa restrictions can also be used. Another 
example mentioned was the enhancement of road safety by transferring freight from road 
to rail and in some cases sea. 
Reluctance of government to intervene was also noted. In particular under-investment in 
transport infrastructures can restrict use of certain modes.  
Public perceptions of the safest mode 
There were mixed comments on what the public would perceive to be the safest form of 
transport. Some stated that air was perceived to be the safest because communication 
between aircraft allows collision warnings to be provided, compared with cars where 
there was no such provision. Others noted that car would be perceived as safest due to the 
heightened perception of control. One noted that buses and other urban transport would 
be safest because of the lower speeds used. One interviewee said rail would be the safest 
in view of the statistics but did not clarify if the public would perceive it as such. 
Alternative modes considered 
More modal options are considered when undertaking a journey for the first time as all 
available options are explored at this stage. After this the individual tends not to change 
unless difficulties are experienced. Limited availability of options for longer distance 
journeys was also noted as a factor. 
Perception in developing countries 
From the experience of interviewees, comments were provided on perceptions in 
developing countries. Cultural differences were identified as impacting safety perceptions 
and modal choice. Safety concerns in developing countries are not as high as in Europe 
or the US because people are normally more exposed to risks. Public behaviour is 
therefore less impacted by major accidents. 
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Limited availability of alternatives for certain modes in developing countries such as 
long distance bus/coach and rail travel was noted. Travel by air was considered the only 
viable option over large parts of Africa, with a reluctance of governments to develop 
other modes, since national airlines imply a certain “status” fostering national pride. The 
safety and the cost effectiveness of high speed trains in China as a mode increasingly 
chosen between large cities were also commented on. 
Other 
The views of interviewees not covered under the above headings are outlined here.  
One expert noted that in some countries there is trade-off between safety and speed. The 
example cited was German autobahns where some parts have no speed restrictions and 
where this higher risk is known and accepted both by the public and government to a 
certain extent.  
Passenger perceptions on board ships have also changed, which has an implication for 
safety. For example, on board ships passengers are now referred to as guests and cabins 
referred to as state rooms, thus making them feel they are in a hotel (unrealistic 
environment) rather than on a ship. This reduces their environmental awareness so that in 
the event of an emergency they may not have prepared themselves properly to know how 
to react. 
 7.5.2  Snowball questionnaire interviews 
From the analysis of the snowball interviewees 6 dominant themes emerged. These 
outcomes and observations are discussed below under the corresponding headings. 
Mode of choice and journey purpose 
An interviewee stated that modal preference depends on socio-demographics and that as 
these change over time, this affects attitudes to price, accessibility and availability of 
mode. Modal preferences varied between interviewees. There was a general preference 
for air travel although cost and flexibility would mean that car would be the alternative 
mode most used. Air travel particularly dominated for leisure, VFR and business travel 
but users would prefer rail and coach if time allowed. 
There was a preference to use public transport where possible, particularly for 
environmental reasons, especially in major hubs where it is widely accessible. For some 
it is not an option due to limited accessibility and availability, especially for commuting 
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purposes. Car travel was preferred because of its flexibility for multi-destination leisure 
trips, long VFR journeys and when a number of people are travelling together. Some 
limitations were expressed such as the cost of parking and tolls. 
Modal choice factors 
Significant modal choice factors noted were price, convenience, schedule, time, safety, 
security, comfort and flexibility. For business travel the modal choice is often determined 
by the company which determines price and available working time when travelling. As 
with the expert interviews, the choice of mode is influenced by journey purpose, 
particularly whether for business or leisure. The access modes used are related to 
availability and accessibility. 
Safety considerations/perceptions 
The interviewees perceived accident risk as more important than personal security and 
mode used more significant than the operator, though there were still some safety 
concerns within a mode. All interviewees thought safety was implicit to a certain extent 
in developed countries. One-off accidents in air or rail were not considered to induce 
modal shift. Rail and air were perceived as safe modes but road safety raised some 
concern.  
The choice of car type is an important consideration in terms of safety expressed by one 
interviewee, i.e. selecting a vehicle with good passenger safety characteristics (size, 
strength, design and overall safety ratings). Others noted safety concerns associated with 
some airlines, particularly trade-offs between using operators/carriers with differing 
reputations. It was also perceived that safety was not normally a concern when related to 
travel for business/work purposes. As with expert interviewees, safety was considered 
important when travelling in developing countries using certain modes, particularly car, 
buses and airlines. The preference was also to use slower public transport modes such as 
bus or rail than cars in such countries. 
Alternative modes 
From the interviews it was clear that for longer distance travel from the UK and Ireland 
there are limited modal options with air travel being the main mode. Users expressed their 
preference for rail on city centre to city centre routes for convenience, ease of boarding 
and access to luggage. Rail was particularly preferred when the higher prices and longer 
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duration often associated with long rail journeys were less important. In many cases rail 
was not considered viable because of the additional time taken compared to air travel. 
Car as an alternative mode was considered a flexible option especially with more than 
one person travelling. Car sharing for long distance was also recognised as an option on 
the basis that the journey is more comfortable but does not represent a modal change. 
On some routes in Europe which are covered adequately by rail, air was not regarded as 
an alternative for those living close to city centres since door to door rail was faster, cost 
effective and avoided the discomfort factor associated with airport security checks. 
Personal security 
The question of personal security mainly seemed to be related to unfamiliar environments 
in which there is a preference for taxi rather than public transport. It was suggested that 
there is trade-off between personal security and safety especially at night and also when 
in less secure environments or countries; for example, there is a fear of driving and of 
carjacking in some countries.  
A key factor for personal security was gender, i.e. for females, particularly those travelling 
alone, at night or in unfamiliar environments. In certain locations both gender and age of 
accompanying persons was thought to be important. 
Choices in adverse weather 
In adverse weather most interviewees stated that they mainly relied on the judgement of 
operators to determine whether to travel or not. It was also suggested that delays and 
cancellations on public transport are a form of accident prevention as operators do not 
take unnecessary risks.  
Regarding road safety, the type of roads used and speeds allowed/possible on these roads 
were recognised as determining choice of whether to travel.  
The age of travellers was an important consideration in travelling in adverse weather. 
There is increasing concern as age increases. 
 7.5.3  Implications of further insights and explanation from qualitative interviews 
The additional insights and detailed explanation provided by the qualitative interviews 
are valuable for this thesis because they provide a more complete understanding of the 
decision processes behind modal choices. For example, schemes to incentivise modal 
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transfer, such as price subsidies for alternate modes, may not yield a large scale modal 
shift if other factors outweigh them. Availability of options, accessibility, unreliability, 
seasonality, time of travel, type of transport infrastructures and socio-demographic factors 
can all restrict the scale of modal transfer, even if travellers had preferences to use another 
mode. 
 SUMMARY 
This chapter has reported the three surveys undertaken for this thesis to help determine 
individuals’ willingness to switch modes, and to understand their views on related topics 
such as risk and modal selection. The questionnaires captured the views of leisure and 
business user groups respectively. A third survey also sought the views of experts on 
travellers’ attitudes and perceptions to risk to augment the user surveys. All surveys 
provided useful contextual information on risk perception. 
The surveys revealed characteristics of travel behaviour and modal choice and 
preferences that will help to determine the applicability of a modal switching policy and 
to influence how it can be applied. The outcomes revealed the following: 
Risk perceptions and willingness to change modes 
 Perceived accident risk was considered to be higher than personal security risk 
by 59% of snowball travel survey respondents (business travellers) while in the 
consumerdata survey (leisure travellers) 48% considered safety to be an 
important issue for the main part of the journey. For snowball respondents, 
accident risk as a deciding factor for modal choice was highest for car at 28% 
followed by 17% for air and 11% for bus/coach. For consumerdata survey 
travellers the outcome was highest for cycling (25.1%) followed by car/taxi 
(12.3%), air (10.8%) and bus/coach (also 10.8%).  
 Safety was implicit rather than explicit when users considered the modes they 
would use for a specific journey. Other factors, particularly convenience, price, 
schedule, availability and time taken ranked more highly as priorities. 
 For overall modal safety, air was considered the safest in both user surveys. This 
was followed by car/taxi and rail/metro in the consumerdata survey and in the 
snowball survey by rail and metro.  
 The expert survey provided insights into the perception of the public from the 
observations of experts working in the modal sectors on factors influencing modal 
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choice and travel behaviour. This survey also helps in understanding how modal 
shift can be encouraged and also factors that could limit a shift. 
 Safety consideration as a factor in modal choice is limited, with price (especially 
in developing countries) and time taken being more important factors. 
Nevertheless safety is thought likely to become more important over time as 
standards improve, particularly in developing countries. The experts confirmed 
that individual safety is influenced by geographical, political and media responses. 
The additional insights and detailed explanation provided by the qualitative interviews 
are also valuable for this thesis because they provide a more complete understanding of 
the decision processes behind modal choices and provide further explanation as to why – 
even through incentivising modal transfer – the scale of the transfer may not be realised, 
as there other factors which may outweigh the incentive (availability of options, 
accessibility, unreliability etc.).  
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 8  EVIDENCE ON CROSS-PRICE ELASTICITIES (CPE) AND 
PRICING IN CONSUMER DECISIONS  
A key factor underpinning modal choice (and hence substitutability) identified by the two 
user surveys described in Chapter 7 is price. This chapter therefore reviews the impacts 
of price as identified by the surveys and in particular measures of the CPE of demand, 
which relates price to the mode selection process. Prior to this, the approaches to CPEs 
are discussed and findings from published literature in the field are also identified. 
 ANALYTICAL MEASURES OF CROSS-MODAL SUBSTITUTABILITY 
The main analytical measure of substitutability, at least in principle, is the CPE of demand 
between any two modes. Positive and significant CPE measures provide a basis in 
principle for the use of modal switch as a policy tool for certain routes. 
Inspection of existing literature in this area suggests that there are few estimates of such 
CPEs among transport modes, partly because of the complexity of doing so. An empirical 
approach is to infer CPEs from an observed shift between modes when price variation is 
known. Balcombe et al. (2004)51 in their guidance manual on factors affecting demand 
for public transport examine urban and regional CPEs. In cases where travellers have 
never considered switching modes, perhaps due to imperfect information, then a survey 
is needed to gauge willingness to consider modal switch in response to various incentives. 
The results of the two user surveys described in Chapter  7  relating to price are presented 
here and explore in detail the influence of elements relevant to modal choice by the 
marginal consumer: that is to say, a consumer just at the point of indifference between 
which modes to use for a journey.  
That there is at least a small degree of substitutability among the various modes of 
transport is evident; consumers considering certain trips clearly give thought to the 
question of which mode to use. What is not immediately clear is the degree of this 
substitutability or how it may vary between destinations52, routes and modes. 
Consequently, measuring the degree of substitutability and demonstrating that it is of 
sufficient magnitude to support safety policy are important factors in this study. Two 
                                                 
51 Section 9. 
52 For LCCs in some instances this can be a different destination (some distance from final destination for 
the traveller). 
 232 
approaches can be used to establish the level of substitutability between the different 
modes: 
(1) Using directly calculated CPE of demand in transport from published studies; 
(2) Directly calculating CPE of demand in transport.  
 EVIDENCE OF CROSS-PRICE ELASTICITIES DERIVED FROM 
PUBLISHED STUDIES  
Overview 
For this study one approach was to review and consider using relevant CPEs from 
published studies. 
There have been extensive reviews of various price elasticities in the published literature 
(Bly, 1976; TRRL, 1980; Goodwin, 1992; Oum et al, 1992; Halcrow Fox et al., 1993; 
Wardman, 1997a; Nijkamp et al., 1998; Pratt, 2000; De Jong and Gunn, 2001; Graham 
and Glaister, 2001; VTPI, 2003). The type of CPEs examined for transport in Great 
Britain is summarised in Table 8-1.  
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Article Year Type of cross-price elasticity 
Accent Marketing 
et al 
1989 Presents evidence on intercity business travel CPEs for Britain. 
Acutt and Dodgson 1995 Provides a set of CPEs of demand at the national level for travel in 
Great Britain. These consist of CPE between car travel and the fares 
on six different public transport modes, and between travel on these 
six modes and the price of petrol. 
Clark  1996 Provides cross-price estimates from studies that employ aggregate 
models based on collective behaviour, such as market share or travel 
volumes. 
Whelan 1997 Reviews CPE estimates in relation to car ownership modelling and 
forecasting. 
Wardman  1997a Provides urban CPE estimates for rail and car, rail and bus, and car 
and bus. 
Wardman 1997b Reviews estimates from inter-urban studies of Great Britain using 
disaggregate mode choice models. Covers rail and car as well as rail 
and coach and considers the demand for both business and leisure 
travel. 
Wardman et al. 1997c Provides evidence of rail and car CPEs in the inter-urban leisure travel 
market in Britain. 
Halcrow Fox and 
TRL  








Provides geographical information for the conurbations for intra-
urban CPEs, including values for the London Underground. 
Balcombe et al. 2004 Reviews CPEs between private and public transport for urban and 
inter-urban short distance (Table 9.13) for London and the rest of Great 
Britain. Includes a review from other countries. 
Dargay 2010 Provides own and CPEs for long distance travel in Britain by domestic 
coach, rail, air and car (Tables 23 and 27). 
Source: Adapted from Graham and Glaister 2001 and updated to include more recent studies 
Table 8-1: Cross-price elasticities for transport in Great Britain 
CPEs are generally considered to be strongly dependent on the competitive situation 
between modes. It is therefore difficult to characterise markets by a single set of CPEs 
(Wardman, 1997b) because they can vary according to relative market modal shares and 
diversion factors53. Diversion factors are the number of individuals using a particular 
mode who say they would be willing to switch to another specified mode54 (Dargay, 
2010).  
                                                 
53 Wardman (1997b) suggests the models reported often assume that users of transport have “a real choice 
between the modes in question” and therefore should not be applied to particular users (e.g. rail users who 
do not have a car should not be included in a rail-car choice model). 
54 For example, a diversion factor of 0.37 from car to rail of for a specific route would suggest that 37% of 
car users would switch to rail, if the cost of using the car became too expensive. 
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Balcombe et al. (2004, Table 9.13) cite inter-urban deduced elasticity (derived from 
Wardman (1997b)) of car cost with respect to rail use as 0.25, and coach use as 0.34.  
Bearing this in mind, the CPEs presented in Table 8-2 illustrate the range of CPEs for car 
travel with respect to rail fare, and rail trips with respect to car fuel cost. 
Inter-Urban Cross-Price Elasticities 
 Car trips with respect to 
rail fares 
Rail trips with respect to 
car fuel cost 
Suggested range of values from comprehensive 
review by Halcrow Fox and TRL (2000) on 
Road/Rail cross-elasticities  
0.02 to 0.03 0.15 to 0.25 
National Transport Model Working Paper 3 
(2003) High/Low Travel Demand 
0.02 0.12 
Acutt and Dodgson (1995) 0.04 (over 50 miles) - 
Source: Adapted from DfT (2003) 
Table 8-2: Comparison of inter-urban cross-price elasticities 
DfT (2003) provides CPEs extracted from their demand model for inter-urban road/rail 
travel. Comparing their CPEs with suggested values from a review conducted by Halcrow 
Fox and TRL (2000) shows limited substitution between rail and car, especially when car 
travel is compared to rail prices. There seems to be more substitutability when rail trips 
are examined in relation to car fuel costs. This may simply be a function of market shares, 
e.g. if rail comprises 20% and car 80%, a given absolute shift represents a much larger 
percentage change in rail travel as such. The CPEs of car travel with respect to rail 
estimated by Acutt and Dodgson (1995) for journeys over 50 miles also seems to indicate 
substitutability, which is higher than the other estimations. A possible explanation is that 
for longer distance travel there is a greater level of competition and hence substitutability. 
Overall, for the UK, there is a tendency for CPEs of car travel demand with respect to the 
price for rail to be low for inter-urban leisure travel (Wardman et al, 1997c). Some care 
is needed in interpreting these figures because of the change in transport costs over this 
period55 and, given that car represents a much higher share for all travel than rail, a given 
absolute shift would represent a much larger percentage of rail travel than of car travel. 
                                                 
55 For example, see ORR (2015) Rail Finance: Rail Fares Index (January 2015) Statistical Release. Index 
showing average change in price of rail fares by ticket type - Table 1.8. 
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Dargay Study 2010 
Dargay (2010) has conducted a study on behalf of the Independent Transport Commission 
developing a forecasting model up to 2030 to examine the prospects for long distance 
travel in Great Britain by car, rail, coach and air. The model is based on elasticity 
framework and CPEs are derived from own elasticities using market shares, diversion 
factors and transfer costs questions. 
Journey purpose was categorised into five segments (business, commuting, leisure day 
trips, VFR and holiday) to allow for the differences in the demand relationships. A further 
division was provided by providing two distance bands (50 to 150 and >150 miles) for 
car, rail and coach, as the competition between modes may vary according to distance; 
air was only considered for trips greater than 150 miles. The forecasting model was 
specified as a system of 35 demand equations where all elasticities varied by purpose, 
distance and mode. The substitution between modes is captured through CPEs for travel 
cost and time, which are key features of the forecasting model developed. 
The elasticities were derived (due to the limitations of NTS data such as lack of cost and 
time information) from data collected in a new survey carried out in the work of Dargay. 
The survey was targeted at the long distance traveller using a sample size of 1000 
individuals for each mode, so that the type of long distance travel and journey costs and 
time elasticities by mode could be estimated. Interviews were undertaken at motorway 
services, on board trains for rail travellers, at coach stations and at airports. A minimum 
of 3 different locations were selected for each mode. 
Part of the survey entailed respondents being asked to provide details of the times and 
costs of the modes available to them. From the 4092 returned questionnaires, only 1101 
provided sufficient information for purposes of modelling. This included time and cost 
information for their current mode and at least one available alternative. It was 
commented that for such interviews the number of responses would be higher but that the 
limited frequency of long distance travel meant that individuals were not aware of the 
costs and time of those modes not used regularly. 
The anticipated behaviour questions were used to estimate diversion factors, from which 
CPE could be derived with respect to journey cost and journey time. Transfer price and 
time questions enabled the estimation of own-elasticities with respect to journey cost and 
journey time.  
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These values were used as dependences to determine journey cost and time elasticities by 
mode, purpose and distance band from elasticities obtained from aggregate data.  
The work of Dargay represents a useful contribution to the literature on this subject as it 
provides a set of journey cost and time elasticities for long distance travel by mode, 
journey purpose and distance band not available from other sources. 
 MEASURING CROSS-PRICE ELASTICITIES OF DEMAND IN 
TRANSPORT 
 8.3.1  Directly calculating cross-elasticities of demand in transport 
Another approach was to calculate CPEs directly from the consumerdata and snowball 
surveys, using data from pricing questions posed in the survey. Questions were asked on 
the cost at each stage of the journey and respondents’ willingness to transfer to an 
alternative mode given a specific % price reduction, to examine and measure the CPE of 
demand between modes on the basis of the responses in this survey. 
 8.3.2  Pricing and impact on modal switching consumerdata survey 
The price question covered the cost of individual journey stages. For return tickets, the 
return fare for each segment was requested (£ sterling). The modes for each part of the 
journey were cross referenced by the respective cost segment to which they referred. For 
the purpose of this analysis, the costs provided have been banded to give a relatively even 
distribution of the costs. The banding is not at equal intervals, but is skewed towards the 
low price end to accommodate the granularity of the responses provided. It would be 
reasonable to assume that the banding 100-500 would be air. Overall, the charts (Figure 
8-1 to Figure 8-4) show that cost of each part of the journey reflects the modes used. Cost 
segment 1 is largely the access modes such as car/taxi, rail/metro and bus and coach, 
whereas cost segment 2 is the main mode of the journey which is primarily air. Cost 
segments 3 and 4 are mainly access modes, although there is some element of main modes 
where interconnecting air services are used. The high figures for car/taxi may reflect an 
element of taxi travel within the total, and also costs of car parking at airports, especially 
for leisure trips (although it has not been possible to test this directly, as there may be a 
difficulty for car users in estimating costs such as petrol for a relatively short feeder trip). 
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Figure 8-1: Journey prices by mode for cost segment 1 (as given by respondents) 
 
Figure 8-2: Journey prices by mode for cost segment 2 (as given by respondents) 
 
Figure 8-3: Journey prices by mode for cost segment 3 (as given by respondents) 
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Figure 8-4: Journey prices by mode for cost segment 4 (as given by respondents) 
Cross-price elasticity implications consumerdata 
Of the reasons for modal switching it was expected that one of the most prominent was 
likely to be the cost of alternative modes. A further question was therefore asked to see if 
respondents would consider switching at different price levels between two modes that 
they themselves specified. The answers to this were considered in relation to the numbers 
giving price as a reason for switching in the earlier question on alternative modes, i.e. the 
34% who said they would consider alternatives more generally, and of these the 23% who 
said price was a primary factor in this decision. 
The question asked was, “if cost would cause you to consider an alternative mode for any 
part of your journey (e.g. selecting a slower mode to save money), please say how much 
lower the cost would have to be for you to change to the alternative mode?” The response 
grid was as follows: 
Transport Type Alternative Type -5% -10% -25% -50% - more than 50% 
       
A particular advantage of this question is that it enables direct estimates of CPE of demand 
for the different transport modes. For this reason it is of considerable value to the core 
objectives of the thesis. The overall outcomes and analysis are summarised in Appendix 
B.6.1. This question was also asked in the snowball survey and the combined findings are 
analysed in a separate Section 8.4 within this chapter.  
 8.3.3  Pricing and impact of modal switching snowball survey 
Respondents were asked approximately how much each stage of the trip cost, and asked 
which mode had been used56. 
                                                 
56 The respondents gave the cost per segment for each stage of the journey so it was not possible to 
determine if they had factored in costs other than fuel such as parking and toll costs. 
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The fare for each segment was requested in the currency used and the answers converted 
to Euros. Return journey fares were divided by two as the question covered the cost of 
individual journey legs. The modes for each part of the journey were cross referenced by 
the respective cost segment to which they referred. 
Similar to the consumerdata the costs have been banded to give a relatively even 
distribution of costs provided. 
Overall, Figure 8-5 and Figure 8-6 show that cost of each part of the journey reflects the 
modes used.  
 
Figure 8-5: Number of stage journeys in each price band  
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Figure 8-6: Modes used at each stage  
Cross-price elasticity implications of snowball survey 
Respondents were asked if the cost of the journey would have caused them to consider 
an alternative transport type for any part of the journey, to indicate the current and 
alternative transport type and to specify the fare reduction necessary for them to change 
to the alternative transport type. Similar to the consumerdata survey the answers were 
considered in relation to the numbers giving price as a reason for switching in the earlier 
question on alternative modes, i.e. the 77% who said they would consider alternatives 
more generally and of these the 47% who said price was a primary factor in this decision. 
The overall outcomes are summarised in Appendix B.6.2. The combined findings are 
analysed in Section  8.4 of this chapter.  
 CROSS-PRICE ELASTICTY IMPLICATIONS FROM COMBINED 
SURVEYS 
A key objective of the surveys was to help understand the CPE of demand between 
different transport modes and how this would impact measures to improve accident safety 
through CMS.  
Using the responses from the surveys, CPEs were calculated to understand how specific 
price reductions in a particular mode resulted in demand responsiveness of other modes, 
and to gauge the level of elasticity of the modes. As mentioned in earlier sections ( 8.3.2 
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and 8.3.3 ) the detailed analysis of the question pertaining to CPEs from the 
consumerdata and the snowball survey is provided in Appendix B.6.1 and B.6.2 
respectively. This section deals with the combined surveys as the identical question was 
posed in each survey. For the consumerdata questionnaire the sample size was 69 out of 
a total of 203 (34%) responses overall, while for the snowball questionnaire it was 86 out 
of 111 (77%). Taking the combined questionnaire responses from both surveys gave 155 
responses out of 314 in total, resulting in a 49% response rate. All responses, including 
no responses (those not indicating price sensitivity) and those that included an alternative 
mode indicating price sensitivity, were considered in the analysis. 
The results of the CPE assessments for the combined survey are provided with some 
general analysis. It has been decided to use only 3 specific price reduction levels (i.e., -
25%, -50% and -60%) to ensure sufficient samples in each cell. Prior to the combined 
analysis some mention should be made of the differences in definitions between each data 
set. The consumerdata participants largely comprised users whose main trip purpose was 
for leisure/holiday while in the snowball group the purpose was more business/work 
travel. The length of the trip for the leisure/holiday group was longer distance in general 
than the business/work which was more focused on distances within Western Europe. 
Within the consumerdata group the treatment of LDR was classified under rail/metro 
category and car and taxi modes were combined as car/taxi category. For the snowball 
survey rail/metro was split into local rail/metro and LDR and car and taxi were treated as 
separate categories. Nevertheless, it was deemed appropriate to analyse the combined 
responses to better understand CPEs and compare with published data. 
Table 8-3, Table 8-5, Table 8-7 and Table 8-9 show the CPEs derived from the combined 
datasets at specific price reductions for the specific modes and the corresponding 
combined base numbers in separate tables (Table 8-4, Table 8-6, Table 8-8 and Table 
8-10). This is compared to the CPEs indicated in Dargay’s (2010) work: for 
Business/Holiday purposes and with distances greater than 150 miles (240kms). Although 
the elasticities are not directly comparable (due to differences in Dargay’s methods, such 
as derivation of indirect CPEs calculated from own elasticities, inclusion of modal market 
shares and diversion factors), the degree of CPE is similar to the results indicated in the 
Dargay study. A ranking (1-3) is provided in the tables to show the degree of elasticity in 
each case. For example, in Table 8-3 Dargay observes higher elasticities for rail/metro 
compared to the other modes of transport, followed by car/taxi and then bus/coach. The 
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first value in Dargay’s CPE values refers to travel for business purposes, the second for 
holiday purposes.  
 
Table 8-3: Cross-price elasticities for current mode with respect to % price reductions in 
air 
 
Table 8-4: Change in current mode with respect to % price reductions in air57  
In the combined surveys (Table 8-5), air to rail/metro has higher CPEs (attributable to the 
more elastic demand between air and LDR trips) followed by car/taxi and Bus/Coach. 
The latter obtain the same ranking as in Dargay’s work, although the absolute values are 
noticeably lower. For ferry there was no comparison available since this mode was not 
considered by Dargay and therefore eliminated from the analysis. 
 The rankings vary from the combined surveys in that bus/coach have higher elasticities 
(as would be expected) followed by air and car/taxi in Dargay’s work, while this work 
has higher elasticities for Air followed by car/taxi and then bus/coach. The existence of a 
CPE within the rail/metro category looks unusual in this work. This can be explained by 
                                                 
57 Base numbers are additive, that is to say that one further person would shift from Rail/Metro to Air if the 
price was reduced from -25 to -50, and a further four if the price was reduced to -60%. Therefore at 60% 
there is a total of 16 in base numbers.  











Rail/Metro 0.14 0.08 0.08 1 0.18/0.48 1
Current Car/Taxi 0.05 0.03 0.03 2 0.03/0.05 2
Mode Bus/Coach 0.00 0.00 0.00 3 0.00/0.02 3
Air 0.03 0.01 0.01 N/A
Ferry / Ship 0.00 0.00 0.00
* Comparison for Business/Holiday 150 miles +
-25% -50% -60%
Current Mode Rail/Metro 11 1 4
Car/Taxi 4 1 1
Bus/Coach 0 0 0
Air 2 0 0
Ferry/ Ship 0 0 0




the complications arising here from the role of rail as a feeder as well as main leg mode. 
For example rail/metro price changes influence transfers from both air (long distance) 
and Taxi (short distance access mode). This is attributable to the fact that in the 
consumerdata survey rail/metro and car/taxi were not separate modal categories 
(although they were in the snowball survey) and therefore could imply either a long 
distance or shorter distance modal transfer. For the combined surveys the broad categories 
had to be used to make comparisons. 
 
Table 8-5: Cross-price elasticities for current mode with respect to % price reductions in 
rail/metro 
 
Table 8-6: Current mode with respect to % price reductions in rail/metro (base numbers) 
Table 8-7 show a variation in the second and third placed rankings (air vs. bus/coach). 
The elasticity values for the highest-ranked rail/metro moving to car/taxi are relatively 
high and so the ranking is the same as in Dargay’s work; but there are noticeably less 
reliable CPE values in the combined surveys. This is attributable to the small sample 
sizes.  











Rail/Metro 0.00 0.01 0.01 N/A
Current Car/Taxi 0.13 0.11 0.14 2 0.10/0.11 3
Mode Bus/Coach 0.03 0.03 0.02 3 0.31/0.36 1
Air 0.19 0.17 0.19 1 0.06/0.21 2
Ferry / Ship 0.00 0.00 0.00 N/A
* Comparison for Business/Holiday 150 miles +
-25% -50% -60%
Current Mode Rail/Metro 0 1 0
Car/Taxi 10 8 9
Bus/Coach 2 2 0
Air 15 12 8
Ferry/ Ship 0 0 0





Table 8-7: Cross-price elasticities for current mode with respect to % price reductions in 
car/taxi 
 
Table 8-8: Current mode with respect to % price reductions in car/taxi (base numbers) 
In Table 8-9, Dargay’s work observes higher elasticities for rail/metro whereas this work 
observes higher car/taxi elasticities. For Air the ranking is the same as for rail/metro in 
the combined surveys (2) and ranked 3 for Dargay’s work. It should be noted that that 
Dargay’s work is concerned with long-distance rail only, whereas the combined surveys 
undertaken also cover rail/metro as an access mode. This can potentially have contributed 
to the differences in ranking. 











Rail/Metro 0.13 0.08 0.07 1 0.25/0.79 1
Current Car/Taxi 0.08 0.04 0.05 N/A
Mode Bus/Coach 0.00 0.00 0.01 3 0.17/0.25 2
Air 0.05 0.03 0.04 2 0.02/0.08 3
Ferry / Ship 0.00 0.00 0.00 N/A
* Comparison for Business/Holiday 150 miles +
-25% -50% -60%
Current Mode Rail/Metro 10 2 2
Car/Taxi 6 1 2
Bus/Coach 0 0 2
Air 4 0 4
Ferry / Ship 0 0 0





Table 8-9: Cross-price elasticities for current mode with respect to % price reductions in 
bus/coach 
 
Table 8-10: Current mode with respect to % price reductions in bus/coach (base numbers) 
The aim of the CPE question in the two user surveys was to quantify demand at various 
price reductions for alternative modes of transport. For the combined survey responses, a 
ranking was developed (as explained above) under each alternative mode to assess the 
degree of elasticity for certain modes. The results were generally consistent with Dargay’s 
findings, although the absolute CPE values in Dargay’s work are higher. The differences 
can be explained by the design of the questionnaires. While Dargay applied diversion 
factors to reflect the ability and willingness to shift between various modes of transport, 
the design of the questionnaires vary and overall the combined surveys have smaller 
sample sizes than the work undertaken by Dargay. Additionally, this study also considers 
access modes used mainly for shorter distances (e.g. rail/metro/taxi etc.) while Dargay’s 
study concentrates on long distances and hence the differences in values could be 
attributable to this. 











Rail/Metro 0.01 0.01 0.01 2 0.01/0.44 1
Current Car/Taxi 0.09 0.06 0.08 1 0.00/0.06 2
Mode Bus/Coach 0.01 0.01 0.01 N/A
Air 0.01 0.01 0.01 2 0.00/0.01 3
Ferry / Ship 0.00 0.00 0.00 N/A
* Comparison for Business/Holiday 150 miles +
-25% -50% -60%
Current Mode Rail/Metro 1 0 1
Car/Taxi 7 2 6
Bus/Coach 1 0 0
Air 1 0 1
Ferry / Ship 0 0 0
 (no.of observations)
Bus/ Coach
Selected alternate mode of transport at various price reductions 
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 SUMMARY 
This chapter has reported the evidence from published data on CPEs and directly 
measured CPEs. The latter made use of the respondent data from the two user surveys 
undertaken for this thesis to help determine individuals’ willingness to switch modes, and 
the specific price reductions at which they may do this.  
The findings revealed the following: 
Willingness to change modes 
For both main surveys there was a willingness to switch to an alternative mode. In the 
consumerdata survey 34% of all respondents indicated that they would switch to an 
alternate mode while in the snowball questionnaire 77% of total respondents would 
consider an alternative. Combining the responses from both surveys gave 49% 
willingness to switch. 
Cross-price elasticity 
Arc CPEs were calculated directly using the responses from the survey. This was based 
on respondents’ willingness to switch modes at specific % reductions in price. For the 
combined survey responses, a ranking was developed for each alternative mode to arrive 
at an estimate of the degree of CPE. The result was generally consistent with Dargay’s 
(2010) findings on long distance travel, although the absolute CPE values in Dargay’s 
work are higher. 
The differences can be explained by the design of the questionnaires, types of modes 
considered (access/long distance) and sample size.  
The implication for this study is that Dargay’s CPE values would be more appropriate to 
use in the net benefit calculations only for long distance trips (150 miles or more) since 
the relatively small sample size means that the CPEs derived in this study are potentially 
less reliable and robust to be used robustly in net benefit calculations. Even if the CPEs 
from the survey were robust enough to use in the net benefit calculation, the data is 
derived from long distance travel (as investigated in surveys) and therefore only 
applicable for similar journeys. 
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 9  ASSESSMENT OF RISK PERCEPTIONS AND ESTIMATING 
NET BENEFITS FROM CMS 
Initially this chapter evaluates the significance of differences between actual and 
perceived risks and the implications for CMS, building on Chapters 7 and 8 respectively. 
The main part of the chapter then uses CBA to provide net benefit assessments which 
compare monetised safety and related economic benefits from modal shifts on sample 
journeys to the cost of realising these shifts, for example through subsidies. These CBA 
calculations test the concept of promoting modal switching and hence draw the analytical 
elements of the thesis towards a conclusion. 
 ACTUAL (AGGREGATE AVERAGE) RISKS COMPARED TO 
PERCEIVED RISKS 
Earlier in this work it was noted that there is variation between actual risks reported 
statistically by official government sources (i.e. aggregate average risks) and the risks 
perceived by the public (ReStarts, 2012). Individual travellers can, for example, 
overestimate specific risks in the aftermath of a high profile incident with extensive media 
coverage (for example large air and rail accidents) despite the risk or probability of a 
casualty occurring on those modes remaining very low (Carlsson et al., 2004).  
Rundmo et al. (2011) observe that there is also a variation between the public perception 
of private and public transport modes. Users of private modes of transport, which tend to 
be under their own control (i.e. own car, motorcycle, etc.), often consider these to be safer 
compared to public modes of transport. Drivers, in particular, tend to assume that they 
can better control dangers compared to a public mode of transport where they do not have 
control of the transport mode.  
This is important because perceived more than actual risks are a key factor in determining 
modal choice and will therefore determine the response to efforts to encourage modal 
switching. To analyse this issue in more detail, the averaged actual risks as defined in the 
Transport Statistics Great Britain have been compared with the perceptions of risks gained 
from the travel surveys conducted as part of this work. 
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 9.1.1  Actual (Aggregate Average) Risks 
The aggregate average risks of being Killed (K) and Seriously Injured (SI) for varying 
modes of transport per 1000M person km are presented using a log scale in Figure 9-1 as 
an average between 2004 and 2013 using DfT (2014, Table TSGB0107) statistics on 
passenger casualty rates by mode. For most modes the casualty risk rates have been falling 
over time due to technological advancements, improvement in standards in individual 
modes and increased awareness of safety aspects in some modes. 
 
Figure 9-1: Aggregate average risks per mode (2004 to 2013 averages on log. scale) 
 9.1.2  Method for perceived risks 
The aggregate average risks described above are compared with the perceived risks 
derived from all three travel surveys: consumerdata, snowball and expert. The perceived 
risks identified by respondents to each question were ranked to allow direct comparison 
with the actual risks. The safest mode was allocated a rank of 1 with less safe modes 
having higher number ranks. The results are now considered in the context of each survey. 
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 9.1.3  consumerdata survey questions 
Users were asked, “Has accident risk ever been a deciding factor in your choice of type 
of transport for a journey (please indicate yes/no for each type)?”58 The types of modes 
provided were air, rail/metro, bus/coach, car/taxi, walk and cycle. Table 9-1 shows the 








(as a % of 
overall total) 
No 
(as a % of overall 
total) 
No response 
(as a % of 
overall total) 
1 Rail/Metro 4.9% 83.7% 11.3% 
2 Walk 9.9% 71.9% 18.2% 
3 Air 10.8% 87.2% 2.0% 
3 Bus/Coach 10.8% 78.8% 10.3% 
4 Car/Taxi 12.3% 78.3% 9.4% 
5 Cycle 25.1% 54.2% 20.7% 
Table 9-1: Was accident risk a factor in modal choice? 
The highest percentage considering safety as a factor in mode choice is cycle at 25.1% 
and the lowest is rail/metro where only 4.9% considered it a safety issue. The ranking 
derived from these results used a scale of 1-5 with the lowest value (rail/metro) 
representing the safest perceived mode. Walking was also perceived to be safer (9.9%) 
than most other modes except rail. air and bus/coach are ranked joint third with the same 
percentage. For all modes of transport a sizable proportion (from 54.2% to 83.7%) 
indicated that accident risk was not a factor in their modal choice. 
Users were also asked, “Considering the types of transport you have used for this journey 
which do you think were the safest (less risk of accident)?”59 The choices provided were 
air, rail/metro, car/taxi, walk and cycle. They could select a maximum of two modes 
which meant a maximum of 406 responses and a minimum of 203, assuming all answered 
the question correctly. The actual number of responses was 338. In this case, respondents 
were limited to the modes they had actually used and hence some modes, such as cycling, 
had a limited response rate.  
                                                 
58 Q14b Consumer Data Survey Appendix B.1.1. 
59 Q18 Consumer Data Survey Appendix B.1.1. 
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For the journey specific question and taking the ranked outcomes at face value, the safest 
was perceived to be air with cycle being the least safe as shown in Table 9-2. 
Ranking of perceived 
risk 
(safest to least safe) 
Mode 
Number identifying 
the safest mode 
Number who actually 
used the mode for the 
journey they specified 
1 Air 177 199 
2 Car/Taxi 63 180 
3 Rail/Metro 62 41 
4 Walk 17 4 
5 Bus/Coach 16 75 
6 Cycle 3 0 
Maximum of 2 modes selected per respondent 
Table 9-2: Transport modes considered safest for the actual journey undertaken 
Thirdly users were asked “Which type of transport do you think in general the safest (less 
risk of accident) to travel?”60 The choices provided were air, rail/metro, car/taxi, walk 
and cycle. They could select a maximum of two modes and, as in the previous question, 
a maximum of 406 responses and a minimum of 203 responses were possible assuming 
all answered the question correctly. In this case, 104 provided two answers and 99 only 
one, leading to a total of 307 responses. Air was ranked the safest followed closely by 
rail/metro and car/taxi while cycling was ranked the least safe. 
 9.1.4  Snowball survey questions 
In the snowball survey, questions comparable to those in the consumerdata survey were 
asked of a wider group, including users from other European countries. Users were asked, 
“Has risk of accident ever been a deciding factor in your choice of transport type for a 
journey? Please tick if it has for all types of transport for which this has been the case.”61 
Choices presented were car, taxi, metro/local rail, LDR, bus/coach, air and ship/ferry. 
This differed from the consumerdata survey in that car/taxi and rail/metro were treated 
as separate modes. Car is considered to be the largest concern for accident risk at 34% 
while, surprisingly, Air at 17% is considered to have the second highest level of concern. 
                                                 
60 Q19 Consumer Data Survey Appendix B.1.1. 




(Safest to least 
safe) 
Mode 
Number of responses 
which indicated accident 
risk as a factor in modal 
choice 
% responses which 
indicated accident risk as 
a factor in modal choice62 
1 Metro/Local rail 1 1% 
2 Taxi 8 7% 
3 Long distance rail 9 8% 
3 Ship/Ferry 9 8% 
5 Bus/Coach 12 11% 
6 Air 19 17% 
7 Car 38 34% 
Maximum of 7 modes selected per respondent 
Table 9-3: Accident risk as a factor in modal choice 
For the snowball survey users were also asked, “Considering the transport types you have 
used for the specific journey described in question 2 which do you think were the safest 
(least risk of accident)? Please rank from 1 to 3, with 1 being the safest”63. The choices 
provided were car, taxi, rail, metro, bus/coach, walk/cycle and air. As there was a ranking 
in the question itself, a weighting was applied to the results to allow the answers to this 
question to be combined. The weightings applied to rankings 1, 2 and 3 were respectively 
1, 0.5 and 0.25 in order to up weight the selection of higher priorities. The outcomes are 
shown in Table 9-4. The perceived rankings in this question approximately correspond to 
the actual aggregate risks rankings in Table 9-6. 
Rank Car Taxi Rail Metro Bus/Coach Walk/Cycle Air 
1 3 2 41 11 2 5 49 
2 7.5 6.5 11 5.5 6.5 2 10 
3 6.5 4 0.25 2.75 4 1.75 1 
Totals 17 12.5 52.25 19.25 12.5 8.75 60 
Weighting: Rank 1 = 1, Rank 2 = 0.5 and Rank 3 = 0.25 
Table 9-4: Weighted safest modes considered for an actual journey undertaken 
 9.1.5  Expert survey questions 
In the Expert Survey the experts were asked about public perceptions of safety as follows: 
“Which of the following modes do you think the public perceive to be the safest (least risk 
                                                 
62 Note that the percentages do not sum to 100%, as the number of yes respondents is expressed as a 
percentage of the total number of responses and therefore varies by mode of transport. Only the sum of yes 
and no by definition add up to 100%. 
63 Q14 Snowball Survey Appendix B.1.2. 
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of accident for a given journey)? Please rank from 1 to 8, with 1 being the safest.”64 The 
choices provided were air, car, rail, taxi, metro, bus/coach, walk/cycle and other. 
The outcomes are set out in Table 9-5. Rankings were determined by applying weighting 
factors to the first three ranks, adding the results for the three top ranks of each mode and 
sorting the total by mode. The values in each column of Table 9-5 are thus as follows: 
 Ranked 1 column: number giving rank 1 to that mode multiplied by 5 
 Ranked 2 column: number giving rank 2 to that mode multiplied by 2 
 Ranked 3 column: number giving rank 3 to that mode multiplied by 1 
 TOTAL: sum of the results for Ranked 1, Ranked 2 and Ranked 3 
The results were sorted on the basis of the TOTAL column to give the ranks in the first 




Mode Ranked 1 Ranked 2 Ranked 3 TOTAL 
1 Air 50 4 0 54 
2 Rail 15 10 7 32 
3 Car 15 6 1 22 
4 Metro 5 6 5 16 
5 Taxi 5 2 4 11 
6 Bus/Coach 0 2 2 4 
7 Walk/Cycle 5 2 0 7 
8 Other 0 2 0 2 
Weighting: Rank 1 = 5, Rank 2 = 2 and Rank 3 = 1 
Table 9-5: Experts’ view of public perceptions of safest modes 
 9.1.6  Comparison of Actual versus Perceived Risks 
All the rankings shown in Table 9-1 to Table 9-5 are combined and compared in Table 
9-6. This is ordered according to the actual risks for K in deaths per 1000M person km. 
The actual risks have also been ranked from 1 (safest) to 8 (least safe) mode.66  
                                                 
64 Q13 Expert Survey Appendix B.1.3 
65 Since only a single respondent noted ferry this has not been included. 
66 Sea transport has been omitted as it was only noted in the snowball survey. 
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Actual Risk vs. Perceived Risk from Surveys (K) Ranked safest to the least safe mode 








Consumer Data Survey 







Air 0.01 1 3 1 1 5 1 1 
Mainline Rail 0.01 2 1 3 2 3 2 2 
Coach/Local Bus 0.3 3 3 5 5 4 5 6 
Metro 0.7 4 1 3 2 1 3 4 
Taxi 1.9 5 4 2 3 2 5 5 
Car (All Roads) 4.2 6 4 2 3 6 4 3 
Bicycle 27 7 5 6 6  6 7 
Walking 29 8 2 4 4  6 7 
Table 9-6: Aggregate average risk compared with perceived risk survey questions  
The aggregate average risks are presented side by side with the perceived risks from the 
survey question rankings. To provide a clear comparison, the original information for 
actual road values of K, which were given per road type, have been combined into a single 
all-road category. This was created using a weighted average for the different road types 
(Motorway, Rural A Roads, Urban A Roads and All Minor Roads) with weights 
determined according to total distance travelled on that road type. Distances were taken 
from the DfT (2013a, Table TSGB0703/TRA0102). 
The variation between actual and perceived risks is shown in Table 9-7 below. The red 
boxes indicate instances where the ranked perception of risk is higher than the actual rank; 
the blue boxes where it is lower. The black dotted lines show the case where the actual 
and perceived ranks are the same. It should be noted that Table 9-7 shows actual versus 
perceived risk only for K (killed) and does not include SI (seriously injured). 
 
Table 9-7: Actual versus perceived risk (K) ranked safest to the least safe modes (delta of 
rankings) 



















Q14b Q18 Q19 Q11b Q14 Q13
Air 0.01 1 -2 0 0 -4 0 0
Mainline Rail 0.01 2 1 -1 0 -1 0 0
Coach / Local Bus 0.3 3 0 -2 -2 -1 -2 -3
Metro 0.7 4 3 1 2 3 1 0
Taxi 1.9 5 1 3 2 3 0 0
Car (All  Roads) 4.2 6 2 4 3 0 2 3
Bicycle 27 7 2 1 1 1 0
Walking 29 8 6 4 4 2 1
Actual (K) vs. Perceived Risk ranked safest to the least safe  mode (Delta of rankings)
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The perception of air is generally aligned with the low actual ranked risk except in two 
instances: (Q14b) in consumerdata and (Q11b) in the Snowball Survey where in both 
cases Air is ranked as having a higher risk than the actual. Even though statistics and data 
show modes such as air travel to be a safe form of transport, some respondents are still 
“fearful” and use air transport only when they have no alternative for certain journeys, 
perceiving it to be more risky than walking or rail. Following the crashes of the Malaysia 
MH370, Air Asia and Germanwings for a variety of reasons the perception of risk for 
users in the cruise stage for air may have changed although the surveys in this thesis were 
conducted prior to these events. 
Similarly, perceived LDR risk is in accordance with the actual ranked risk and close in 
ranking to Air. There is a slight divergence between actual ranked and perceived risks in 
the consumerdata survey, where the perceived ranked risk is slightly lower than actual 
ranked risk (Q14b) and slightly higher than actual ranked risk (Q18). What is notable is 
that perceived risk of long-distance rail is considered higher than car, which is the 
opposite of the objective risk. This confirms the expectation that travellers in control of 
their transport perceive themselves to be safest since they are in charge. LDR is also 
perceived to be less safe than metro in consumerdata survey Q18. 
In one case for the consumerdata survey (Q18,), car is perceived to be safer than long-
distance rail. In some cases this can be attributed to instances of large accidents on long 
distance trains with major casualties from a single incident well in excess of one vehicle 
accident on the road. In the Expert Survey (Q13), car is still considered to be in the top 3 
ranked as safest. The experts were asked to rank the safest modes according to how the 
public would rank safety. Experts suggested that the car users felt more in control of the 
vehicle compared to public transport modes. 
Bus and coach have considerably lower actual risk than cars yet are only once perceived 
to be safer than car in the snowball survey (Q11b). This perception could be attributed to 
a large number of travellers who travel to different regions for holiday/business and 
perceive the risks for local bus/coach used as a feeder to get to their destinations having 
higher risk rates. It could also be linked to risks associated with getting to the bus/coach 
terminus, which can involve walking which carries a different risk profile. Berntman et 
al. (2010) note this risk type in their work, stating that although the risk for occupants 
while travelling on buses is low, a door to door journey involving buses is associated with 
a higher risk, as there are notable casualties to and from the bus stops (which also involve 
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a large number of older persons). Perception of risk can vary and differ in origin and 
destination locations. This is supported by the Expert Survey where it was commented 
that local bus can be considered to be affected by accident safety considerations especially 
for countries such as India and Thailand.  
Walking carries a relatively high actual probability of being killed or seriously injured 
compared to other modes; however, for the consumerdata Survey Q14b it was perceived 
as the second safest transport mode after LDR, and overall it is perceived to be a safe 
mode despite a very high actual risk relative to other modes. Again this suggests that 
people perceive themselves better able to control risk than a third party or operator. The 
low public perception of walking risk may also be because they do not associate safety 
with distance travelled but assess it against some other parameter such as per journey 
made. They may also consider that risks are highly dependent on the specifics of a 
particular journey so that in most cases walking is perceived to be safe, and may actually 
be so, for example if no dangerous road crossings are required.  
In summary, from the analysis it can be said that there are certain variations between 
perceived and actual ranked risks (car and rail) which could be attributed to factors such 
as media exposure, origin and destination locations, and private versus public transport 
modes. There are also variations between modes such as walk and car versus coach/bus, 
air and rail, the former being perceived to be safer. A possible explanation is the 
perception of control and overweighting of low probabilities which is consistent with 
prospect theory mentioned in Chapter 3. This seems to be the case for Air and Bus/Coach 
travel as shown in Table 9-7. The practical implication of the gaps between perceived and 
actual levels of risks is that it would be important to complement CMS incentives with 
an information campaign to try to convey the actual safety risks. In addition to promoting 
CMS this could also help reduce anxiety for some people, particularly for air travel. The 
net monetised safety benefits of CMS applied to key journey types, where the modal 
switch policy is promoted by using a fare subsidy as the main tool, and associated costs 
are estimated in the following section. 
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 ASSESSMENT OF NET BENEFITS FROM CMS 
 9.2.1  Approach to net benefit assessment 
CBA was selected as the appraisal method for assessing potential improvements in safety 
from CMS. Using the information from earlier chapters, CBA is now applied to examine 
the potential monetised safety and other economic benefits from the application of CMS 
to different journey profiles as compared to the costs of achieving the modal switches. 
Three journey scenarios were selected for the net benefit calculation: 
a) A long distance journey with distance beyond the likelihood of regular commuting 
(London to Glasgow) 
b) A relatively long journey dominated by inter-regional traffic but which is also 
commutable (London to Birmingham) 
c) A short distance commute dominated by regular commuting (Kingston to 
Guildford) 
The use of this varied selection of journeys was designed not only to compare the benefits 
of applying CMS, but also to consider which type of journey would be most amenable to 
the use of incentives to switch modes. For this reason, the examples chosen are regarded 
as being ‘high volume’ examples of their journey type. This means that if there is a net 
benefit from incentivising modal switch, that benefit could be realised for a large number 
of travellers. This would depend on sufficient additional capacity being available on the 
recipient mode. For each of the examples chosen, the high volumes are made possible by 
frequent rail services, good road connections and, on the long distance London to 
Glasgow example, air services as well. For London to Birmingham air travel is not 
considered because it is not quite far enough to justify the fixed time elements of air travel 
needed for this mode. 
The calculations for each journey were quantified as follows: 
 Take an assumed target year by which changes in policy measures and user 
responses would have matured towards equilibrium. 
 Apply subsidised prices as the policy tool intended to achieve modal shift. Other 
incentives could also be used, such as infrastructure investments to improve 
capacity or marketing campaigns, but in this case the analysis for these particular 
scenarios is limited to price subsidy only. 
 257 
 Data on passenger traffic flows and regional movements by different modes are 
used to help calculate the numbers of passengers willing to transfer from one mode 
to another. There are problems of consistency in the data and definitions of data 
sources that have to be controlled. 
o These data were obtained from press release by the Train Operating 
Companies (TOCs), via 2011 Census Data on Nomis and ORR published 
reports available modal shares data (along specific rail/air corridors and 
general market shares according to distances travelled) and press releases, 
etc. 
o For the point to point journeys it should be noted that where specific data 
is not available, approximations from regional or national data have been 
used. 
 Aggregate actual risk rates and monetised valuations for K and SI have been 
obtained from published data as discussed earlier in this thesis. 
 CPEs over short and long distances has been estimated based on the findings in 
Dargay (2010) and in Balcombe et al. (2004) on the demand for public transport. 
Distance travelled per mode is combined with monetised risk per mode to provide an 
overall per person whole journey risk for each modal combination. The reduction in risk 
per person as a result of the switch is then multiplied by total traveller numbers switching 
to provide the benefits for safety. Consumer surplus, time savings and environmental 
impact are also taken into consideration as complementary benefits. 
 9.2.2  Description of scenarios 
As the journey types are varied, the general assumptions and the sources that are 
applicable in each case are provided in the specific journey discussions and corresponding 
tables. A summary of the approach is provided in Table 9-8 which presents the modes 
used, origin and destination locations and rationale for each of the three scenarios. 
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Glasgow to London (point to point) 
 
Kingston upon Thames to Guildford 
(point to point)  
Birmingham (15 km radius) to London (15 km 




Car to Long Distance Rail (LDR) Car to Local Rail Car to Rail 
Journey Type 1 Car, Walk 
Journey Type 2 Local Bus, LDR, Taxi 
 
Journey Type 1 Car, Walk 
Journey Type 2 Local Bus, Rail, Walk 
 
Journey Type 1 Car 
Journey Type 2 Rail, Bus, Underground 
 
Scenario This scenario is a journey from Glasgow to London 
including access modes with the modal shift from car 
to LDR to give an illustration of a regularly used, long 
distance, non-commutable route within Great Britain. 
This scenario is a suburban journey 
dominated by commuting with access 
modes, from Kingston upon Thames Local 
Authority District to Guildford Local 
Authority District with the modal shift from 
car to rail.  
This scenario is a journey originating from 
Birmingham within a 15 km radius to a destination 
in London within a 15 km radius with the modal shift 
from car to LDR. The objective here was to consider 
a journey with its origin as a regional catchment area 
and a destination in the central London region, i.e. 
not a point to point journey. 
Origin and 
Destination 
The origin and destination points for both modes are 
assumed to be a residential location just to the north of 
Glasgow and a central London location just over a 
mile from the main terminus at Euston. 
The origin and destination points for both 
modes are assumed to be Surbiton Crescent, 
Kingston via Surbiton Station, and Castle 
Street, Guildford. This is a point to point 
journey which considers different access 
modes. The access mode for Journey 1 is 
walk followed car as the main mode, while 
for Journey 2, local bus and walk are the 
access modes and rail is the main mode. 
This journey considers various access modes within 
the catchment area of both cities. 
Rationale The car to rail scenario has been chosen based on the 
revealed and attitudinal preference information from 
the travel surveys undertaken for this thesis and CPEs 
taken from published literature (Dargay et al., 2010)67. 
These suggest willingness to shift from car to rail in 
response to certain reductions in price of rail, and 
identify thresholds for modal substitution between 
certain modes. The timescale considered for this 
illustrative calculation will only be the year in which 
the modal shift has been made, assumed to be 2014 
The car to rail modal switch scenario has been 
chosen as it represents a short suburban 
commute and contrasts with the much longer-
distance Glasgow to London scenario. The 
modal shares are much more dominated by 
rail compared to long distance journeys, as 
are the own and CPEs, which for this scenario 
have been taken from Balcombe et al. (2004, 
Table 6-10 and Table 9-11 respectively) using 
suburban own and cross-price elasticity 
The car to rail scenario has been chosen based on the 
revealed and attitudinal preference information from 
the travel surveys undertaken for this thesis and 
CPEs taken from published literature (Dargay et al., 
2010)67. These suggest willingness to shift from car 
to rail in response to certain reductions in price of 
rail, and identify thresholds for modal substitution 
between certain modes. The timescale considered for 
this illustrative calculation is the year in which the 
modal shift has been made, i.e. 2014, implicitly 
                                                 
67 Table 23 and 27 own and cross-price elasticities respectively. 
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Glasgow to London (point to point) 
 
Kingston upon Thames to Guildford 
(point to point)  
Birmingham (15 km radius) to London (15 km 
radius) (catchment area to catchment area) 
with the actual policy introduced a few years 
previously. 
The data values for traveller numbers are estimates 
because specific data for individual point to point 
journeys are not available. Some of the published data 
also has limitations which allow only approximate 
values to be extrapolated. The exception is Virgin rail 





assuming that the actual policy was introduced a few 
years previously. 
The data values provided for user numbers are 
estimates which have been derived from MVA 
Consultancy et al. (2012)68. 
 
Table 9-8: Description of scenarios  
  
                                                 
68 The estimates are from Table 3.1. PLANET Long distance: Average weekdays rail trips and growth, between London and City Council areas without HS2. 
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Baseline Scenarios: Journey Specific Inputs 
Glasgow to London (point to point) 
Kingston upon Thames to Guildford (point to 
point) 
Birmingham (15 km radius) to London (15 km 
radius) (catchment area to catchment area) 
 
 
This is a journey which considers different access modes. The 
origin and destination point for both modes is Torrance, near 
Glasgow, to just over a mile from the main arrival terminus at 
Euston, London. The access mode for Journey Type 1 is car, 
this being the main mode followed by a small amount of 
walking as an access mode on arrival in London from car park 
to destination. For Journey Type 2,  rail is the main mode with 
local bus as the initial access mode to Glasgow Central 
Station followed by taxi to reach the final destination from 
London Euston. 
The journey distance is approximately 654 km/407 miles. The 
number of rail users on the Glasgow to London route 
(600,000 in a one year period in 2013/4) was derived from the 
Virgin Trains press notification. The number of car trips on 
this route during the same period is derived from market share 
data applied to the rail traffic numbers, again because car trip 
information was not available69. 
The car-rail market shares for the Glasgow to London route 
were based on NTS data. The published NTS data are specific 
to all journeys over 350 miles, and hence are assumed to be 
applicable in this case. Car journeys covered 34%, rail 13% 
and air travel 44%. Bus and other modes were only 5% and 
2% respectively. Rail share on the specific route (Glasgow-
London) would probably be higher (even one third) than for 
Scotland as a whole to the South East of England. It should 
The data values provided for rail user numbers 
and car driver and passenger numbers are 
estimates collated from the Census Survey 2011 
Nomis database conducted by the Office of 
National Statistics (ONS). This data was used 
because specific data for the point to point 
journey was not available from other sources. 
The census data contains information on the 
location of usual residence (origin), place of 
work (destination) and method of travel to work 
and this information was extracted using Nomis 
at local authority district level. Not all residents 
replied to the Census (Kingston upon Thames 
had an average response of 93% (ONS, 2012) 
and not all respondents answered the journey to 
work question, so the traveller numbers are 
considered to be under-represented. Accordingly 
an adjustment was applied to reflect the average 
response rate for the local authority of origin). 
The number of travellers by car per day was 521 
and by rail 105. These were multiplied by 255 
working days and adjusted to reflect the 93% 
Nomis response rate, resulting in 142,855 trips 
by car and 28,790 trips by rail. Table 9-10 
outlines the key journey inputs and provides the 
relevant sources used. 
The journey distance is approximately 181 km/112 
miles for car and 173 km/108 miles for rail. The 
number of rail users on the Birmingham to London 
route was 4,472,000 in the period in 2013/4. The 
number of car trips on this route during the same period 
is derived from market share data applied to the rail 
traffic numbers, again because car trip information was 
not available69. 
The car-rail market shares for the Birmingham to 
London route were based on National Travel Survey 
data. This was from (DfT, 2013a, NTS0317, edited). 
The specific medium range car journeys covered 77% 
with rail at 14%. Table 9-10 outlines the key journey 
inputs and provides the relevant sources used. 
For this assessment car to rail modal shift has been 
considered but not air/rail or car/air given the relatively 
short distance. 
The person kilometres were calculated based on 8,600 
weekly one-way trips per business day for a 52 week 
period (i.e. one year) which results in 4,472,000 trips 
per year.  
                                                 
69  Table NTS0317 Long distance trips within Great Britain by main mode and length: England, 2009/2013 (five survey years combined) was provided as an edited version by 
NTS in April 2015. 
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Baseline Scenarios: Journey Specific Inputs 
Glasgow to London (point to point) 
Kingston upon Thames to Guildford (point to 
point) 
Birmingham (15 km radius) to London (15 km 
radius) (catchment area to catchment area) 
 
 
also be noted that NTS data excludes an air interline 
component. Table 9-10 outlines the key journey inputs and 
provides the relevant sources used. 
For this assessment car to rail modal shift has been considered 
but not air/rail or car/air. The reason in the first case is that air 
and rail have very similar risk rates (although the air SI risk 
rate is comparatively lower) and encouraging modal shift 
would not necessarily lead to net safety benefit or 
improvement. The car to air scenario has been excluded 
because of uncertainties about the air market share. This share 
is difficult to assess since the NTS data excludes transfers at 
London which, if included, would approximately double 
market share for air. Hence, the origin and destination of air 
passengers is unclear because some passengers may transfer 
on to another destination, or start journeys, for example, 
elsewhere in the west of Scotland and include other access 
modes. In view of NTS understating the air market70 and the 
corresponding data being ambiguous due to it being based on 
broad averages, only car to LDR has been considered. 
The person kilometres were calculated based on the distance 
and the number of trips estimated in each mode and expressed 
in units as per 1000M kilometres. 
The distances include the access mode distances. 
Journey 1 has a 33.2 km car journey and assumes 
a 1.5 km walk in Guildford from car park to the 
destination. Journey 2 involves 2 km of bus 
travel at the origin and a 5 km walk to the 
destination from Guildford station. 
 
Table 9-9: Details of the baseline scenarios for the net benefit calculation 
 
                                                 
70  CAA air trip data is available, but consideration would then have to be given to journey times to Heathrow via rail in respect of interline trips and therefore NTS may be a 
better proxy for purely domestic travel. 
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Following from Table 9-9, Table 9-10 provides quantitative information for each of the 
main scenarios. In addition to the basic distances for the car journeys and LDR, this also 
includes contextual information on the number of persons and passenger km travelled on 
each route annually. 
Journey specific inputs 
 Glasgow -  
London71 
Kingston –  
Guildford72 
Birmingham -  
London73 
Distance Car (km) 654 34.7 180.9 
Distance Rail (km) 648 31.1 172.9 
Persons travelling Journey Type 1 in Y 2014 (trips) 1,600,000 142,855 24,596,000 
Persons travelling Journey Type 2 in Y 2014 (trips) 600,000 28,790 4,472,000 
Person kilometres current mode (1000M km) 1.047 0.005 4.450 
Person kilometres alternative mode (1000M km) 0.385 0.001 0.773 
Table 9-10: Journey specific inputs for all 3 scenarios 
 9.2.3  Monetary valuation and risk rates 
The weighted risk rates are provided below for each scenario followed by a comparative 
summary table at the end of this section.  
The monetary values for the VSL and VSI for all three scenarios were taken from the 
WebTAG Data book and are shown below in Table 9-11. There are some variations in the 
monetised values for life and seriously injured for individual modes, although to ensure 
consistency in the data the recommended statistics from WebTAG November 2014, Table 
A 4.1.1: Average value of prevention per casualty by severity and element of cost have 
been used. The 2010 values have been adjusted to 2014 values and prices to include 
changes in monetary inflation and GDP74. 
                                                 
71 Sources: National Travel Survey 2013-4: Car Market share 34% (car driver and passengers for 
distances over 350 miles). Rail Market Share 13%. Edited tables provided by NTS to include Scotland: 
http://www.mynewsdesk.com/uk/virgintrains/pressreleases/virgin-trains-sees-surge-in-anglo-scottish-rail-
travel-1104955, Google Maps 
72 Sources: Census Survey ONS 2011, Nomis database. Correction factor applied to reflect response rate 
for the survey. https://www.virgintrainseastcoast.com/rail-travel/the-best-way-to-travel/carbon-calculator/ 
73 Sources: National Travel Survey 2013-4: Table NTS0302 (edit) Mode share - average distance 
travelled: England, 2013. Car Market share 77% (car driver and passengers). Rail Market Share 14%. 
MVA Consultancy et al., (2012, Table 3.1). 





Statistical Value of 
Life (VSL) 
1,836,054 GBP 
WebTAG: TAG data book, November 2014 
(Table A 4.1.1), 2010 values adjusted for real 
GDP growth and inflation until 2014. 
Value of Seriously 
Injured (VSI) 
206,321 GBP 
WebTAG: TAG data book, November 2014 
(Table A 4.1.1), 2010 values adjusted for real 
GDP growth until 2014. 
Table 9-11: Monetary valuation 
For all three scenarios, data for aggregate risk rates for K and SI per 1000M person km 
for car and rail were taken from Transport Statistics Great Britain, Road Casualties, Road 
Traffic Statistics and Rail Accidents and Safety as shown in Table 9-12 to Table 9-18. 
Glasgow to London 
For the car risk, it was assumed that the main part of the journey (93.8%) was on 
motorways, a small proportion (6%) on urban roads and walk (0.2%). Table 9-12 shows 
the weighted calculation. 
Weighted risk calculation of Journey Type 1 
Conversion 1.60934 km/mile 
Urban journey part LON 20.1 
miles from junction M 40 to location few km from Euston, 
London 
Urban journey part GLA 5.1 miles from Torrance, Glasgow to Junction 2 onto M80 
Motorway 632.5 km from Motorway M80 Junction 2 to Junction M40/M4 
Walk LON 1 km from parking to destination 
Aggregate Urban journey 
Share [A] 
6.0% of total journey 
Motorway Share [B] 93.8% of total journey 
Walk Share [C] 0.2% of total journey 
Risk of killed Urban [D] 8.33 per 1000M person km 
Risk of killed Motorway [E] 0.97 per 1000M person km 
Risk of killed Walking [F] 29.00 per 1000M person km 
Calculation = A*D+B*E+C*F 
Weighted average journey 
specific risk of being K 
1.45 per 1000M person km 
Risk of SI Urban [G] 183.69 per 1000M person km 
Risk of SI Motorway [H] 7.24 per 1000M person km 
Risk of SI Walking [I] 313.00 per 1000M person km 
Calculation = A*G+B*H+C*I 
Weighted average journey 
specific risk of being SI 
18.31 per 1000M person km 
Table 9-12: Weighted risk calculation Journey Type 1 - Glasgow to London 





Weighted risk calculation of Journey Type 2 
Conversion 1.60934 km/mile 
Urban journey part GLA 12.9 km bus from Torrance., Glasgow to Glasgow Central 
LDR 641.6 km from GLA to EUS 
Urban journey part LON 2.9 km taxi from EUS to few km, London 
Aggregate Urban journey Share [A] 2.0% of total journey 
LDR Share [B] 97.6% of total journey 
Taxi Share [C] 0.4% of total journey 
Risk of killed Bus [D] 0.30 per 1000M person km 
Risk of killed LDR [E] 0.01 per 1000M person km 
Risk of killed Taxi [F] 1.90 per 1000M person km 
Calculation = A*D+B*E+C*F 
Weighted average journey 
specific risk of being K 
0.02 per 1000M person km 
Risk of SI Bus [G] 8.70 per 1000Mperson km 
Risk of SI LDR [H] 0.90 per 1000M person km 
Risk of SI Taxi [I] 16.10 per 1000M person km 
Calculation = A*G+B*H+C*I 
Weighted average journey 
specific risk of being SI 
1.12 per 1000M person km 
Table 9-13: Weighted risk calculation Journey Type 2 - Glasgow to London 
There is, however, a slight difference in the definitions for SI between car75 and rail travel 
(known as major injury)76. Both definitions refer to injuries requiring hospital in-patient 
treatment. For rail it is defined as being hospitalised for more than 24 hours; while for 
road serious injuries refer to being an in-patient shortly after an accident, which suggests 
similarity to the ‘24 hours in hospital’ approach. The definition of SI for road suggests 
that some less serious injuries are included as well as those which require a hospital stay. 
This implies that road related “serious injuries” have a wider definition and rail “major 
injuries” have a more narrow definition. The differences are not considered sufficient to 
prevent the statistics being used comparatively. 
                                                 
75 Serious injury: An injury for which a person is detained in hospital as an “in-patient”, or any of the 
following injuries whether or not they are detained in hospital: fractures, concussion, internal injuries, 
crushings, burns (excluding friction burns), severe cuts, severe general shock requiring medical treatment 
and injuries causing death 30 or more days after the accident. An injured casualty is recorded as seriously 
or slightly injured by the police on the basis of information available within a short time of the accident. 
This generally will not reflect the results of a medical examination, but may be influenced according to 
whether the casualty is hospitalised or not. Hospitalisation procedures will vary regionally. 
76 Major injury: Injuries to passengers, staff or members of the public as defined in schedule 1 to RIDDOR 
1995 amended April 2012. This includes losing consciousness, most fractures, major dislocations, loss of 




Kingston to Guildford 
As there was more than one mode in both journeys, composite risks were calculated and 
weighted according to the distance. Table 9-14 and Table 9-15 show the calculation. 
Weighted risk calculation of Journey Type 1 
Conversion 1.60934 km/mile 
Car 33.2 km 
Walk 1.5 km 
Share Car [A] 95.7% of total journey 
Share Walk [B] 4.3% of total journey 
Risk of killed Car [C] 8.33 per 1000M person km 
Risk of killed Walk [D] 29.00 per 1000M person km 
Calculation = A*C+B*D 
Weighted average journey 
specific risk of being K 
9.22 per 1000M person km 
Risk of SI Car [E] 183.69 per 1000M person km 
Risk of SI Walk [F] 313.00 per 1000M person km 
Calculation = A*E+B*F 
Weighted average journey 
specific risk of being SI 
189.29 per 1000M person km 
Table 9-14: Weighted risk calculation Journey Type 1 - Kingston to Guildford 
Weighted risk calculation of Journey Type 2 
Conversion 1.60934 km/mile 
Local Bus 2.0 km 
Rail 27.6 km 
Walk 1.5 km 
Share Local Bus [A] 6.4% of total journey 
Share Rail [B] 88.7% of total journey 
Share Walk [C] 4.8% of total journey 
Risk of killed Bus [D] 0.30 per 1000M person km 
Risk of killed Rail [E] 0.01 per 1000M person km 
Risk of killed Walk [F] 29.00 per 1000M person km 
Calculation = A*D+B*E+C*F 
Weighted average journey specific 
risk of being K 
1.43 per 1000M person km 
Risk of SI Bus [G] 8.70 per 1000M person km 
Risk of SI Rail [H] 0.90 per 1000M person km 
Risk of SI Walk [I] 313.00 per 1000M person km 
Calculation = A*G+B*H+C*I 
Weighted average journey specific 
risk of being SI 
16.47 per 1000M person km 
Table 9-15: Weighted risk calculation Journey Type 2 - Kingston to Guildford 
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Birmingham to London 
For the car risk, it was assumed that the main part of the journey (89%) was on motorways 
and a very small proportion (11%) on urban roads. Table 9-16 and Table 9-17 show the 
calculation. 
Weighted risk calculation of Journey Type 1 
Conversion 1.60934 km/mile 
Car Motorway 160.9 km 
Car Urban 20.0 km 
Share Car Motorway [A] 88.9% of total journey 
Share Car Urban [B] 11.1% of total journey 
Risk of killed Car Motorway 
[C] 
0.97 per 1000M person km 
Risk of killed Car Urban [D] 7.91 per 1000M person km 
Calculation = A*C+B*D 
Weighted average journey 
specific risk of being K 
1.74 per 1000M person km 
Risk of SI Car Motorway[E] 7.24 per 1000M person km 
Risk of SI Car Urban [F] 149.98 per 1000M person km 
Calculation = A*C+B*D 
Weighted average journey 
specific risk of being SI 
23.02 per 1000M person km 
Table 9-16: Weighted risk calculation Journey Type 1 - Birmingham to London 
Weighted risk calculation of Journey Type 2 
Conversion 1.60934 km/mile 
Local Bus 4.0 km 
Rail 160.9 km 
Underground 8.0 Km 
Share Local Bus [A] 2.3% of total journey 
Share Rail [B] 93.1% of total journey 
Share Underground [C] 4.6% of total journey 
Risk of killed Bus [D] 0.30 per 1000M person km 
Risk of killed Rail [E] 0.01 per 1000M person km 
Risk of killed Underground [F] 0.39 per 1000M person km 
Calculation = A*D+B*E+C*F 
Weighted average journey specific 
risk of being K 
0.04 per 1000M person km 
Risk of SI Bus [G] 8.70 per 1000M person km 
Risk of SI Rail [H] 0.90 per 1000M person km 
Risk of SI Underground [I] 16.86 per 1000M person km 
Calculation = A*G+B*H+C*I 
Weighted average journey specific 
risk of being SI 
1.82 per 1000M person km 
Table 9-17: Weighted risk calculation Journey Type 2 - Birmingham to London 
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Comparative risk rates 
The resulting risk rates for all three scenarios are shown in Table 9-18. 
Risk Rates Summary77 
(per 1000M person km) 
 
 Glasgow -  
London 
Kingston –  
Guildford 
Birmingham -  
London 
Probability of being K – Journey Type 1 1.45 9.22 1.74 
Probability of being SI – Journey Type 1 18.31 189.29 23.02 
Probability of being K – Journey Type 2 0.02 1.43 0.04 
Probability of being SI – Journey Type 2 1.12 16.47 1.82 
Table 9-18: Comparative risk rates for all three scenarios 
 9.2.4  Subsidy, cross price elasticity and rail fares 
The incentive used to encourage modal shift in all three scenarios is a price subsidy 
resulting in a fare decrease of 10% for rail travel on the route. 
Glasgow to London 
A CPE value of 0.10 has been derived from an average of varying purpose of travel 
(business, commuting, holiday, leisure and VFR) is used from Dargay (2010, Table 27) 
for long distance travel demand (greater than 150 miles) to determine the extent of the 
modal shift from car to rail, as this is considered to be appropriate to the demand on this 
route. The resulting shift corresponding to this rail price decrease from the subsidy is 1% 
of car users changing to rail. Although the percentage is low, given the high market share 
of car travel the amount of transfers is large in absolute terms. 
The representative rail ticket fare between Glasgow Central and London Euston was 
obtained from the ORR (Table 12-10) using average revenue per franchised passenger 
kilometre (pence/km) for 2013/2014 which showed 13.74 pence/km. This was multiplied 
by the rail distance, resulting in a fare of £90.30. This is similar to the average fare by 
West Coast TOC as noted in the article by Steel (2015, p59). 
                                                 
77 DfT (2014a, Table RAS30017), DfT (2013d, Table TRA0204); DfT (2014c, Table RAS3001- 




Kingston to Guildford 
An illustrative CPE of 0.03 was used, derived from Balcombe et al. (2004, see Tables 9.6, 
9.8 and 9.12). These tables respectively gave CPEs for car use with respect to  
underground fare (0.02), CPE of car use  with respect to rail fare (0.05), and urban 
deduced cross elasticities (0.054) for car use with respect to rail cost in London and 
surrounding areas. The 0.03 CPE value used, which is within the range of values given 
by Balcombe et al., is considered to be appropriate to the demand on the Kingston to 
Guildford route. The resulting shift corresponding to the 10% reduction in rail price from 
the subsidy is 0.3% of car users changing to rail as shown in Table 9 19 (i.e. 10% of 0.03). 
The representative rail fare between Kingston and Guildford was an average rate obtained 
from thetrainline.com using the Any Time day return fare of £17 divided by 2 to represent 
a one way rail fare and from an average of season ticket price from National Rail 
(assuming 50:50 split). This would be the fare used by peak hour commuters. 
Birmingham to London 
A CPE value of 0.06 has been derived from an average of varying purpose of travel 
(business, commuting, holiday, leisure and VFR) is used from Dargay (2010, Table 27) 
for long distance travel demand (0-150 miles) to determine the extent of the modal shift 
from car to rail as this is considered to be appropriate to the demand on the Birmingham 
to London route.  The resulting shift corresponding to the 10% rail price decrease from 
the subsidy is 0.06% of car users changing to rail. Although the percentage is low, given 
the high market share of car travel, the number of transfers is large in absolute terms. The 
representative rail ticket fare between Birmingham and London Euston was obtained 
from the ORR Statistics (2014, Table 12-10) using revenue per franchised passenger 
kilometre (pence/km) for 2013/2014 which showed 13.74 pence/km. This was multiplied 
by the rail distance, resulting in a fare of £22.11. This is similar to the average fare by 




The overall price reduction and CPE factors are summarised in Table 9-19. 
Summary of Subsidy, cross-price elasticity and rail fares 
 
 Glasgow -  
London78 
Kingston –  
Guildford79 
Birmingham -  
London80 
Cost of Subsidies per person/per trip (GBP) -9.03 -0.76 -2.21 
Cross-price elasticity Car towards LDR  0.10 0.03 0.06 
Percentage change in Price for Rail (%) subsidy 
assumption 
-10.00% -10.00% -10.00% 
Percentage change in demand for Car (%) as a result of 
CPE and assumed price reduction 
-1.0% -0.3% -0.6% 
Rail ticket price London Euston - Glasgow Central 
one-way (GBP) 
90.3 7.61 22.11 
Table 9-19: Price reduction and cross-price elasticity 
 9.2.5  Safety benefits 
Glasgow to London 
The impact of the modal shift from car to rail resulted in the benefits shown in Table 9-20. 
In absolute numbers the fare adjustment incentive would result in 15,604 trips moving to 
rail rather than travelling by car. This was calculated by multiplying the persons making 
the journey by rail annually by the % increase in demand for rail resulting from the rail 
price drop, acting on the CPE relationship established between car and rail. Table 9-20 
shows how the total safety benefit of £64,997 was calculated. 
Calculation of safety benefits 
Number of trip changes from Car to Rail [A] 15,604 trips  
Reduction in person km due to switch from car to public 
transport Glasgow - London [B=A*674km/1,000,000] 
0.0105 1000M person km  
Increase in person km on rail due to switch on Glasgow - 
London [C=A*657.4km/1,000,000] 
0.0103 1000M person km  
Reduction of persons killed in journey type 1 [D=B*1.45] 0.0153 persons  
Persons killed in journey type 2  
[E=C*0.02] 
0.0002 persons  
Lives saved due to switch [F=D-E] 0.0151 persons  
                                                 
78Based on ticket price and price reduction assumption, Average Cross Price Elasticity over 150 miles 
Dargay, 2010 (Table 27), ORR Statistical table 12.10: Based on revenue per franchised passenger kilometre 
(13.74 pence/km) 2013/14.  
79 Based on ticket price and price reduction assumption, Demand for Public Transport (Balcombe et al., 
2004), Table 9.11, http://ojp.nationalrail.co.uk/service/seasonticket/tickets and www.thetrainline.com. 
80 Based on ticket price and price reduction assumption, Average CPEs for distances below 150 miles 
(Dargay, 2010, Table 27), Source: ORR Statistical table 12.10: Based on revenue per franchised passenger 
kilometre (13.74 pence/km) 2013/14. 
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Calculation of safety benefits 
Reduction of persons seriously injured in journey type 1 
[G=B*18.31] 
0.1926 persons  
Increase in persons seriously injured in journey type 2 
[H=C*1.12] 
0.0115 persons  
Reduction in injuries due to switch [I=G-H] 0.1811 persons  
Monetised values lives saved due to switch [J=F*VSL] 27,634 GBP  
Monetised values of injuries prevented due to switch 
[K=I*VSI] 
37,364 GBP  
Total Safety Benefit [L=J+K] 64,997 GBP  
Table 9-20: Safety benefits calculations Glasgow to London 
Kingston to Guildford 
The benefits of the modal shift from car to rail safety are now considered. In absolute 
numbers the fare adjustment incentive would result in 429 trips moving to rail from car. 
This was calculated by multiplying the persons making the journey by rail annually by 
the percentage increase in demand for rail resulting from the rail price drop, acting on the 
CPE relationship established between car and rail. Table 9-21 shows how the total safety 
benefit of £751 was calculated. 
Calculation of safety benefits  
Number of trip changes from Car to Rail [A] 429 trips  
Reduction in person km due to switch from car to 
public transport Kingston - Guildford 
[B=A*34.7km/1,000,000] 
0.00001 1000M person km  
Increase in person km on rail due to switch on 
Kingston - Guildford [C=A*31.1km/1,000,000] 
0.00001 1000M person km  
Reduction of persons killed in journey type 1 
[D=B*9.22] 
0.0001 persons  
Persons killed in journey type 2  
[E=C*1.43] 
0.0000 persons  
Lives saved due to switch [F=D-E] 0.0001 persons  
Reduction of persons seriously injured in journey 
type 1 [G=B*189.29] 
0.0028 persons  
Increase in persons seriously injured in journey type 
2 [H=C*16.47] 
0.0002 persons  
Reduction in injuries due to switch [I=G-H] 0.0026 persons  
Monetised values lives saved due to switch 
[J=F*VSL] 
217 GBP  
Monetised values of injuries prevented due to switch 
[K=I*VSI] 
535 GBP  
Total Safety Benefit [L=J+K] 751 GBP  
Table 9-21: Safety benefits calculation Kingston to Guildford 
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Birmingham to London 
The impact of the modal shift from car to rail resulted in the benefits shown in Table 9-22. 
In absolute numbers the fare adjustment incentive would result in 157,414 trips moving 
to rail rather than car. This was calculated by multiplying the persons making the journey 
by rail annually by the percentage increase in demand for rail resulting from the rail price 
drop, acting on the CPE relationship established between car and rail. Table 9-22 shows 
how the total safety benefit of £214,078 was calculated. 
Calculation of safety benefits  
Number of trip changes from Car to Rail [A] 157,414 trips  
Reduction in person km due to switch from car to public 
transport Birmingham - London [B=A*180.9km/1,000,000] 
0.0285 1000M person km  
Increase in person km on rail due to switch on Birmingham 
- London [C=A*172.9km/1,000,000] 
0.0272 1000M person km  
Reduction of persons killed in journey type 1 [D=B*1.74] 0.0495 persons  
Persons killed in journey type 2  
[E=C*0.04] 
0.0010 persons  
Lives saved due to switch [F=D-E] 0.0485 persons  
Reduction of persons seriously injured in journey type 1 
[G=B*23.02] 
0.6557 persons  
Increase in persons seriously injured in journey type 2 
[H=C*1.82] 
0.0495 persons  
Reduction in injuries due to switch [I=G-H] 0.6062 persons  
Monetised values lives saved due to switch [J=F*VSL] 89,007 GBP  
Monetised values of injuries prevented due to switch 
[K=I*VSI] 
125,070 GBP  
Total Safety Benefit [L=J+K] 214,078 GBP  
Table 9-22: Safety benefits calculation Birmingham to London 
 9.2.6  Subsidy derived benefits 
Glasgow to London 
In addition to the safety benefits, additional complementary benefits arise directly from 
the price subsidy.  
As a result of the price subsidy of 10% the existing rail users (600,000) for the journey 
selected also benefit in terms of reduced rail fares. This amounts to approximately £5.4 
million per annum. This benefit would be a transfer payment from tax payers in general 
and can be considered a re-distribution effect in favour of rail users.  
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Together with the benefits to existing rail users, there is additional demand generated by 
the “own-mode” demand for long-distance rail services which is fairly elastic (Dargay, 
2010, Table 23). Table 9-23 highlights the own elasticity for rail from Dargay which is -
0.83 and results in a change in demand of 8.30%. The total number of additional users 
due to the price reduction is 49,800, of which 34,196 are additional rail users due to own-
mode elasticity of demand. A price reduction in rail would generate revenue from 
additional persons (£4.0 million per annum). The total consumer surplus (see Figure 9-2) 
gain for these users is £ 295,374.  
 
Figure 9-2: Consumer surplus for additional users as a result of price subsidy 
From this figure the consumer surplus of persons switching from car to LDR has been 
deducted (to avoid double counting) resulting in a net consumer surplus gain of £154,434 
that can offset part of the subsidy. In this scenario the “rule of half” has been applied to 
evaluate the average consumer benefits to additional users that have been attracted 
through the price reduction but which are not those who have shifted modes, or were 




Benefits of price reduction attracting new LDR passengers 
Own elasticity of rail -0.830  
Dargay 2010, Table 23, 
Own elasticities with 
respect to travel cost 
Price Reduction -10.00%   
Percentage change in demand for Rail (Own 
elasticity) 
8.30%   
Number of additional trips using rail in total 
[A=600,000 trips * 8.30%] 
49,800   
Revenue generated from additional trips 
[B=A*(90.3-9.03)] 
4,048,270   
New trips due to price reduction (excl. modal shift 
car to LDR) [C=A-15,604 trips] 
34,196   
Consumer surplus of new trips applying rule of half 
[D=C*9.03GBP/2] 
154,434  Assumes "Rule of Half". 
Number of persons switching from Car to LDR 15,604   
Consumer surplus of trips switching from car to LDR 
[E=15,604 trips*9.03GBP] 
140,940  
Assumes full benefit of 
price reduction. 
Consumer surplus due to price reduction 
[F=D+E] 
295,374 GBP  
Table 9-23: Benefits of price reduction attracting new LDR passengers 
Kingston to Guildford 
In addition to the safety benefits, there are additional benefits arising directly from the 
price subsidy. These are now considered on the same basis applied to the Glasgow to 
London case above. 
As a result of the price subsidy of 10% the existing rail users (28,790) for the journey 
selected also benefit from reduced rail fares. This amounts to approximately £21,895 per 
annum.  
Together with the benefits to existing rail users there is additional demand generated by 
the “own-mode” demand for suburban rail services (Balcombe et al., 2004, Table 6-10). 
Table 9-24 highlights the own elasticity for rail which is -0.58 (short-run) and results in a 
change in demand of 5.8%. The number of additional rail users due to own-mode 
elasticity of demand is 1,670. A price reduction in rail would generate revenue from 
additional persons (£11,429). The total consumer surplus gain is £798. From this figure 
the consumer surplus of persons switching from car to rail has been deducted (to avoid 
double counting) resulting in a net consumer surplus of £472 which, in this scenario, does 




Benefits of price reduction attracting new rail passengers 
Own elasticity of rail -0.580  
Demand for public 
transport, Balcombe et 
al., 2004, Table 6.10. 
Price Reduction -10.00%  
 
Percentage change in demand for rail (own elasticity) 5.80%   
Number of additional trips using rail  
[A=28,790 trips * 5.80%] 
1,670  
 




New trips due to price reduction (excl. modal shift 
car to rail) [C=A-429 trips] 
1,241  
 
Consumer surplus of new trips applying rule of half 
[D=C*0.76GBP/2] 
472  
Assumes "Rule of 
Half". 
Number of persons switching from car to rail 429   
Consumer surplus of trips switching from car to rail 
[E=429 trips*0.76GBP] 
326  
Assumes full benefit of 
price reduction. 
Consumer surplus due to price reduction 
[F=D+E] 
798 GBP  
Table 9-24: Benefits of price reduction attracting new rail passengers 
Birmingham to London 
There are additional benefits arising directly from the price subsidy as well as 
environmental improvements. These are now considered. 
As a result of the price subsidy of 10% the existing rail users (4,472,000) for the journey 
selected also benefit in terms of reduced rail fares. This amounts to approximately £9.9 
million p.a.  
Together with the benefits to existing rail users there is additional demand generated by 
the “own-mode” demand for long-distance rail services (<150 miles) which is fairly 
elastic (Dargay’s 2010, Table 23). Table 9-25 shows the own elasticity for rail which is -
0.81 and results in a change in demand of 8.10%. The total number of additional users 
due to price reduction is 362,232 of which 204,818 are additional rail users due to own-
mode elasticity of demand. A price reduction in rail would generate revenue from 
additional persons (£7.2 million). The total consumer surplus gain is £574,530.  
From this figure the consumer surplus of persons switching from car to rail has been 
deducted (to avoid double counting) resulting in a net consumer surplus gain of £226,540 




Benefits of price reduction attracting new rail passengers 
Own elasticity of rail -0.810  
Demand for public 
transport, TRL 593, 
2004. Table 6.10 
Price Reduction -10.00%   
Percentage change in demand for Rail (Own 
elasticity) 
8.10%   
Number of additional trips using rail in total 
[A=4,472,000 trips * 8.10%] 
362,232   
Revenues generated from additional trips 
[B=A*(22.11-2.21)] 
7,208,815   
New trips due to price reduction (excl. modal 
shift car to rail) [C=A-157,414 trips] 
204,818   
Consumer surplus of new trips applying rule 
of half [D=C*2.21GBP/2] 
226,450  Assumes "Rule of Half". 
Number of persons switching from car to rail 157,414   
Consumer surplus of trips switching from car 
to rail [E=157,414 trips*2.21GBP] 
348,080  
Assumes full benefit of 
price reduction. 
Consumer surplus due to price reduction 
[F=D+E] 
574,530  GBP  
Table 9-25: Benefits of price reduction attracting new rail passengers 
 9.2.7  Gross cost 
The cost here refers to the cost of encouraging the modal shift. The cost is defined in 
terms of the method used to achieve the modal switch, which in this scenario is a price 
subsidy for rail. The effectiveness of this method (i.e. how many persons are willing to 
switch from car to rail) is measured using CPE. It is assumed here that there are no 
infrastructure investments required. These are very costly and may not yield net benefits 
unless said benefits are significant. The only consideration in terms of cost is the subsidy 
provided for the price reduction to rail, at 10%. There could be some further costs if the 
increase in users required the addition of further capacity on rail, although considering 
the numbers shifting due to the CPEs, the impact would be marginal and unlikely to 
require additional capacity. This depends however on the time distribution for example, 
adding to Friday evening peak time. 
Summary of gross cost of subsidies 
 Glasgow -  
London 
Kingston –  
Guildford 
Birmingham -  
London 
Gross cost of subsidies (£) 5,560,311 22,221 10,236,715 
Table 9-26: Cost of subsidies for all scenarios 
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 9.2.8  Other economic benefits (Time savings and environmental) 
Time savings  
As there are some notable time savings between using car and rail the approximate value 
of the time savings has been calculated for using rail and shown in Table 9-27. For this 
scenario an approximate 2.0 hours of savings were considered taking into consideration 
the specific journey types. Values of non-working time and working time values were 
used in proportions of 60% and 40% and weighting applied respectively which 
approximately conforms to the findings of the work undertaken by Lyons et al. (2013) 
and Wardman and Lyons (2015). The value of the time savings is £459,184. Given the 
short distances for the Kingston to Guildford and Birmingham to London no time savings 
have been considered for these scenarios. Together with the time savings quantified here 
by using rail, there would also be some impact of time benefits to continuing car drivers 
from reduced congestion and potential vehicle cost savings while potentially there could 
be increased delays for rail travellers due to the increase in rail passengers.  
Other Economic Benefits (Time savings) 
Time savings    
Time LDR 6.0 hours 
4.5 hours LDR, 1h local bus, 30 min. 
Taxi  
Time Car 8.0 hours 
7.0 hours net driving, 45 min. breaks, 
15 min. Walking 
Time saved per person by 
using rail 
2.0 hours  
Value of time savings 14.7 GBP/hour 
WebTAG November 2014: Table 
A.1.3.1 Value of Working/Non-
working time by Mode (£ per hour, 
market prices adjusted for 2014) and 
weighted 60% applying non-working 
time values and 40% applying working 
time values. 
Value of time saved per 
person 
29.43 GBP  
Trips 15,604 trips  
Total value of time savings 459,184 GBP   
Table 9-27: Time savings Glasgow to London 
Environmental benefits for all three scenarios 
One additional benefit is the environmental improvement of reducing the levels of carbon 
emissions from the car journeys now made by rail. This benefit has been calculated using 
average car emission rates and the avoided emissions multiplied by the social cost of 
carbon which provides an additional benefit. This is shown in Table 9-28. 
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It should also be noted that there are potentially some ‘reverse benefits’ in that remaining 
road users could benefit – through the absence of those switching –through reduced 
congestion, and possibly some related vehicle cost savings, while those that do switch 
could suffer increased rail congestion. 
Summary of Environmental benefits 
 Glasgow -  
London 
Kingston –  
Guildford 
Birmingham -  
London 
Environmental benefits (£) 48,347 68 128,080 
Table 9-28: Environmental benefits in terms of reduction in CO2 emissions 
Detailed calculations and assumptions for each scenario can be found in Appendix C. 
 9.2.9  Sensitivity analysis 
Glasgow to London 
The sensitivity of the estimated calculations to some of the assumptions made in the 
Glasgow to London scenario are examined. Sensitivity was calculated for: 
 the reduction/increase in rail fare and its impact on safety benefits; 
 changes in CPE and its impact on safety benefits; 
 the reduction in rail fare and its impact on total economic benefits; 
 changes in CPE and its impact on total economic benefits;  
 rail price subsidy and its impact on BCRs. 
These are shown in Table 9-29 to Table 9-31. Sensitivity of safety benefits (Table 9-29) 
suggests that as price for rail is reduced then the safety benefits increase. The reverse is 
also true: small reductions in the price of rail lead to smaller safety benefits. The central 
values in the sensitivity tables refer to each reference scenario for a given set of input 
variables. 
Similarly if the CPE is higher, the safety benefits will also increase and, conversely, if the 
CPEs are lower the resulting safety benefits are also reduced. 
 
Table 9-29: Sensitivity analysis of safety benefits (£ p.a.) Glasgow to London 
 Price Reduction Rail (%)
64,997           -5% -7.5% -10% -15% -20%
0.06 19,169 28,754 38,339 57,508 76,677
0.08 25,834 38,751 51,668 77,502 103,336
CPE 0.10 32,499 48,748 64,997 97,496 129,995
0.20 65,822 98,733 131,644 197,466 263,289
0.30 99,146 148,718 198,291 297,437 396,582
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Sensitivity of total economic benefits (Table 9-30) suggests that as price for rail is reduced 
in % terms then the economic benefits increase accordingly and the reverse is true when 
% price reductions are smaller. For a given CPE value, it is self-evident that the 
relationship between price reduction and safety benefits follows a linear pattern. 
This linear pattern is also observed with respect to sensitivity of total economic benefits 
and CPEs. Doubling the CPEs value from 0.1 to 0.2 could compensate a reduction of 
price decrease from -10% to -5%. 
 
Table 9-30: Sensitivity analysis of total economic benefits Glasgow to London 
Table 9-31, providing the sensitivity on BCRs with respect to rail price subsidy and CPE, 
shows that doubling the subsidy does not proportionally increase the BCR and halving 
the subsidy also does not reduce the BCR by the same proportion. Overall the BCR ratio 
is very small and mainly related to the time savings gained from persons switching from 
car to rail. 
 
Table 9-31: Sensitivity analysis of BCRs for Glasgow to London 
Kingston to Guildford 
Traveller numbers for this scenario are limited and low CPE results in a minimal modal 
shift. A sensitivity analysis can still prove to be worthwhile if a larger CPEs is assumed 
(e.g. 0.06 instead of 0.03) given that there is a direct relationship between CPE values and 
safety benefits. Doubling the CPE as shown in  
Table 9-32 leads to an increase in BCR (i.e. including cost of subsidy) of 30%. What is 
notable is that if higher CPEs values are observed (0.15), a small reduction in price (5%) 
 Price Reduction Rail (%)
726,962         -5% -7.5% -10% -15% -20%
0.06 214,687 356,406 521,042 919,066 1,408,759
0.08 269,780 436,336 624,002 1,062,668 1,585,776
CPE 0.10 324,873 516,265 726,962 1,206,269 1,762,792
0.20 600,337 915,913 1,241,762 1,924,274 2,647,875
0.30 875,801 1,315,561 1,756,561 2,642,280 3,532,957
 Price Subsidy Rail (%)
1                -5% -7.5% -10% -15% -20%
0.06 1.08 1.09 1.09 1.11 1.13
0.08 1.10 1.11 1.11 1.13 1.14
CPE 0.10 1.12 1.12 1.13 1.14 1.15
0.20 1.22 1.22 1.22 1.22 1.22
0.30 1.31 1.31 1.30 1.29 1.28
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can lead to better results in terms of BCR as compared to a larger price reduction (15%). 
This is mainly due to the cost of subsidies which puts a limit on achievable BCR values. 
Alternatively higher price reductions are required at lower CPE values to improve BCRs. 
 
Table 9-32: Sensitivity analysis of BCRs for Kingston to Guildford  
Birmingham to London 
The sensitivity of the estimated calculations to some of the assumptions made in the 
Birmingham to London scenario are observed. Sensitivity was examined for: 
 the reduction/increase in rail fare and its impact on safety benefits; 
 changes in CPE and its impact on safety benefits; 
 the reduction/increase in rail fare and its impact on total economic benefits; 
 changes in CPE and its impact on total economic benefits. 
Sensitivity of safety benefits as shown in Table 9-33 follows the same linear pattern as 
the other two scenarios. 
 
Table 9-33: Sensitivity analysis of safety benefits Birmingham to London 
Table 9-34 shows that if price is reduced from 10% to 20% from the central value 
(568,607) then total economic benefits will increase by nearly 3 times. 
  
 Price Reduction Rail (%)
1     -5% -7.5% -10% -15% -20%
0.03 1.04 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.08
0.06 1.07 1.08 1.08 1.09 1.09
CPE 0.09 1.10 1.10 1.10 1.11 1.11
0.12 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.12 1.12
0.15 1.16 1.16 1.15 1.14 1.14
0.18 1.19 1.18 1.17 1.16 1.15
 Price Reduction Rail (%)
214,078 -5% -7.5% -10% -15% -20%
0.02 40,140 60,209 80,279 120,419 160,558
0.04 73,589 110,384 147,179 220,768 294,357
CPE 0.06 107,039 160,558 214,078 321,117 428,156
0.12 207,388 311,082 414,776 622,164 829,552





Table 9-34: Sensitivity analysis of total economic benefits Birmingham to London 
 SCENARIO FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
Table 9-35 summarises all the safety and related economic benefits arising from the 
subsidised modal shift for all three scenarios. The economic benefits comprise cost saving 
benefits to existing rail users, revenues from additional rail users attracted by the subsidy, 
environmental benefits from reduced car use and time savings for new rail users. The total 
net benefits and the BCRs are also shown. The BCRs are calculated using the safety 
benefit but also include benefits resulting directly from the subsidy as shown in Table 
9-35. The BCRs are 1.13 for Glasgow to London (benefits dominated by time savings 
from switching from car to rail) and 1.06 for the other two cases, and though positive are 
very small. 
Key scenario findings (£) 
 Glasgow -  
London 





Safety Benefits [A] 64,997 751 214,078 
Benefits of the price reduction to existing LDR 
passengers [B] 
5,419,371 21,895 9,888,635 
Consumer Surplus due to price reduction [C] 295,374 798 574,530 
Total Cost of Price Reduction [D] 5,560,311 22,221 10,236,715 
Safety and subsidy derived benefits [E=A+B+C-D]  219,431 1,223 440,528 
Time savings [F] 459,184 N/A N/A 
Environmental benefits [G] 48,347 68 128,080 
Total Net Benefit [H=E+F+G]  726,962 1,292 568,607 
BCR [I=(A+B+C+F+G)/D] 1.13 1.06 1.06 
Table 9-35: Comparison of key findings 
Table 9-36 shows the percentage composition of benefits within each scenario. Time 
savings for the Kingston to Guildford and Birmingham to London scenarios have not 
 Price Reduction Rail (%)
568,607 -5% -7.5% -10% -15% -20%
0.02 147,961 284,796 463,534 946,719 1,597,517
0.04 187,826 334,396 516,070 984,734 1,593,815
CPE 0.06 227,691 383,996 568,607 1,022,748 1,590,114
0.12 347,287 532,797 726,217 1,136,791 1,579,009
0.18 466,883 681,597 883,827 1,250,835 1,567,905
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been calculated due to the short duration of the trips and hence negligible time savings 





Benefits from all 
scenarios ranked as a 
% of total benefits  











Economic benefit to 
existing rail users 
85% 93% 92% 
Time savings from 
modal diversion 
9% N/A N/A 
Benefits to additional 
users in the form of 
consumer surplus 
4% 3% 5% 
Safety benefits to car 
users who have 
transferred to rail 
1% 3% 2% 
Environmental benefits 
from reduction in CO2 
emissions 
1% < 1% 1% 
Table 9-36: Benefits ranked as % of total benefits 
 9.3.1  Safety benefits 
The safety benefits for all scenarios are very limited, ranging from 3% of the total benefits 
in the Kingston to Guildford case to 1% on the London to Glasgow example. In absolute 
terms, the safety benefits are £64,997, £751 and £214,078 respectively. An explanation 
for this are low risks rates due to significant improvements in car safety and low CPE 
values which do not induce large numbers of travellers to switch from car to rail.  
The total safety benefits (£64,997) for the Glasgow to London scenario are low compared 
to the travel time saving benefits (£459,184). Decision making over any pricing 
intervention for this case would therefore have to be based on economic/equity issues 
relating to travel time savings, with safety improvements as a by-product. 
For Kingston to Guildford the safety benefits are slightly higher proportionally than the 
other two scenarios, at 3% of total benefits, but very small indeed in absolute terms (£751) 
such that they could be regarded as within the margin of error and in any case could easily 
be absorbed by administrative costs in any implementation. 
The very low load factor here of 3% for train partly reflects the 'contra-peak' nature of the 
flow. This can be partially attributed to the fact that it does not account for additional 
passengers entering the train at stations during the journey (e.g. Waterloo to Guildford). 
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For the Birmingham to London case, the safety benefits are greatest in absolute terms at 
£214,078, though these are still only 2% of the total benefits gained. The larger relative 
safety benefit can be attributed to higher volume of trip switches. 
 9.3.2  Other economic benefits 
For all three scenarios the majority of the benefits stem from advantages provided to 
existing rail users through the subsidy. This is 93% for the Birmingham to London case, 
92% for Kingston to Guildford while for Glasgow to London this proportion of the total 
benefits is slightly lower at 85%. This could be considered as the largest form of transfer 
payments from the taxpayers to existing rail users and requires some care when looking 
at the balance between those paying and those receiving the benefits, as pointed out by 
Last (2013). He discusses the economic benefits generated by concessionary travel in 
relation to the costs for certain target groups. In his calculations only the consumer surplus 
benefits were considered. He summarises that of the net benefits to society as a whole 
arising from providing concessionary bus fares to older and disabled passengers, the 
largest part of the benefit is in the form of transfer payments from taxpayers to pass 
holders), and overall the BCRs are not very large (ranging from 1.24 for a zero fare to 
1.56 where only 50% concession is provided). Caution should be exercised when looking 
at the equity balance between tax payers and those that benefit. Similarly, in the scenario 
calculations the distributional and possible equity effects of the subsidy should be 
carefully considered. 
The economic benefits that accrue to existing LDR users based on time savings (only for 
the Glasgow to London due to the journey type) are a significant contributor to the overall 
benefits at 9%.  
There is also a contribution of 3 to 5% to the overall benefits from the consumer surplus 
of additional users due to own-mode elasticity for rail, applying the “rule of half” in all 
scenarios. 
Environmental benefits for the reduction in CO2 emissions resulting from the modal 
switch to rail for car users have been estimated for all scenarios, although these are a 
negligible fraction of the total. This is 1% or less in each case. 
In terms of the overall BCRs, for the Glasgow - London case the net financial cost is 
strongly affected by whether additional revenue from new rail users is included in 
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calculations for BCRs and travel time savings or not. The environmental effects 
calculations appear to assume no extra energy generated from fossil sources (coal, oil, 
gas) being used by rail to carry the extra passengers. The estimate for the BCR ratio 
sensitivity tests (1.13) seems to be mainly sensitive to CPE assumptions. 
CPEs were used from Dargay, as the CPEs calculated and measured in this work were not 
robust enough to use with a high level of confidence. 
The findings from the three scenarios, although positive in terms of absolute safety 
benefits and BCRs, suggest a marginal case for CMS but not on the basis of safety per se. 
If other economic benefits are considered (time savings) then there may be a requirement 
for modal shift. 
The results suggest further research needs to be undertaken particularly in instances where 




 10  CONCLUSIONS AND PRACTICAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
This final chapter draws together the findings of the research, highlights its contributions 
and considers its limitations. The chapter also provides the overall conclusion and makes 
suggestions for further research. 
This thesis set out to explore how overall safety could be further enhanced and 
encouraged through Cross Modal Switching (CMS). This could potentially provide safety 
gains for both urban and long distance passenger transport without large infrastructure 
investments, or more likely as a complement to such investments. 
As a basis for the assessment of CMS, the work firstly explored the development of 
optimal transport safety policy across modes, advocating a more holistic rational 
approach working across all modes rather than the single mode-focused approach which 
has most often been the basis of transport safety policies. The literature on CMS to date 
largely concentrates on support for environmental objectives, time savings and 
sustainability rather than safety. The thesis therefore sought to answer the following main 
research question:  
To what extent can CMS be used as an instrument (explicitly or implicitly) of 
transport safety policy to encourage users to transfer from less safe modes to safer 
modes of transport? 
Some supporting questions were also posed covering methods of appraisal and associated 
tools, the measurement of safety output and substitutability between modes, CPE of 
demand, policies deployed, the benefits realised and the routes where CMS could be 
applied. Journey safety considerations, it was noted, should include the whole end to end 
journey because use of a main mode with a good safety record can also entail use of feeder 
modes with considerably lower safety records.  
The approach to address the main research question consisted of two stages: 
 Could CMS provide net safety gains taking full account of the composite nature 
of most journeys? 
 Would the promotion of CMS be practical and effective in changing travel 
behaviour and if so, what would be the most successful incentives? 
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This sequence is illustrated in Figure 10-1, which also summarises the key findings in 
each area. The answers to the first two questions were positive, but the overall monetised 
safety benefits were found to be very small for the journey scenarios considered. The 
BCRs were found to be positive, but only when taking account of related benefits derived 
from the subsidy in addition to safety. 
 
Figure 10-1: Overview of the research approach and summary of findings 
The main findings of the work overall are now assessed in more detail. 
 MAIN FINDINGS 
This work suggests transport safety policy should be developed by adopting a rational 
approach while considering the varying perspectives of those concerned with safety 
(ranging from individual travellers to those determining and implementing policy 
measures). Such a rational approach, although implicit in the work examined by others in 
the field, has not been widely explicit in underpinning transport safety policy across 
modes. In practical terms this means resisting pressure to respond to major public 
transport incidents by diverting resources that might be more effectively deployed on 
other safety measures. If CMS is to be successful it is important that this approach is 
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maintained because the impacts of CMS are likely to be more subtle than major 
infrastructure initiatives. 
The discussion of safety policies in the thesis has been carried out within the framework 
of the utilitarian inspired Pareto norm which is considered the most relevant norm with 
which to address CMS as a tool of safety policy. Within Paretian analysis it is recognized 
that a market system will fail to allocate resources optimally resulting in market failures 
either in the presence of public non-excludable externalities and/or where there are 
significant asymmetries of information, or misinformation. 
In relation to transport safety public non-excludable externalities arise when third parties 
who have no commercial relationship with a transport operator are impacted; and so on 
Paretian grounds there will be a case for state intervention to correct the resulting market 
failure/misallocation of resources. For this type of externalities the argument is strongest 
for road transport safety, where third parties are impacted due to the multiple use character 
of road networks. 
Information asymmetries can result in the public being misinformed of the safety aspects 
of transport modes, which may give rise to sub-optimal modal choices. There is arguably 
a key role for the state to intervene to promote better-informed choices to consumers, and 
where necessary to incentivise such choices. The empirical results from the travel surveys 
undertaken in this work suggest that there are indeed imperfections in consumer 
information about the relative safety of the different modes. For example, the user surveys 
results show that the perception of lower risk modes (aviation and bus/coach) are 
overweighted (carrying a perception of higher than actual risk) which is consistent with 
prospect theory. Here in principle the case for intervention to transfer people to modes 
whose safety risks they are overstating can be justified.  
Optimal safety has been debated with regard to the cost of safety provision and the value 
of safety to society and individuals. This can lead to friction between policy makers, who 
understand the potentially substantial costs of averting small risks in relation to small 
safety gains, and those advocating safety irrespective of cost. Within this thesis, it is 
advocated that safety gains are achievable without large investments through CMS, 
although marginal improvements with considerably lower associated costs could be 
considered to enhance safety. This contrasts with some infrastructure investments such as 
a £130 million in rail ATP systems to prevent two on-board rail fatalities (Evans and 
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Addison, 2009). It is notable that developed nations with already relatively high levels of 
safety are in a situation that makes additional improvements (marginal safety benefits) 
more difficult to achieve, though still important. 
 10.1.1  CMS framework 
The discussion of CMS highlighted that transport safety policy has hitherto been 
considered on a mode-specific basis without considering policies set in other modes, and 
that this could result in the development of sub-optimal safety policies overall. The reason 
for this is a mixture of limited government funding, competition between modes, 
technical aspects of transport safety being necessarily mode-specific and because, 
although substitution factors have been considered to some extent for other applications, 
this has not been extended to safety policies. It has already been recognised in the 
literature that work on modal transfer on the grounds of safety is limited. 
A contribution made by this thesis centres around the conceptual innovative framework 
advocating the move from single mode policies towards an optimal safety policy spanning 
all transport modes simultaneously. This would include but not be confined to CMS of 
passengers/persons from modes with lower levels of safety to those modes that yield the 
highest safety benefits as an instrument of safety promotion policy. 
This approach is supported by the recent literature from Litman (2014, 2016). Litman 
recognises that that there can be multiple impacts emanating from a specific policy and 
advocates the modal shift to public transport from cars in North America to improve 
transport safety. 
 10.1.2  Composite risk assessments 
Several composite risk assessments were completed for a wide range of journey profiles. 
The overall differences between pairs of modal combinations were calculated for all 
routes to assess the potential safety gains that could be achieved using CMS. The 
assessment provided a number of findings which indicate:  
 Urban journeys are dominated by high risk modes, partly because shorter 
distances make more risky forms of travel such as walking and cycling practical. 
Rail is also a common component of urban journeys and is lower risk, but the 
regularity with which cycling and walking are used as feeders increases the 
composite risks of such journeys. 
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 Car journeys, which form the bulk of non-urban travel, carry relatively high risk. 
This applied to all types of road even though different risk rates were applied to 
different categories, i.e. urban roads, minor roads, trunk roads and motorways. 
 The impact of feeder modes on safe long distance transport modes, notably air 
and rail, is still considerable. It is evident that journeys using higher risk 
feeder/access (modes other than those used for the main leg of the trip) often form 
a major component of the risk and must therefore be a target for CMS. 
 Risks for the safer forms of transport, such as aviation and rail, are dominated by 
a very small number of specific incidents. In these cases, public policy needs to 
take account of the specific issues involved as well as the summary view provided 
by the statistics. It may also need to address the imbalanced perceptions that may 
emerge after media coverage of such events. 
The results from the total journey risk calculations indicated that modal switching could 
lead to safety gains. For shorter distances on certain modes of transport the risk rates are 
significant per person km (walking and cycling) so that when considering the whole door-
to-door journey the risk is substantially higher than for the main mode alone (often bus 
or train). Nevertheless, the distances involved are often short and in many cases the 
alternatives are limited. When evaluating longer distance journeys, modal switching is 
also valid to shift from high risk modes (car) to safer modes (rail or aviation) as 
highlighted in the outcome of the composite risk calculations. Both of these types of 
possibilities were therefore taken forward to the net benefit analysis later in the work. 
 10.1.3  Risk unrelated to distance 
For aviation, bus and rail travel modal risks unrelated to distance were investigated in 
order to assess how risk should be addressed when considering journeys with transfers. 
The research reveals that at present there are no established transfer risk rates (for 
interchanges between routes or modes during one specified journey) that are readily 
available and can be applied. There are some statistical data on bus and coach casualties 
arising from boarding and alighting but this is not sufficient to derive transfer risk rates. 
This thesis provided an illustrative calculation applying an additional constant risk factor 
to the different transfer stages. Results showed that while there are changes in composite 
risk rates, including the transfer stages versus the original rates, these are not notable. For 
aviation there is no indication that the figures include boarding and alighting effects. It 
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has been demonstrated that applying a risk factor to allow for the higher risk probabilities 
for the high risk phases of a flight yields marginal differences and hence require no 
specific treatment for comparative purposes. 
Further research would be necessary to quantify the specific transfer-related risk per mode 
of transport, but in this work it has been shown that allowing for the additional risk factor 
for transfers does not change the total composite risks significantly. 
 10.1.4  Measurement of modal substitution 
Direct arc CPEs were calculated using the results from the user survey, while many of the 
published CPEs are derived from own price elasticities. This was based on the 
respondents’ willingness to switch modes at specific percentage reductions in price. For 
the combined survey responses, a ranking was developed under each alternative mode to 
get an estimate of the degree of CPE. The results are generally consistent with Dargay’s 
(2010) findings on long distance travel, although the absolute CPE values in Dargay’s 
work are higher. 
The findings suggest that in measuring substitutability the most important factors are the 
market shares of the respective transport modes being considered, the diversion factors 
and own price elasticity (as CPE in the published literature has been derived using these 
factors to a large extent); hence the effects of relative market size and direction of change 
are the critical factors determining the extent of the modal shift. Additionally, it is 
apparent that modal choice availability (the extent to which alternative modes are easily 
available for a user) impacts the extent of the modal transfer. 
Long distance CPEs were used from Dargay (2010) and short distance from Balcombe et 
al. (2004) as the CPEs calculated and measured in this work were not robust enough to 
use with a certain level of confidence, given the high degree of granularity of various 
modal alternatives analysed and hence the small sample population for specific modal 
shifts (e.g. car to rail/metro, car to air, car to walking, car to local bus etc.).  
 10.1.5  Empirical surveys 
Three surveys undertaken for this thesis helped to capture the views of leisure and 
business user groups respectively. A third survey revealed views of experts on travellers’ 
attitudes and perceptions to risk, to augment the user surveys. 
The outcomes revealed the following: 
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 There is a difference between those selecting accident risk as opposed to personal 
safety as a priority in the snowball survey (59%) compared to the consumerdata 
survey (48%) combined with respondents in the snowball survey perceiving air 
risk to be greater (17%) than those in the consumer data survey (10.8%). This 
could be attributable to journey purpose. Those in the snowball survey used 
different modes for the main leg (car, rail, air) while in the consumerdata survey 
most journeys were for leisure travel and the main part of the journey was 
completed by air which respondents regarded as a safe mode. The fact that 
personal safety was not highly ranked in both user surveys (as commented by 
respondents for travel in Europe) suggests that it is intrinsically provided for by 
modes (implicit rather than explicit) compared to other factors ranked as higher 
priorities. In line with responses from the expert survey, respondents from the user 
surveys also confirmed that individual safety is influenced by geography when 
travelling outside Europe. 
 Both consumerdata (34%) and snowball (77%) survey respondents’ willingness 
to switch to alternative modes provided a good indication of modal substitutability 
and insights into the specific modes that would be considered. The willingness to 
switch was considerably lower in the consumerdata survey indicating perhaps a 
lack of alternative options. For long distance air routes there are indeed limited 
alternatives.  
 The expert survey provided insights into perceptions of public behaviour on 
factors influencing modal choice and travel behaviour, from the observations of 
experts working in the modal sectors. This survey also helped in understanding 
how modal shift can be encouraged and also factors that could limit a shift. 
 The qualitative interviews are valuable for this thesis because they provide a more 
complete understanding of the decision processes behind modal choices. They 
also provide further explanation as to why, even if modal transfer is incentivised, 
its potential may not be realised due to other factors which may outweigh the 
incentive (such as availability of options, accessibility and unreliability). 
 10.1.6  CBA calculations 
These calculations thus tested the concept of promoting CMS and helped to draw together 
the analytical elements of the thesis towards a conclusion. They illustrate the effects of 
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CMS for selected urban to long distance journeys of different distances. The detailed 
findings are provided in Chapter 9. 
It is evident from all three scenarios, although the findings are positive in terms of 
absolute safety benefits, that there are only marginal monetary safety benefits in each. 
This is possibly due to improvements in vehicle safety and road infrastructure and low 
CPE values reducing the modal transfer.  
For the Glasgow to London scenario, safety gains are marginal compared to the travel 
time saving benefits. Decision making over any pricing intervention for this case would 
therefore have to be based on economic/equity issues relating to travel time savings with 
safety improvements as a by-product. 
While the associated safety benefits are not dramatic, it might be a better proposition to 
encourage modal transfer at existing risk rates rather than investing in very high cost 
technology to reduce already low risk rates for marginal safety improvements. An 
example includes the introduction of an ATP system for rail.  
In all cases the importance of the modal share, direction of the change, the level of 
subsidy and CPEs are critical in determining the impact of the modal switch. The higher 
the CPE and modal share of the current mode, the larger the modal transfer potential to 
another mode with lower market share (e.g. car and rail on suburban commute).  
The results suggest that further research needs to be undertaken particularly in instances 
where risk rates and CPE values are high. A greater number of composite journeys and 
more detailed assessments of the overall benefits and costs would be needed to establish 
the specifics of modal switching policy measures. 
 10.1.7  Alternative interpretation of scenario findings 
Another way to view the net benefit calculations might be to consider the net cost of the 
policy measure to be the subsidy minus the consumer surplus gains to existing users, since 
the latter are a kind of transfer that almost cancels out with the subsidy (Table 10-1). The 
net cost can then be related to the net safety benefit achieved, i.e. excluding from the 
benefit side the transfer payment benefit represented by lower fares for all existing users. 













    
Net Benefits excluding other economic 
benefits (£)  
[A] 
219,431 1,223 440,528 
Net cost (£)  
[B] 
140,940 326 348,080 
Net BCR excl. other economic benefits 
[ (A+B)/B ] 
2.56 4.75 2.27 
Other economic benefits (£)  
[C] 
507,531 68 128,080 
Net BCR incl. other economic benefits 
[ (A+B+C)/B ] 
6.16 4.96 2.63 
Table 10-1: Summary of findings from net benefit/net cost calculations 
The main benefit (consumer surplus to existing rail users) should be a mirror image of 
that part of the subsidy which represents a simple transfer to the existing rail users. 
Cancelling these gains, both on the cost and the benefit side, the resulting net BCRs range 
from 2.27 (Birmingham to London) to 4.75 (Kingston to Guildford). These BCR values 
include benefits and costs of subsidy to those people switching from car to rail; and the 
benefits to new rail users attracted by the now lower price. 
Additionally, if other economic benefits are included then the case for modal shift is 
further strengthened with BCRs varying from 6.16 (Glasgow to London) to 2.63 
(Birmingham to London). The large BCR of 6.16 for the Glasgow to London scenario 
can be attributed to the sizeable time savings that are assumed to be gained from using 
rail. 
 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The study has evaluated how to enhance safety through CMS and was conducted through 
use of primary and secondary data, information sources and surveys. As a direct 
consequence of this methodology, the study encountered a number of problems which 
need to be considered along with their implications for the thesis.  
 10.2.1  Fares data limitations 
Initially three approaches were considered to be suitable to measure the level of 
substitutability between the different modes: 
1. Calculation of CPEs of demand in transport using primary fares data collated with 
associated load factors or ridership; 
2. Calculation of CPEs through the results from the user surveys; 
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3. Through existing published data on CPEs. 
Fares were collated for 16 months in order to calculate actual CPEs for specific journeys 
over a given time frame. However, data on passenger volumes were not available for 
commercial confidentiality reasons. From the user travel surveys conducted it was 
possible to infer arc CPE of modes, although the sample was not robust enough to use in 
net benefit calculations. 
The lack of suitable/adequate data collated or accessed has meant that the results cannot 
be used to contribute to other work in the field or be considered with a high level of 
confidence. It suggests that further research would be required to derive more 
measurements that can be used in the net benefit calculations rather than relying on 
existing published studies. 
 10.2.2  Questionnaire survey limitations 
There were some limitations and constraints in the surveys process. Firstly there was a 
lack of random sampling as the questionnaires were conducted using online and electronic 
surveys, meaning that some of the results can have some bias in terms of the sample 
respondents for both surveys.  
Secondly, direct face to face interviews were not possible due to reluctance of operators 
to allow access to travellers, especially at airports. This was mainly because of security 
concerns. SNCF initially agreed in principle to questionnaires being distributed on the 
Paris-Frankfurt and Paris-London routes, but in practice stalled and failed to respond. 
This meant that in the end no permission was given. Direct face to face interviews would 
have provided this work with more valuable insights from travellers, removed sample 
bias and potentially provided a larger sample of respondents than online/electronic 
surveys. 
The consumerdata survey was mainly based on leisure travellers from the UK to other 
countries; this meant that the main mode alternatives for many of these travellers were 
very limited. This could have affected the sample of respondents citing alternatives, which 
will have impacted the CPE calculations and hence the granularity of the results.  
Finally, it was not possible to obtain any socio-demographic data from the consumerdata 
sample. That could have enabled more detailed analysis such as age specific risks. 
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 10.2.3  CBA calculations 
Rail passenger volume data was requested from ATOC for specific routes but was not 
forthcoming due to commercial sensitivity concerns. Notwithstanding the limitations in 
data availability, an indicative cost-benefit analysis was carried out and it was noted that 
the results were quite sensitive to the precise methodological assumptions made in respect 
of consumer surplus. Nonetheless, since the benefits (although marginal) outweigh the 
costs in modal switching in both of the suggested approaches to treatment of consumer 
surplus, it can be said that CMS for purposes of safety improvement yields positive net 
benefit (potential Pareto improvement). Therefore, it may be used explicitly or implicitly 
as an instrument of transport safety policy. Further analysis of a wider range of journey 
net benefits calculations is necessary to suggest this as a viable option that can be 
implemented practically.  
 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Positive net benefit outcomes for the specific routes suggest that the CMS approach is 
potentially of value in specific cases, although further research and investigation is 
required to substantiate this through net benefit calculation for large quantity of different 
journeys. This would be necessary as policies are implemented on a regional or national 
scale. From a policy perspective, safety promotion using CMS might be a more cost-
effective proposition than larger infrastructure investments that only yield marginal safety 
improvements, particularly in existing low risk modes. For example in the case of 
diverting road travel to rail, significant reductions in environmental pollution occur, 
especially where the railways in question are electrified. This suggests that safety benefits 
should be considered as part of a wider multi-objective policy approach (also suggested 
by Litman (2014)) to promote modal transfer and investment in public infrastructure 
simultaneously. 
The CBA net benefit calculations can also potentially provide a basis for prioritising the 
allocation of resources to the promotion of CMS by identifying the more promising 
routes, e.g. long distance or short commuter journeys.  From the scenarios reviewed this 
prioritising cannot be undertaken since all BCRs calculated are similar. It was observed 
however that this was less the case when using the alternative BCR calculation based on 
net benefits/costs. As a result the method would not be as limited with regard to route 
prioritisation if the alternative BCR calculation was used. 
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It is also important to note that this work has been undertaken during a period where there 
has been a significant attempt to promote modal change in urban travel, notably towards 
cycling and walking. The effects of this shift need to be monitored from a safety 
perspective because in some respects the overall benefits of this shift in terms of reduced 
congestion, environmental improvements and health benefits do not always align with the 
safety perspective. 
 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 10.4.1  General 
Since the subject of CMS is wide ranging and sensitive to CPE levels, further research 
work could be conducted on the extent of travellers’ willingness to use alternate modes, 
i.e. diversion factors, and the research could be extended to include specific socio-
demographic groups. This should be undertaken through direct face to face interviews in 
specific regions where alternative modes are available. The practical difficulty with this 
is obtaining the necessary permission from the relevant authorities to conduct such 
interviews at major transport hubs, at a time when security is a major concern. 
More primary research is also needed to confirm the substitutability preferences, 
particularly in support of targeted journeys or regions, using the stated preference method. 
This would provide a more reliable understanding of consumer preferences and CPE 
estimates, allowing full optimisation of the target subsidies. The work undertaken could 
also be applied in developing countries to compare differences in attitudes to safety, 
modal switching and travel preferences since the benefits of modal switching may be 
greater in these regions. 
 10.4.2  Specific research 
Specific topics for additional research are proposed as follows: 
 Extend the research to age-specific accident risks could be considered, 
highlighting higher risks: for example older/younger populations on certain 
modes.  




 Investigate the impact of new transport technologies and infrastructure and its 
implications for modal transfer on safety grounds. 
 Investigate the national or regional impact of policy measures, aggregating the 
outcomes of groups of journey-specific modal transfers from high risk to low risk 
modes in the UK. This would mean expanding the net benefit assessment 
approach used in this thesis to cover a wider set of regional transfers, rather than 
mainly the point to point examples assessed here. 
 Analyse journeys/regions where CMS is promoted for reasons other than safety, 
and evaluate the safety impact in such cases. For example the move to walking 
and cycling from other road transport modes could be considered. 
 Identify and investigate the effect on safety of modal transfer from high risk 
modes in developing countries or regions. One example could be transfers from 
car to air in India for specific longer distance routes. This would need to consider 
issues of capacity and affordability to a greater extent than the work conducted 
here in the UK and Europe. 
 CONCLUSION 
This thesis shows that there is a marginal justification for CMS as a tool within an overall 
integrated transport policy that considers safety in all modes simultaneously. This must 
recognise that the absolute safety benefits are not very large relative to other benefits, 
although the relative size depends on the manner in which changes of consumer surplus 
are treated in the CBA. Safety promotion through CMS can be demonstrated to be cost 
effective in low risk modes, relative to larger infrastructure investments that may only 
yield marginal safety improvements. In evaluating safety policy in this manner using 
CMS, policy could be targeted towards specific regions or journeys, both in developed 
and developing nations, where the largest safety gains can be attained with minimum 
expenditure. In developing countries the safety gains in non-monetised terms may yield 
larger potential benefits from modal diversion than in Great Britain. The issue here may 
be monetised values for life in such countries, if these are related to real incomes and thus 
relatively low. Further research, using a larger sample of journey net benefit calculations, 
is thus required to validate the case robustly for CMS. This would identify beneficial 
opportunities for modal switching and specify certain routes and target modes.  
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